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Summary 
 
It is often thought that a state dependent on debt is in a vulnerable position. But 
Britain has long been such a ‘debt state’. Since the seventeenth century Financial 
Revolution and the foundation of the Bank of England, the state has amassed 
levels of debt it could never realistically repay. Far from a burden, the ability to 
issue its debt as a form of money has been the basis of great power. It provided the 
state a readily accessible pool of financing and established a monetary 
infrastructure through which it could govern the broader economy. For that reason, 
this thesis claims that the British state has never been a passive recipient of 
creditor agendas when it raised public finance. This provides a different perspective 
on the development of monetary governance in postwar Britain and in particular the 
period of transition from Keynesian to neoliberal techniques of governance in the 
1970s and 1980s. This is a time often discussed in terms of the British state ceding 
power to financial markets as it strived for the ‘credibility’ necessary to support its 
growing public debt. Instead, this thesis shows how the imposition of monetary 
targets and neoliberal financial reform were attempts by the state to enhance its 
capacity to manage liquidity across the British economy. While debt is often 
assumed to be a problem for the state, this thesis instead shows how debt is a form 
of state power.  
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 Introduction 
Two weeks after the British public voted to leave the European Union, the Bank of 
England sold £2.25 billion of long-term public debt at a record low yield of 0.91 per 
cent. Its issue was significantly oversubscribed (Moore, 2016). The broader British 
economy was still reeling from the outcome of the referendum vote. Sterling had 
collapsed, the FTSE 250 was down but British public debt remained hot property 
(Hunter and Toplensky, 2016). 
That the government was still able to borrow so cheaply during a time of 
upheaval, and in a country whose economic fundamentals were so weak1, presents 
something of a puzzle. Common sense would imply that a nation’s ability to borrow 
from credit markets would depend on its future growth prospects, the robustness of 
its public finances and the stability of its political system. A government that racks 
up vast debts would surely test the limits of investors’ patience. The more debts 
mount, the more dependent it becomes on creditor support. There must, in that 
sense, be a limit to the amount of debt a nation can raise. 
Yet Britain’s historical experience contradicts this common sense. The 
British state has long been heavily indebted. Since the Financial Revolution in the 
seventeenth century, which saw the establishment of banknotes and then the Bank 
of England, the British state has amassed levels of public debt well beyond what it 
could ever realistically repay. This was not a weakness, but a source of enormous 
strength. Because through the Financial Revolution, debt issued as banknotes 
acquired the capacity to serve as money. This transformed the politics of debt 
because, for as long as debt circulated as money, it did not need to be repaid. 
By appropriating the development of banknotes to make public debt 
circulate as money, the state revolutionised the question of public finance. Simply, if 
a state could print its own money, what limits did it face? Indeed, the power this 
provided the British state historically is well recognised. Debt financed Britain’s 
imperial dominance (Brewer, 1990) and debt was foundational to Britain’s twentieth 
century welfare state (Norfield, 2016).  
                                                      
1 In aggregate terms Britain had a large public debt, large trade deficit, a significant 
budget deficit, slow growth, and low productivity (Cadman et al., 2016).  
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Given this history, it is striking that increasing public debt is now cast as a 
problem for the state. Many commentators like Wolfgang Streeck (2014a) now 
depict public debt as a burden on the state that becomes harder and harder to bear 
as debts mount. This idea is central to the way in which the transition to 
neoliberalism in Britain is understood. The key moment in that transition to 
neoliberalism is often thought to be the 1970s crisis of high inflation, high interest 
rates and slow growth, which was supposedly resolved through the steps Margaret 
Thatcher’s government took to impose ‘monetary discipline’. These policies 
included the establishment of monetary targets, a regressive reordering of the tax 
regime, and the selling off of public assets to the private sector (Prasad, 2006), 
which many have argued were the necessary cost of securing ‘credibility’ in the 
eyes of international investors (for example Brooke et al., 2005).  
Progressive voices counter that securing monetary discipline in this way 
meant sacrificing part of the state’s economic power at the altar of financial 
markets. The need for governments to be ‘credible’ in the eyes of their lenders 
meant the state pursuing only the sort of policies that creditors desired. Streeck 
(2011, p. 27) encapsulates this view in his suggestion that the state’s dependence 
on external finance allowed ‘market justice’ to triumph over ‘social justice’.  
The seeming paradox of the idea that raising vast debts was a source of 
power for the state in the past, but is now a major vulnerability stems from the way 
in which the monetary aspect of debt is often neglected in contemporary 
commentary. This is especially important because the ability of the state to issue its 
debt as money not only provided a readily accessible source of finance, but it also 
established an infrastructure through which the broader economy could be 
governed. For that reason, public debt was a very productive form of 
empowerment. 
The deep connection between money and debt is well known. Indeed even 
the Bank of England now insists that money is created as a form of debt (McLeay et 
al., 2014). Yet while many recognise that money is debt, the flip side, of how debt is 
money, has proved much harder to acknowledge. And by turning away from the 
moneyness of debt, many lose sight of the power of the state in monetary 
governance. Instead, the question of public finance becomes necessarily one about 
the steps a state must take to attract creditor finance. It is why the idea of 
‘credibility’ is so readily used to explain developments in monetary governance. In 
contrast to the complexity of monetary relations, the idea of ‘credibility’ makes the 
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politics of public finance all about the perspective of creditors. To raise money, a 
state must simply do what credit markets desire. 
As such, these accounts make it appear as if the effort to secure financial 
market credibility has often come at the expense of the power of the state. Though 
clear that the state has not retreated under neoliberalism, the seeming juxtaposition 
of state power with financial market credibility, makes it particularly difficult to 
account precisely for what role the state played in the construction of neoliberal 
financial governance. It is why techniques associated with neoliberal financial 
governance, from monetary targets to later central bank independence, are cast as 
strategies of ‘depoliticisation’ (for example Burnham, 2007).  
As a result, despite the awareness that the state’s power has only grown 
under neoliberalism, the state is often made to appear as an enforcer, something 
instrumentalised by creditors for their own desires. The state is designated, as 
such, a peculiar kind of agency, developing policies like monetary targets in order 
to curtail the scope of its own actions. As such, writers like Streeck (2011; 2014b) 
end up in a contorted position where the capacity of the British state to raise vast 
sums of debt is treated as a sign of its weakness, rather than a source of strength.  
In response to such thinking, the central claim of this thesis in response is 
that the state has never been a passive recipient of creditor agendas when it has 
raised public debt. As a result, the imposition of monetary targets and financial 
sector regulatory change through the 1970s and 1980s cannot be thought of as 
episodes of creditor power. Rather, to recapture the politics of public finance in 
Britain, it is necessary to keep the moneyness of debt at the front and centre of the 
analysis. This means assessing how the monetary aspect of public debt was 
institutionalised into the British political economy.  
Doing so allows for a recasting of the political trajectory of postwar Britain. 
While the moneyness of debt first provided a foundation for Keynesian governance 
by allowing for a great expansion in public debt, by the 1970s it began to pose a 
problem as private money debt rapidly expanded. The neoliberal reforms to 
monetary governance that unfolded in response were aimed not at breaking with 
the past, but at developing the state’s capacity to continue monetising its debts 
through the establishment of neoliberal techniques of financial governance. The 
fungibility of public debt, the fact it circulates so readily, and was so rarely called in 
for redemption, meant that the solvency of the state was not a direct problem 
confronting postwar policymakers in Britain. Consequently, the monetary order that 
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was constructed in the 1970s and 1980s was never one dictated solely by creditors, 
but was also driven by the state’s need to build the public debt and manage its 
liquidity. 
Synopsis 
The first chapter reviews the literature on public finance and the state in order to 
establish the research problem underpinning the thesis. My argument centres on 
the way in which the Financial Revolution, the development of banknotes, and the 
explosion of debt that followed set British public finance on a unique trajectory; one 
that demanded a paradigmatic shift in the way the questions of debt, money and 
the state were conceptualised. The state’s ability to monetise its debts2 meant it 
constantly confounded the limits its indebtedness was supposed to have 
established. I show how commentators through history have been unable to fully 
come to terms with the monetary aspects of the Financial Revolution, and instead 
have repeatedly been forced to adjust what they understood to be the nature of the 
debt problem. I bring this historical perspective to bear on the contemporary 
literature on neoliberal financial governance in Britain. I argue that by sidelining the 
moneyness of debt, and the monetary infrastructure that is established through it, 
existing accounts overlook the interest of the state and its role in the construction of 
neoliberal financial governance. Instead, posed from the perspective of creditors, 
financial governance is depicted as driven by the need to impress financial markets. 
I challenge this by showing how, when recast in light of the moneyness of public 
debt, the power of the state in neoliberal monetary governance remains crucial. 
The second chapter tracks the development of British public debt to show 
how and in what ways it acquired monetary features. I show how Britain has been a 
‘debt state’ since the Financial Revolution three hundred years ago. When debt can 
serve as money, its dynamics are transformed. The question of repayment, and the 
leverage this provides creditors, begins to fade, and a monetary infrastructure 
begins to form that allows for a rapid expansion in the level of debt. The 
development of banknote issuing and the establishment of the Bank of England put 
the English state in a unique position where it was able to issue its own debt as 
money. I track the gradual institutionalisation of this development and the way it 
                                                      
2 In a broad sense of debts acting as a form of money, rather than the narrow meaning 
of central bank purchases of government debt securities.  
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shaped financial governance in Britain. The central position of public debt as a 
means of payment (money) provided the state with new avenues for economic 
intervention. This came from the way in which the Bank of England established 
itself as the sole provider of cash by the middle of the eighteenth century. As the 
dominant supplier of money, the Bank of England set the terms by which this 
liquidity was made available to an economy that was becoming ever more 
integrated through banking networks across the country by the start of the 
nineteenth century. When public debt was rapidly expanded to finance the two 
world wars this dynamic was transformed once more. As Keynes argued the fact 
that public debt was now deeply monetised meant it was now possible, through the 
management of public debt, to manipulate the commercial activity of the national 
economy as a whole.  
In the third chapter I show how Keynes’s insight helped British policymakers 
finally come to terms with the monetisation of public debt, paving the way for the 
Keynesian revolution in Britain that was a revolution in monetary governance. By 
showing the productive potential of public debt Keynes transformed the nature of 
the problem of public debt. Debt need not be a drag on the economy in the way the 
classical political economists had insisted. Instead, it was possible for the state to 
stimulate investment in the private sector. Through his conception of the economy 
as a nationally integrated system of monetary flows, Keynes showed how a growing 
public debt would grow the common pool of a nation’s economy as a whole. I argue 
that Keynes’s monetary thought has often been lost in the debate over whether 
Britain ever underwent a ‘Keynesian revolution’ in economic governance. In making 
this point I show how the initial postwar effort at Keynesian governance centred on 
these monetary techniques. For that reason, I argue that the Keynesian revolution 
was more than a simple departure from ‘balanced budgets’. The monetary 
interventions between 1945 and 1951 that followed Keynes’s thinking meant 
flooding the banking system with such a large volume of public debt securities that 
the Bank of England’s monopoly control on the provision of liquidity was rendered 
mute. Without a viable monetary policy, the state had to rely on fiscal budgetary 
governance of the economy instead in the second half of the 1950s and 1960s. The 
fiscal focus that has come to define Keynesianism is, as such, a post-hoc reflection 
of the failures of the monetary interventions made in his image.  
I explore in the fourth chapter how this paradigm was challenged by the 
rapid growth of the financial sector. This was because of the way the private banks 
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developed ways to monetise their debts. Towards the end of the 1960s and the 
early 1970s, interbank debt became deeply institutionalised as a means of payment 
within the banking system. This allowed private banks to rapidly expand their 
lending. It was a dynamic that undermined many of the previously dominant 
banking institutions in Britain. The clearing banks who were the highstreet names 
that had dominated British banking since the mid nineteenth century suddenly 
found their place threatened by new ‘secondary banks’ who operated in ‘parallel’ to 
the traditional clearing bank network. These banks were able to rapidly raise 
liquidity by issuing short-term liabilities to one another and did not need to draw 
from the Bank of England or customer deposits in order to make loans. This ‘credit 
revolution’ undermined the mechanisms the state had developed to manage 
liquidity. Simply, through the credit revolution the state’s debt became a less 
important form of money than those of private sector banks. By the early 1970s this 
necessitated a shift in the way the state managed money. This shift is now often 
cast as an abdication of the state’s responsibility as monetary management moved 
to a regime of market-led governance instead.  
A response to the credit revolution was a series of repeated attempts to rein-
in credit creation. Though Keynes had established that there existed no fiscal limit 
on the potential capacity to raise public debt, critics argued that growing public debt 
underpinned excessive levels of credit creation and caused inflation as a result. 
Fixing inflation required policymakers to set targets for the levels of money in the 
economy. As I argue in the fifth chapter, by the mid 1970s this argument came to 
be known as ‘monetarism’ and entailed the public authorities announcing targets for 
the levels of monetary growth. The move to monetary targeting is now often 
described as a depoliticisation of monetary governance. Yet when cast in terms of 
the moneyness of public debt, the evolution of monetary targets in Britain takes on 
a different light. The discretionary power the state had established through the 
gradual monetisation of public debt over the previous centuries was not simply 
dismantled and boxed away. Rather, the mode of control shifted, and the capacity 
for the state to use monetised public debt for the purpose of economic governance 
transformed. Whatever the rhetoric, monetarism and the idea of market-regulated 
credit only ever figured as an aspiration. As I show, by using targets the monetary 
authorities were hoping to find a way of responding to the credit revolution. I argue 
the period is best understood as an attempt to build the capacity for interest rate 
control of the broader economy.  
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The sixth chapter recasts the neoliberal financial regulatory reform of the 
1980s. Often these reforms are depicted as part of the effort to restore ‘monetary 
discipline’ to Britain and dampen the political role of the state in monetary matters. 
Instead, I show how the period is better understood in terms of the way it allowed 
the British state to increase its debts and improve its capacity to govern the 
economy through active monetary policy. I argue that by the end of the 1970s the 
state faced two primary problems with regard to monetary governance. First was 
the fact that public debt securities had become a less significant form of money 
than private debt securities since the credit revolution. Second was the fact that the 
period of monetary targeting had undermined the stable way in which it sold public 
debt. The financial reforms undertaken in the 1980s helped to resolve these two 
issues. First, the Monetary Control Act of 1980 reformed the way the Bank Rate 
was set. Rather than the discount window, rates were set instead through the Bank 
of England’s open market operations in the bill market. This provided greater 
flexibility for the Bank Rate and helped it adjust more swiftly in line with broader 
money markets. Next, the Financial Services Act of 1986, better known as the ‘Big 
Bang’, opened up the London Stock Exchange, where gilts were sold, to 
international financial houses which had much larger capitalisations and were able 
to absorb much bigger gilt issues and sell them to a broader, international customer 
base. This ended up greatly expanding the size and liquidity of the gilt market, and 
separated the issue of debt management from monetary policy.   
The conclusion discusses how the contemporary place of monetary policy 
as the primary post-crisis solution, and the ability of the state to issue and purchase 
vast quantities of its own debt, demand reflection on how public debt securities 
have become the primary vehicle of global liquidity in the contemporary global 
political economy. 
In sum this thesis makes three contributions. The first is historical: I 
demonstrate how the British monetary authorities developed the means to grow 
and service public debt and the way in which public debt securities were used to 
govern the economy in the four decades after the second world war. Specifically, I 
show that the 1986 deregulation of the London Stock Exchange help expand the 
market for British government debt and improve the liquidity of British government 
debt. The second is conceptual: by holding the moneyness of public debt in the 
foreground of my analysis, I overturn the common assumption that debt is 
constraining by demonstrating how debt has empowered the British state. From this 
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base I rethink the implications of public debt for our understanding of the transition 
to neoliberalism. More often than not, neoliberalism appears as a resolution to an 
over-leveraged state, and driven by the imperatives set by creditors. But when the 
moneyness of debt is considered, it is possible to see the transition to neoliberalism 
as a state-led evolution of the monetary infrastructure that had been deeply 
embedded into the workings of the British political economy. In building the project I 
make a third, methodological, contribution: I develop an approach able to explore 
the moneyness of debt. This means examining the process by which debt acquires 
the capacity to circulate in the economy and serve as money, and also the process 
by which money empowers the state by providing an infrastructure through which to 
manipulate the broader economy. Doing so allows for a study of debt comfortable 
with the idea that in a political economy near defined by its utter abundance, the 
potential scarcity of debt is not a secure enough anchor on which to conduct an 
inquiry. Ultimately, I build the tools for considering the way in which public debt can 
be a basis of state power. 
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1. The paradox of the neoliberal 
debt state 
Introduction 
The state of the public finances is central to the way neoliberal governments 
present their reforms. In recent years, British politics has been near defined by the 
Conservative government’s insistence about the ‘need to pay down the debt’ (for 
example Osborne in Chan, 2015). This, though, did not stop them from undertaking 
policies that in fact led to an increase in both the budget deficit and the national 
debt (Treanor and Allen, 2016). The fact that, more often than not, periods of so-
called neoliberal retrenchment coincide with an increase in debt - both public 
(Simon Rogers, 2013) and private (Montgomerie, 2015) - prompts many to suggest 
their claims are cover for something else, with critical voices dismissing anxiety 
over public finances as an ‘ideological front’ for regressive regimes (for example 
Krugman, 2015). Recently, however, there has been growing academic attention on 
the question of the politics of public debt, with critical literature (for example 
Streeck, 2014; Hager, 2016; Bear, 2015) arguing that a state’s dependence on debt 
raised from private sector financial markets is a key feature of neoliberal politics. 
The recognition that debts have only grown under austerity throws up an 
apparent contradiction: neoliberal governments cut public spending to increase 
their capacity to borrow more. If governments are being forced by credit markets to 
restructure their political economies with public sector cuts, then why don’t those 
same creditors mind when spending does not fall, as was the case during Margaret 
Thatcher’s government of the 1980s (Eaton, 2013) and the Conservative regime of 
today (Katie Allen, 2015)?  
In that sense it is not simply the aggregate level of public debt that matters. 
Rather how public debt is being used is significant too. The literature on debt has 
recognised this but pushes the idea that debt-dependence suits a particular political 
agenda, those of creditors. To make this claim there is often a unspecific notion of 
who these creditors are and what their interest might be but neoliberal reform is 
presented as establishing the political conditions for borrowing to continue securely 
(Streeck, 2014a; Blyth, 2013; Lazzarato, 2012). This has been taken to mean 
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reorganising government action in the economy to broadly favour the interests of 
creditors (Streeck, 2014) by cutting areas of spending that credit markets deem 
unimportant and developing rules that limit the government’s policymaking options 
(Burnham, 2011). By this reasoning, when governments simultaneously cut both 
welfare spending and taxes at the top of the wealth bracket (where creditors tend to 
reside (Hager, 2016)), they demonstrate to credit markets their ‘commitment’ to the 
kind of programmes that will see them reducing their future borrowing 
requirements. This argument explains why fiscal ‘credibility’ can be such a 
ubiquitous idea in understanding the actions of neoliberal governments (for 
example Clift and Tomlinson, 2008; Gill, 1998; Hay, 2004). George Osborne, for 
instance, often explained how, despite slow growth, repeated deficits and mounting 
debt, his macroeconomic reforms helped ensure Britain remained a credible “safe 
haven” in the eyes of creditors (BBC News, 2011).  
Used this way the idea of credibility is the solution to the paradox of the debt 
state and is the implicit notion that connects debt to neoliberalism in the literature. 
When mobilised in this way the necessity to remain ‘credible’ in the eyes of credit 
markets always appears as a limit on the state. Governments cannot do anything 
they want and cannot borrow indefinitely because they must remain ‘credible’ in the 
eyes of wealthy, private sector creditors (Hager, 2016). Credit markets come to be 
cast as the ultimate sovereign, checking the arbitrary power of governments. Or, as 
James Carville, Bill Clinton’s campaign manager, put it in one of the pithier 
articulations of the frustrations of the debt state: “I used to think if there was 
reincarnation, I wanted to come back as the president or the pope or a .400 
baseball hitter. But now I want to come back as the bond market. You can 
intimidate everybody” (in Mcardle, 2011).  
In this respect, the transformation of economic policymaking in Britain 
through the 1970s and 1980s has often been seen as an iconic case study of 
neoliberal transformation (Harvey, 2007; Peck and Tickell, 2007; 
Fourcade‐ Gourinchas and Babb, 2002). In the eyes of many writers (for example 
Kerr, 2001; Green, 2013; Seymour, 2016) the purpose of the last years of the 
Callaghan government, and then especially the Thatcher regime, was to restore 
Britain’s credibility in the eyes of international credit markets. This happened 
through an assault on (some forms of) public spending, public industries, and 
workers’ wages. Champions of the neoliberal transformation (for example Minford, 
2015; Brittan, 1988; Crafts, 2012) see this period as a necessary disciplining of the 
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country’s economy by the forces of the market. Critics see the economic folly and 
social upheaval that followed and bemoan how market rule muscled over a more 
democratic order (Streeck, 2014; Blyth, 2013). But when examined against the 
history of the British state, the notion that the need to ensure credibility in the eyes 
of creditors checks the discretionary power of the state and its fiscal outgoings runs 
up against significant factual problems. The historical work of John Brewer (1990) 
and Samuel Knafo (2013) have shown that the longer history of the British state 
and central banking is defined by its ability to empower itself through borrowing. It 
was its vast national debt that built its colonial capacity (Brewer 1990), its success 
in the first world war (Braudel, 1982), and the construction of the postwar welfare 
state (Norfield, 2016). 
Crucially, this capacity came from the way public debt has been used as a 
form of money in Britain. Ever since the seventeenth century Financial Revolution 
the ability of the state to monetise its debts has granted it enormous flexibility in the 
scope of raising debt finance and opened up avenues to use public debt securities 
not just for raising spendable funds, but as a much broader basis for widespread 
economic governance. This monetary aspect of public debt has political dynamics 
that are hard to pin down. But it helps to recontextualise more recent developments 
in monetary governance. For example, the monetary aspects of public finance 
helps one to understand how, during Thatcher’s time of painful ‘monetary 
discipline’, the state found a way to vastly expand the size of the market for its 
public debt (Bank of England, 1989), even when that meant overcoming the 
resistance of the financial houses that had brokered the sale of public debt for 
years (Moran, 1990). Similarly, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, 
ostensibly neoliberal governments harnessed the monetary aspects of public debt 
when central banks bought back their own public debt issues through the so-called 
‘quantitative easing’ (‘QE’) programme. Indeed, the Bank of England handed the 
£34.7 billion in interest payments it received on gilt repurchases back to the 
Treasury, reducing the overall size of the government’s budget deficit (Bank of 
England, 2016). The QE process actually resembled the monetary policy of the 
second world war and the period that followed (Allen, 2014). Back then such ‘cheap 
money’ was considered archetypical of a Keynesian interventionist state. Now QE 
is deemed neoliberal (for example Green and Lavery, 2015). Yet the fact that the 
British indebted state has the capacity to undertake such policies challenges the 
notion that its dependence on debt narrowed its room for manoeuvre and led to a 
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political economy scripted by, and for, a creditor class. In that sense, the monetary 
aspect of British public debt has constantly provided a basis for the state to 
empower itself through its operations in public finance.  
In this chapter I establish how the moneyness of public debt provides a 
foundation to reconsider the transition to neoliberal financial governance in Britain. 
The chapter is divided into three sections.  
The first outlines how the conception of public debt has evolved over time. I 
focus on how the Financial Revolution, which provided the English state a unique 
capacity to finance itself through issuing banknotes, transformed the analysis of 
debt that had previously prevailed. Given the significance of the revolution it is no 
coincidence that classical political economists emerged in Britain challenging 
previous ideas about debt and establishing foundational assumptions about the 
state’s limited ability to build up debts indefinitely, and how as a result, increasing 
public debt will eventually produce a public crisis. The classical assumptions, 
however, were confounded by the gradual institutionalisation of public debt into the 
broader economy, which saw public debt acquire monetary features. The more the 
state was able to monetise its debt, the more distant the ‘limit’ became and the 
more management of the public debt could be used for centralised governance of 
the economy as a whole. In that way public borrowing helped build the capacity for 
interventions by state officials and thereby a degree of autonomy from credit market 
actors. As such the state as a borrower found ways to ‘buy time’ and ‘tame’ its 
indebtedness. Despite this, the monetary features of public debt have yet to impact 
upon the way debt is conceptualised in the literature.  
As a result, as I show in the second section, when debt is mobilised as part 
of the explanation of the shift to neoliberal governance in contemporary literature, 
public policy is cast in terms of the need for governments to be credible in the eyes 
of investors, which gives the sense of neoliberal policy as something designed for 
the appeasement of creditors. As a result, it becomes very difficult to conceptualise 
the discretionary power of states in constructing the neoliberal order. If, however, 
the monetary dynamics of public debt are considered, ceaselessly growing debt 
becomes more understandable, granting space for rethinking the primary problems 
driving neoliberal financial reforms in Britain.  
The third section then examines what it means to analyse the transition to 
neoliberalism in Britain when we keep the moneyness of public debt at the centre of 
the analysis. It argues that we cannot grasp the debt politics of the transition to 
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neoliberalism from the perspective of abstract creditors and whatever we assume to 
be their interests. Rather we should examine how the state’s effort to raise debt 
helps to forge a particular kind of state power that can later be mobilised for the 
purpose of policymaking. This is what happened through the development of 
central bank money (Knafo, 2013) and the Keynesian apparatus after the second 
world war (Tily, 2010). This will allow to me to argue later in the thesis that this took 
place again during Thatcher’s time through the way the ‘Big Bang’ helped to greatly 
expand the market for public debt. 
1.1 The classical roots of the dangers of debt 
The Financial Revolution in England transformed the state of English public finance 
and the way debt was understood. It provided the English state a unique capacity to 
finance itself on the basis of banknotes, greatly increasing the size of its debt and 
the scope of debt financing. Soon after the revolution, the scale of the public debt 
jumped well past the level at which full repayment could ever realistically be 
expected (Dome, 2004; Brewer, 1990).  
Up until then, discussion about debt was articulated not in the quasi-
scientific language of political economy but in more explicitly moral concerns over 
usury and money lending and was, as such, something regulated by appeals to 
religious, ethical and moral systems (Dodd, 2014). The problem of usurious debt 
was that it was an unfair exchange, violating principles of reciprocity that had 
underlined commercial-like exchange (Graeber, 2013). There were, as such, deep 
suspicions about usurers, and the wealth they acquired “without the production or 
physical transformation of tangible goods” (Le Goff, 1990, p. 18). Rather than 
facilitate productive investment, the usurer leant for consumption and often to 
desperate people. Usurers lacked any particular social clout and were kept on the 
margins of commercial activity with their kind of interest-based lending officially 
restricted in England, and banned by Parliament in 1552 on the basis that it was a 
practice that opposed the word of God (Knafo, 2013). 
These kinds of restrictions on financiers inhibited the development of 
banking in Britain, something that became a problem for both landlords (who 
wanted to develop agricultural industry) and, more pressingly, for the state. It 
lacked a developed financial market to draw from and relied instead on forced loans 
from the English aristocracy, financial support from abroad and manipulation and 
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debasement of currency on a vast scale (Knafo, 2013, p. 77). In that way there 
were clear limits to the state’s ability to finance itself through borrowing. 
The seventeenth century Financial Revolution and the foundation of the 
Bank of England in 1694 changed all that. Through banknote issuing the state was 
always able to increase its debts, without having to debase its stock of coins. The 
Financial Revolution is often discussed as part of the broader Glorious Revolution 
that supposedly established the early liberal state in England. The state’s success 
borrowing vast sums of money was, by this account, a consequence of the 
‘credibility’ the state had acquired in the eyes of investors who were convinced that 
the state’s emerging liberal character would ensure their loan agreements would 
not be violated (Brewer, 1990). Again here is the contradictory notion of the state 
empowered financially through its political disempowerment.  
If, however, the Financial Revolution is cast as a revolutionary innovation in 
money, rather than politics, the implications for public finance look different. Debts 
grew not because lenders had ‘confidence’ in the state, but because of the 
technique developed by the London Goldsmiths to issue discounted banknotes as 
credit. I discuss the discounting revolution in greater depth in the following chapter 
but for now it is worth stressing that when the state appropriated the technique of 
debt discounting through the establishment of the Bank of England, it effectively 
discovered a way to rapidly monetise its debts. Institutions soon developed around 
this monetised debt that helped ramp up the levels of public debt.  
As a result of both monetised state debt, and the increasingly ‘productive’ 
role money lending was playing in the development of agriculture after the early 
enclosures (Wood, 1981), it made less sense to discuss moneylending in the terms 
of usury. To focus on debt as an unequal exchange between two private parties 
seemed less relevant. The emerging public debt was less bound up with 
interpersonal connections or any in particular trade as had been the case 
previously (Dodd, 2014). Moreover the way public debt circulated meant it 
appeared abstracted from any particular social bonds and seemed to belong to the 
economy as a whole (Graeber, 2013). And it was on these grounds that classical 
political economy altered the tenor of the debate on debt. The normative belief that 
large debts were unwelcome did not shift and David Hume was wary of the 
potentially usurious motives that underpinned paper money (Sgambati, 2013, p. 
122). Yet he, and the classical political economists that followed, had to recalibrate 
the problem away from a focus on unequal exchange among individual parties, and 
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onto the more formal worry about the long-term effects public debt had on the 
economy as a whole. Yet the Financial Revolution made this problem incredibly 
difficult to pin down. The longer the state went on successfully ramping up levels of 
public debt, the more difficult it was to clarify where exactly the limit to the process 
lay. The moneyness of public debt made its dynamics slippery. As such from Hume 
to Smith to Ricardo you see repeated efforts to try and adjust the experience of 
ever-rising public debt to the assumption that such developments must surely be 
unsustainable.  
It was with classical political economy that the monetary aspects of public 
debt became sidelined in favour of a reading of debt based upon its 
unsustainability. Hume, for example, had witnessed the English crown finance 
repeated wars through the expansion of paper-issued public debt, something that 
had come on the back of a recent history in which the state had actively 
manipulated its currency to feed its deficit expenditure. He focussed, as a result, on 
restricting the growing power of the “moneyed interest” which he felt was acquiring 
undue political prowess. He saw the growth of public debt as stemming from this 
power and allowing “moneyed interests” to “sink into the lethargy of a stupid and 
pampered luxury” (Hume 1987 [1752]: 357–8, in Dome 2004, p.1), paid for at the 
expense of taxpayers (landlords in particular).  
Hume’s broader critique of mercantilism also implied a different treatment of 
money. While mercantilists chased surpluses of precious metal, seen as valuable 
ends in themselves, Hume argued that such a pursuit was fruitless because a state 
would struggle to sustain the balance of payment surpluses necessary to 
accumulate bullion in the mercantilist way. Rather, international market forces 
would correct the imbalance. Better a country concentrates on growing its 
productive capacity – its real wealth – than acquire stocks of money which could 
only nominally signify wealth. As Sgambati (2013, p. 122-3) puts it:  
“[F]or Hume what is really at work in the creation of value by a nation – in 
the valorisation of its stock – is not the accumulation of bullion per se, 
because here more money would simply imply (ceteris paribus) higher 
prices, but a universal mechanism underpinning its harmonious association 
with other nations: the price-specie-flow mechanism.” 
The price-specie-flow mechanism became the basis of classical reasoning on the 
market management of money. But it always represented more of an aspiration to 
be strived towards, rather than a reality on the ground. Paper money threatened the 
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idealised working of the mechanism because it could be issued without limits. The 
bind Hume was trying to untangle was how to square the monetary dimensions of 
paper debt, with the underlying fiscal order. There appeared a ‘monetary’ versus 
‘real’ split in the workings of the economy once the paper promises of public debt 
issued as notes had been established.  
As such, through his price-specie-flow mechanism Hume helped to establish 
the problem of money as a problem of inflation. If paper money was issued to a 
level that went out of step with the economy’s needs, then inflation will follow. 
Hume’s suspicion was that financiers would partner with the state to over issue 
banknotes. As a result he advocated for a limit on money creation through the use 
of hard currency, coins with intrinsic value that could not be “multiplied without end” 
and “sink to nothing” in the way paper money could (Schabas and Wennerlind, 
2007, p. 109). That would ensure the laws of his mechanism would be obeyed.  
Apparent already in Hume’s sketching out of the price-specie-flow 
mechanism, and his attendant belief in hard currency, is a transformed sense of the 
problem of money and debt. The morally-charged themes of ‘just-price’ and 
usurious, unequal exchange were giving way to what Sgambati (2013, p. 124) 
describes as “a growingly technical debate on monetary theory and policy” about 
matching the correct level of banknotes to the underlying transactions in the real 
economy. The problem was less that vast loans would impose an unequal 
relationship between lender and borrower, and more that growing paper debt 
issues would lead to inflation, and thus needed to be anchored by a hard currency. 
In that sense the foundational classical political economy laid out by Hume 
did not really come to terms with the implications of the moneyness of debt. Hume’s 
fear was that while in the short-term it may be possible to print more debt as 
money, eventually the rules of the price-specie-flow mechanism will kick in, inflation 
will arrive and the economy will suffer. As such Hume focussed on how a liberal 
state could generate sufficient revenue to repay its debts, and avoid an inflationary 
solution to excessive debts (Dome, 2004). Hume never resolved the problem he 
sketched out, and instead could only foresee a “natural death of public credit”, 
through voluntary default, or a deliberate inflating away of the debt by government 
(ibid., p.204), either of which would destroy the basis of further public credit.  
What is clear from Hume is the scale of the challenge of the Financial 
Revolution. Put simply, how was it possible to conceive of limits on the economic 
capacity of the state when it suddenly seemed able to ceaselessly create its own 
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means of payment? The strategy he introduced in response was to search for a 
fiscal bottom line, which would ultimately work to contain how much money could 
be borrowed. Hume, as such, argued that the limit to public borrowing arose 
because it was an unproductive loan that crowded out productive investment. A 
continual build up of public debt would necessitate continued increases in taxation 
on landlords, draining away money that would otherwise have been put to 
productive use. In that way debt and the tax that followed etched away at the 
productive capacity of a nation until it eventually collapsed. The suddenly 
boundless potential of paper money production, in Hume’s thinking, was a problem 
that could be contained through a hard currency anchor.  
The broad framework laid out by Hume, that turned debt and money into a 
more technical than moral problem, and centred around the correspondence of 
note issues to the underlying economy, was taken up by Adam Smith in a slightly 
different way. Smith did not share Hume’s view on the necessity of hard currency, 
instead proposing a ‘real bills’ doctrine that argued banknote issuing need not be 
inflationary. Notes issued against bills of exchange, he suggested, could be thought 
of as advanced payment. Broadly, provided banks did not over-issue, the supply of 
banknotes would follow variations in the number of exchanges taking place. Or, the 
nominal money-economy, would follow the underlying real economy. The key then, 
was to allow money to form out of private sector demand. Where a problem arose 
was when money issuance grew out of step from the underlying real economy. In 
public debt, as a result, inflationary danger lurked. And on this basis he returned to 
similar grounds as Hume. The bottom line was the underlying real economy, to 
which public debt, and the notes that financed it, had to correspond.  
Smith fleshed this out through his well-known concerns about public 
spending and taxation draining the productive resources of merchants, who could 
grow the wealth of the nation as a whole. It is possible to see in this the solidifying 
of the notion of public debt as drawn from a ‘common pool’ of resources produced 
by the private market economy. If debts continued to grow, eventually states would 
be left with no choice but to tax merchants ever more (so as to honour their debts) 
which would squeeze merchants out of the productive economy, robbing states of 
their ability to generate any revenue to restore the common pool of resources. The 
public debt and money that circulated because of it would have grown too distant 
from the underlying real economy, and would only lead to crisis. This could be in 
the form of an explicit government default or, by Smith’s reckoning, a more sordid 
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inflationary route, a “pretended payment” through “an adulteration of the coinage 
[that] was an unjust and treacherous fraud” (Smith 1976 [1776]: 930, in Dome 2004, 
p.57). Smith’s solution was to both reform the tax system (though Smith recognised 
this would only hit landlord rents) and more importantly to withdraw military support 
from the colonies. Without such fiscal consolidation - to use the contemporary 
parlance - governments would be left with “enormous debts which at present 
oppress, and will in the long-run probably ruin, all the great states of Europe” (Smith 
in Blyth 2013, p.113).  
Yet, that bottom line, that moment of crisis, kept getting further away. Smith 
had already noted how “Great Britain seems to support with ease, a burden which, 
half a century ago, nobody believed her capable of supporting”. But he was sure 
time was running out: “Let us not, however, upon this account rashly conclude that 
she is capable of supporting any burden; nor even be too confident that she could 
support, without great distress, a burden a little greater than what has already been 
laid upon her” (Smith 1776/1976, V.III p. 929 in Theocarakis 2014, p.10). It spoke to 
the difficulty paper money presented the classical political economists.  
The public debt, meanwhile, only continued to expand. By the early 
nineteenth century, paper money had superseded metal coins as the dominant 
means of payment in England and Wales (Davies, 2002, p. 278) and the question 
remained of how to conceptualise that underlying bottom line, the centre of gravity 
into which the monetary stock had surely to collapse eventually. By this point David 
Ricardo had departed from Smith’s idealised view about the supply of money 
following market demand to centre much more clearly on the Bank of England. 
Writing after the suspension of the Gold Standard in England had provoked much 
debate and derision, Ricardo was deeply suspicious of the Bank of England which 
he felt was creating bank notes unduly. He critiqued the applicability of the real bills 
doctrine to Britain and instead pushed a Bullionist position in parliament that would 
turn modern money back into the hard currency that Hume had advocated. Ricardo 
pushed for the Gold Standard to limit the distorted money creation by the Bank of 
England, and as a rival stockbroker himself, took great umbrage at the Bank’s 
monopolistic position which he felt extracted undue profits from the public. To 
Ricardo, it was “lamentable to view a great and opulent body like the Bank of 
England, exhibiting a wish to augment their hoards by undue gains wrested from 
the hands of an overburdened people” (Ricardo 1951–73 [1816], vol. 4: 93 in Dome 
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2004, p. 132). Ideally money creation would be handled by the state but, through 
the use of hard money, would only follow market activity.  
These views of money creation were undergirded by a general liberal 
suspicion about the ill-effects of public debt. Though Ricardo was vehemently anti-
tax, and anti-government spending, he did actually advocate for a lump-sum tax on 
property to fix the national debt (Dome, 2004). He did not want the Bank of England 
continually absorbing interest payment money and saw in the national debt a 
diversion of savings from useful to useless investment. Indeed, it is not true, as has 
been later inferred by conservative writers like Robert Barro (1974) and James 
Buchanan (1976), that Ricardo saw public debt as equivalent to tax, rather Ricardo 
saw public debt as worse (Dome, 2004). While taxes eroded future investment and 
therefore future productive potential, public debt diverted existing investment and 
therefore the current productive potential of an economy (Tsoulfidis, 2007). It is 
precisely why in Parliament in 1819, Ricardo advocated for a capital levy and 
abolishing the Sinking Fund that was supposed to, but hadn’t, provide a pool to 
repay the national debt. The continual build up of debt, thought Ricardo, would 
injure the wealth-generating capacity of a country and inevitably lead to crisis.  
The classical work on public debt is revealing. Firstly, by negating the 
implications of the moneyness of debt, their examination of public finance is 
anchored by the notion that debt must be repaid, and is therefore unsustainable. 
The fear is always that refinancing a continual build-up of debt can only go on for so 
long before it hits a limit and the state faces a moment of collapse.  
Secondly, as a result, their attention is on how the state can generate the 
revenue needed to repay debts, making debt politics an issue about the distribution 
of taxation and public spending. Inevitably this introduces another normative layer. 
Hume felt landlords should be protected from taxation, while Smith wanted to ring 
fence merchant activities from taxation and Ricardo overcame his aversion to tax to 
advocate for a capital levy, as well as restrictions on the Bank of England’s ability to 
create state debt as money. Needless to say each of these positions chimed with 
their own interests.  
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, in order to establish a sense of a 
‘bottom line’ to the levels of debt that can be issued there is an assumption in the 
classical literature that governments draw from a ‘common pool’ of finite resources 
when they raise debt, and the more it draws down by mounting debt, the less 
resources there are for anyone else. On this basis debt growth can only be 
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‘excessive’ and a distortion of some underlying fundamental, that will make itself felt 
in the form of a ‘solvency limit’ forcing the crisis and correction that drags public 
finances back into balance.  
That the problem of ‘excess’ and ‘unsustainability’ should be so present in 
the classical literature is perhaps unsurprising. Hume was responding to the 
Financial Revolution that had first allowed public debt to climb to levels where 
repayment seemed impossible, Smith wrote at a time when the costs of war in 
America had bled the public exchequer and feared the English state would go the 
same way as the Dutch and French into bankruptcy, and Ricardo was actively 
campaigning in Parliament after the suspension of the Gold Standard after the state 
had run successive deficits. Nonetheless the classical work provided a basis that 
saw the growth of public debt as a crisis for the state that had to be avoided. 
1.2 Governing dangerous debt 
This notion endured until John Maynard Keynes helped transform the question of 
debt. Having recognised that the moneyness of public debt allowed for its great 
expansion there was a shift in the paradigm of public finance in the early twentieth 
century. Debt was to become a tool to embrace, rather than a poison to avoid, 
opening up the question of financial governance and the state’s role in it for the first 
time.  
That it took until Keynes to reframe how debt was understood stems from 
how soon classical political economy emerged after the Financial Revolution and 
the difficulty it had in fully coming to terms with what had been unleashed. In 
financing public debt through banknote issuing the problem of state action in a 
mercantile economy - the securing of gold and silver - was transformed. It was 
suddenly possible to create a debt-based means of payment ‘out of nothing’. What 
that meant for economic governance was unclear to classical political economists, 
though it certainly transformed how the repayment imperative was felt. 
This was because, as Keynes came to recognise, as paper (debt) money 
became accepted as a means of payment, the actual moment of redemption 
became more and more delayed (Sgambati, 2016). As Hume himself recognised 
“public securities [have] become a kind of money, and pass as readily at the current 
price as gold or silver - no merchant now thinks it necessary to keep by him any 
considerable cash” (in Brantlinger, 1996, p. 92). For precisely this reason it was 
possible to greatly expand debt. Publicly-issued banknotes showed how debts 
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could be extended, refinanced, and resold for ever growing periods without needing 
to be repaid, deferring the ‘solvency limit’ seemingly indefinitely. As such the 
question about public debt was not solely about public spending and tax revenue, 
but was becoming more deeply about its role in the workings of an emerging 
‘national economy’. In that sense, the moneyness of public debt posessed was in 
the process of establishing a monetary infrastructure through which the state 
gained the capacity to govern the broader economy. 
These developments provoked a rich vein of monetary thought in Britain that 
was to culminate in Keynes’s paradigm shift. In this the monetary control debate 
that emerged in middle of the nineteenth century (O’Brien, 1997), as the Bank of 
England sealed its grip as the monopoly supplier of banknotes in the country (an 
issue examined in more depth in the following chapter), was very important. Having 
seen the state greatly expand its debts, and state paper money become central to 
the operation of the payments system in the nineteenth century, monetary thinkers 
began to confront the situation where the repayment imperative and 
unsustainability of debt existed in a very different institutional context to that with 
which the classical political economists had first grappled.  
In this way the fiscal perimeter to the state’s capacity to borrow seemed less 
of a pressing problem than the potential for ceaselessly created debt to court 
inflation. Nineteenth century monetary thinking began to shift accordingly, adjusting 
the classical concerns about debt to the new institutional environment by focussing 
on the instability stemming from the ease of credit creation. It is in this context that 
the establishment of the Gold Standard should be understood. The Gold Standard 
came out of an attempt by English landed interests to control the ability of moneyed 
interests to easily create credit, which they felt courted the inflation that eroded the 
value of their (fixed) rental income. As Knafo (2013) argues this led to the 
transformation of the Bank of England into a modern ‘central bank’ whose central 
position in the national payments system gave it the capacity to steer credit creation 
(this is discussed in more depth in the following chapter). By the end of the 
nineteenth century, with the emergence of a central bank and a European Gold 
Standard, monetary thinkers like Walter Bagehot examined the position of public 
debt securities in the broader economy and the necessity for government, acting 
through the central bank, to govern the monetary system that would otherwise 
produce instability (Mehrling, 2010). Recognition, in other words, that the 
moneyness of the state’s debt meant it was now deeply embroiled within the 
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workings of the financial system and the state bared the capacity, and indeed 
responsibility, for its governance. 
Yet when it came to understanding what governance role the state should 
play, and how the capacity of the state as a debtor to shape broader economic 
relations was built on the institutionalisation of the monetary aspect of public debt, 
monetary thought until Keynes was still bound by the terms of the classical political 
economists. Ralph Hawtrey was a very important case in point. Hawtrey can be 
seen as the successor to Bagehot and central to the development of economic 
thought at the British Treasury in the early twentieth century (Mattei, 2016). He 
drew from Ricardo especially to argue that the growth of public debt would lead to 
inflation. Hawtrey had recognised that state money had become so deeply 
institutionalised within the banking system and so readily treated as a store of value 
in itself, that its redemption - and the solvency of the state as a result - was a less 
pressing concern (Mehrling, 2010). This made it very easy for the state to facilitate 
rapid credit creation. Yet, anchored in the idea that debt creation was 
unsustainable, Hawtrey was convinced this would inevitably lead to inflation (ibid.).  
His arguments about the ‘instability’ of credit creation became especially 
important in Britain after the first world war, when the country was saddled with high 
debts. To guard against inflation he argued that credit creation had to be controlled, 
advocating for ‘dear money’ through the restoration of the Gold Standard and a 
clamp down on public spending (Hawtrey, 1919). This would ensure that credit 
creation did not become ‘excessive’ in a way that would threaten the ‘credibility’ of 
government as a debtor. 
It is here where Keynes was so influential. He reversed Hawtrey’s reading of 
public debt. By acknowledging the capacity the state had acquired through the 
position of public debt securities in the banking system and the importance of the 
central bank, he advocated an entirely different approach to public debt. It was an 
opportunity to grasp. This was essentially Keynes’s challenge to the Treasury View 
that Hawtrey had developed in the 1920s. Investment, he argued, was inhibited by 
uncertain expectations about the future and as such there was a role for 
government to ‘fill in the gap’ by spending money that the private sector was 
reluctant to part with (Tily, 2010). In that way it could mobilise debt to help build 
productive capacity and in that sense prevent any chance of a solvency ‘limit’. As 
early Keynesian economists Alvin Hansen (1941) and Abba Lerner (1961) argued, 
there was as such no potential limit to the ‘common pool’ and the capacity for public 
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debt financing if debt was raised domestically and used for productive purposes. 
The solution to the public finance predicament was for the state to facilitate 
investment. And debt provided the means through two possible routes. Either it 
could be raised for direct government investment, or national debts could be used 
to keep interest rates low enough to stimulate private sector investment (Tily, 
2012). Either way, recognition of the possibilities of debt in this way made Keynes 
highly critical of the orthodoxy that surrounded him.  
Yet Keynes did not depart entirely from the classical thinking on debt. His 
argument rested on the idea that public debt had to be used for productive 
purposes if it was to pay for itself. Though Keynes showed how debt could grow the 
common pool, he retained a notion of the common pool, a real economy to which 
monetary developments were bound. If debt did not fund productive investment, 
and debts surpassed a certain level - when they became ‘excessive’ - creditors 
would lose faith, and inflation would ensue until a crisis forced the moment of 
correction, undoing all that had gone before. As such while Keynes was significant 
in showing how state spending was not, by definition, parasitical to the economy 
and thus debt did not necessarily breed political economic ruin in the way Hume 
and Smith laid out, the state’s ability to raise debt still depended on the capac ity of 
the economy to deliver growth. Increasing proportions of national debt, in relation to 
the total size of the economy, risked paper money losing its value. As an instrument 
of government borrowing, money needed to be credible and that meant the 
assurance that the broader national economy was growing.  
The result of Keynes’s work was to politicise the state as an economic actor 
in a different way to before. To be ‘credible’ in the eyes of creditors and be able to 
secure the debt with which to finance productive investment, the state had to be 
judged as an economic agent. By the 1960s, for example, the Plowden committee 
which had been commissioned by the Treasury to examine the place of public 
spending noted how “[The] Budget is seen not as a simple balancing of tax receipts 
against expenditure, but as a sophisticated process in which the instruments of 
taxation and expenditure are used to influence the course of the economy” (1961, 
p. 6).  
The idea of the productive capacity of an economy being important to the 
credibility of the state’s debt, and the efficacy of the state as an economic agent, 
proved crucial in shaping the way creditors and debtors related, because it helped 
found more systematic analyses of public debt (Tribe, 2015). Macroeconomic 
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indicators (which of course Keynes was crucial in establishing (Tily, 2009)), like the 
total debt to GDP ratio, or productivity, or balance of payments deficits, could be 
used as a basis for politicising the public debt. It is here that public debt began to 
collapse into a series of broader political economic issues and is part of the reason 
why ‘supply side’ strategies - like attacks on trade unions or regulatory reform - 
came to be associated with public spending cuts in the literature on the transition to 
neoliberalism (for example Blyth, 2013; Kerr 2011). Yet it also revealed how loose 
the notion of ‘excessive debt’ could be. There was no fixed ‘ratio’ for the point at 
which public debt becomes a problem, nor an established framework to judge 
whether public debt was successfully building productive capacity or not. Put simply 
there were times when debt-financed expansion coincided with growth, and other 
times when it did not.  
Moreover, in the postwar era when sterling was tied not directly to gold but 
to the dollar the problem of ‘excessive debt’ was felt slightly differently again. There 
was a growing debate about the way public debt intermeshed with the monetary 
system and the fixed exchange rate regime of Bretton Woods. In order to maintain 
exchange rate parity Britain needed access to dollars. It could do this either by 
increasing exports or buying dollars from the open market. The latter proved much 
easier than the former but absorbed Britain’s foreign exchange reserves. The more 
reserves were depleted the more difficult it would supposedly become to raise 
government debt, because creditors were not convinced that the state would be 
able to maintain the value of the currency over the long-term period on which gilts 
were issued (Allen, 2014). As such government borrowing also had to take place 
directly through the banking system, which increased the supply of money and (it 
was assumed) consumption on imports, which in turn worsened the balance of 
payments problem (Kerr, 2001). This again made it possible for the clutch of related 
problems in the British political economy to coalesce around the notion of public 
debt.  
It is in reaction to this context that the ‘Chicago School’ theorists like Milton 
Friedman or James Buchanan should be read. The shift that had taken place 
through Keynes was to accept how there appeared to be no fiscal bottom line to the 
state’s capacity to raise debt. The monetarist response was to shift the bottom line 
from fiscal to monetary grounds, and in that sense reflected an acceptance of the 
moneyness of public debt. Simply, public debt was cast as the source of money 
creation and the source of inflation. This neoliberal articulation of the problem of 
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public debt became the template by which subsequent literature on the transition to 
neoliberalism in Britain has been conceptualised (for example Blyth, 2013). To take 
Buchanan first, he updated the liberal suspicion of state officials present in Adam 
Smith through his development of public choice theory. The significance of this for 
conceptualising the public debt was in formalising the idea that public officials in the 
state would be unable to act as coherent and productive economic agents because 
they are self-serving utility maximisers who will divert state resources to the interest 
groups that best serve public officials (be this a particular tranche of voters or a 
dominant lobbying group) (Buchanan, 1975). Democracy, whether enacted via 
votes or voice, was something that had to be resisted or controlled, lest state 
officials waste resources placating its needs. Buchanan, with Richard Wagner, 
converted his theoretical commitments into political tract with the publication of 
Democracy in Deficit: The Legacy of Lord Keynes in 1977 and it spoke well to a 
period where growth rates in developed countries were comparatively low and the 
efficacy of supposedly state-led Keynesianism highly doubtful. This was to have 
important consequences for how critics of neoliberalism depicted the move as ‘anti 
democratic’ (for example Bruff, 2014; Gane, 2015; Flinders and Wood, 2016), in 
effect adopting Buchanan’s framing while reversing the normative commitments.  
Buchanan, though, remained a more significant figure in the United States 
than he did in Britain. Friedman, on the other hand, found much more purchase 
among British policymakers with his arguments about monetarism. I revisit the 
monetarist critique in more detail in chapter five, but for now it is worth noting how 
the monetarist case revived Hume’s notion of the price-specie-flow mechanism and 
Hawtrey’s ambition of trying to make paper money behave more like commodity 
money so that a ‘market’ based monetary system would regulate economic activity, 
and solve distortions that government debt-financed programmes had caused 
(Chick, 1993). At the time a flurry of new credit instruments had eroded the 
government’s existing capacity to regulate credit in Britain, so the promise of 
monetarism was bright. The idea was that if regulators could control the creation of 
credit, which in the way it was calculated in Britain’s financial system meant limiting 
government borrowing, then paper money would obey the conventions of the 
quantity theory of money and distribution of credit would follow a market logic. 
Anything else, said Friedman, would lead to temporary stimulus and eventual 
inflation (ibid.). The result would be creditors doubting the credibility of government 
borrowers and increasing the cost of borrowing until a drastic resolution is found.  
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Despite acknowledgment that monetised state debts are stubbornly liquid 
and, in the case of central banking, that public debt provided the state a capacity for 
policy interventions that did not previously exist, it was still the prevailing view that 
public debts were unsustainable and excessive debts left the continued viability of a 
government at the whims of creditors. Eventually, so the story implied, the 
limitations described by the liberal classical political economists kick in and debts 
become unbearable and reforms must take place that restore a government’s 
credibility in the eyes of creditors in the market. It is precisely why it is argued that 
the transition to neoliberalism in Britain began with the imposition of monetary 
targeting by the IMF from whom Britain needed to borrow in order to restore its 
foreign exchange reserves (Clift and Tomlinson, 2008; Clift and Tomlinson, 2012). 
From that nadir reforms began to take place which were then rapidly expanded by 
Margaret Thatcher’s 1979 regime. The stories of the supply-side revolution, the 
attack on Labour unions, the high-interest-rate deflation of Britain’s manufacturing 
sector, all of this appears as the necessary correction to the problems built up in the 
previous years, steps the state had to take to make itself ‘credible’ again. 
1.3 Debt and the neoliberal transformation 
The fact that debt has acquired more and more monetary functions presents a 
problem for the analysis of debt. It becomes very difficult to rediscover a bottom 
line, the limit that is supposed to have contained the continued growth in public 
debt. The result is commentators like Streeck striving for new ways to establish a 
bottom line from which to clarify the politics of public finance. Yet without taking the 
monetary aspect on board it becomes very difficult to avoid portraying debt politics 
in instrumental terms.  
This is very apparent in how the transition to neoliberalism in Britain is 
presented which tends to proceed from an assumption that to raise finance the 
state must make itself credible in the eyes of financial markets, something that is 
always posed from the creditor side of the creditor-debtor relationship. For that 
reason, the current literature struggles to conceptualise how state debt - and the 
state’s capacity to monetise it - has worked to empower the state. Critical literature 
(for example Streeck 2014; Blyth 2013; di Muzio 2016) instead often adopts a 
framework for analysing debt developed by the classical political economists, one 
anchored by the problem of ‘excessive debt’ and its ‘unsustainability’. The difficulty 
it has is in trying to square the theory where debt is unsustainable, with the 
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experience where state debts have only continued to mount. To contain this 
seeming contradiction the critical literature presents growing debt as a distortion of 
an ideal situation, and one that renders debtors vulnerable to creditors in an 
imbalanced relationship. This leads critical literature to depict neoliberalism as the 
product of this imbalance. As such neoliberalism is cast as a reaction to the state’s 
excessive debt, and one that empowers creditors over the state, and restricts and 
undermines the sovereign power of government. A crisis of debt is thus often 
associated with a crisis of sovereignty (for example Streeck 2014). This, I argue, 
stems from three fundamental and related misconceptions about public debt, which 
colours the way scholars understand the transition to neoliberalism in Britain, and 
its implications for state power.  
Firstly, the literature often presents the idea of raising credit as withdrawing 
from a ‘common pool’ of resources (most clearly in Streeck, 2014). This is 
supposed to represent the ‘bottom line’ that an indebted state has to be wary of and 
is invoked in the explanation of why states throughout history have had to 
overcome difficulties with raising revenue, and have at times been subjected to 
stringent conditions on their borrowing. In that way accounts about public debt often 
mobilise some notion of a ‘real’ economic base upon which the size of the financial 
debt is implicitly measured against. This could be a debt to GDP ratio, or the 
balance of payments, for example. As a consequence of this ‘common pool’ 
imaginary about debt, inquiry into it is often based on the premise that there is a 
point where healthy provision of credit, becomes an unhealthy dependence on 
debt. Debt is deemed unhealthy if it reaches a level where paying back to the 
common pool becomes unlikely. There is, of course, no fixed idea of what the 
moment of excess is, when good credit becomes bad debt, and it is something that 
would depend entirely on context. Nonetheless this idea is so deeply embedded 
into the way debt politics is understood that debt is treated as a potentially scarce 
resource which by definition makes continually mounting debt unsustainable.  
This is a deeply held assumption that remains despite the overwhelming 
historical evidence that demonstrates how state debt can, and has, been 
continually piled up, and the realities of the current moment where credit is more 
abundant than ever. The English crown, when it first raised finance from the 
London Goldsmiths and then the Bank of England, assumed these loans needed 
repaying in full and raised taxes to do so in just the way liberal economists warned 
about. Soon, however, the crown discovered loans rarely needed repaying, 
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provided debt could be serviced (and often not even that) (Brewer, 1990). It is partly 
why the original 1694 Bank of England loan to the crown remained on its balance 
sheets for another 300 years, until 1997 (Choudhry et al., 2003). Though the 
literature has recognised that monetisation of state debt facilitated its great 
expansion, well in excess of what could realistically be repaid, there remains the 
assumption that this distortion must come at a cost. And this assumption colours 
how scholars understand the neoliberal transition in Britain because it appears as 
the reaction to that unsustainability. 
Secondly, the dominance of this common pool framework and a quantitative 
imaginary of the debt problem sets up a level of analysis problem. Critical writers 
especially are keen to emphasise the importance of context-specific institutions and 
histories, stressing the detail of how and why a state’s dependence on credit takes 
hold, and the way the political consequences of this dependence unfolds (for 
example Bear, 2015; Streeck, 2014; Lazzarato, 2012). Yet their inquiries are 
anchored on the assumption of the potential scarcity of credit, which makes it very 
difficult to look past the power this grants creditors to use financial markets to set 
the terms of their relationship with the state as a debtor. As a result, critical 
literatures often depict the institutional developments as unfolding as a response to 
the imperatives set by credit markets (ibid.). In that sense, even when trying to 
stress the contingency and detail of the creditor-debtor social relation, critical 
accounts often depict the imperatives creditors set as the ultimate ordering 
principle. The institutional detail can explain, perhaps, how a state became 
dependent on credit markets for example, but is not drawn on to explain how those 
credit markets end up functioning.  
Thirdly, when the above two points are taken together, the politics are 
obscured. The neoliberal transition can easily appear in critical literature as the 
consequence of excessive public debt; the moment where good credit has turned 
into bad debt, and left the state in an unhealthy, dependent position in relation to 
creditors. By this account neoliberal governance is depicted as a regime of 
governance that helps creditors prevail and deepens the dependence of state and 
society on credit markets (ibid.). For this reason neoliberalism is depicted as a 
triumph of the interests of creditors over the broader sovereignty of the state and 
competing social interests (for example Di Muzio, 2016). As such there is a close 
association between creditor interests in neoliberalism and the depoliticisation of 
monetary governance. The idea is that when a state abdicates its governance role 
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to ‘the market’, it protects the creditor interest from those of other competing social 
groups.  
This adds up to an instrumentalist reading of the politics of debt which again 
makes it very difficult to conceptualise the relationship between the state as a 
debtor and its creditors. It also obscures how the state transforms its discretionary 
power through monetised public debt and how it shapes its relationship with credit 
markets. Though critical literature aspires to treat debt as a social relation, by 
negating the monetary aspect of public debt their analyses of the way creditors 
exercise power through the market makes only one aspect of this relationship 
visible: the creditor imperative, which is precisely why the discretionary power of the 
state often fades out of view. This underpins a more general conception of 
neoliberal governance as a disempowering technology of governance that swept 
away the practices of the postwar era. 
In what follows I use four examples to show how the three problems 
identified above are perpetuated across the critical literature that uses public debt 
as a basis for examining the transition to neoliberalism in Britain. In doing so I show 
that the notion of credit markets as the original drivers of the neoliberal era of 
governance functions as an analytically obstructive cipher (Appleton, 2015) for the 
nature of the role played by the state in the process of the construction of this order. 
As a result, critical accounts struggle to conceptualise the way in which the use of 
public debt securities worked as a basis for the state’s discretionary power and the 
active role the state played in constructing contemporary neoliberal governance in 
Britain.  
This is necessarily an incomplete survey of the vast literature on the 
transition to neoliberalism in Britain. Rather, the purpose is to demonstrate how 
pervasive the problems I identified are. History has shown the enduring 
sustainability of ever increasing levels of public debt, yet this has not altered the 
conceptual framework that rests on the idea of the opposite. 
Carmen Reinhart & Kenneth Rogoff: Pay your debts 
In June 2010, shortly after he had become chancellor of the exchequer, George 
Osborne made a simple claim that was to underpin his economic narrative for the 
next decade: “Unless we deal with our debts there will be no growth” (in Skidelsky, 
2015). Osborne based this claim on the work of Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth 
Rogoff (ibid.), two neoclassical economists, who in their book This Time is Different 
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(2009) and a related series of papers (for example, Growth in a time of debt (2010) 
and A decade of debt (2011)) outlined the problems excessive public debt presents 
an economy. 
The ambition of their work was grand, aiming to develop a theory for the 
relationship between public finance and economic growth that would hold across 
historical and geographical contexts. Moreover, the argument they arrived at was 
fantastically simple: High public debt leads to lower growth (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2010). 
Fittingly, the search for a grand theory about the dangers of debt involved 
compiling data on 44 countries spanning 200 years in what amounted to 3700 
annual observations that covered a “wide range of political systems, institutions, 
exchange rate arrangements, and historic circumstances” (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2011, p. 21). The explicit aim was to cut across contexts and allow the examination 
of debt to stand as a bottom line from which economic predictions can be formed. 
Their headline findings were stark: in what they describe as ‘advanced economies’, 
“the relationship between government debt and real GDP growth is weak for 
debt/GDP ratios below 90 percent of GDP. Above the threshold of 90 percent, 
median growth rates fall by 1 percent, and average growth falls considerably more” 
(ibid.). The impact was exaggerated in ‘emerging economies’, where a 60 per cent 
debt/GDP ratio brought a 2 per cent decline in annual growth. Or, more simply, 
there was a systematic correlation between high levels of public debt and low levels 
of economic growth.  
It was on this basis that conservative politicians could beef up their claims 
about the dangers of public debt and the necessity of paying debt down. As it 
happened a PhD student, Thomas Herndon, exposed Reinhart & Rogoff for making 
a serious error in their calculation, but the significance of their contribution is 
revealing. Excessive public debt comes at a cost and they discovered the 
quantitative ‘level’ at which debt begins to pose a problem, thereby ‘proving’ its 
unsustainability. They depict their findings as a mere formal confirmation of the 
obvious, for if there were no consequences to ramping up public debt (to a 90 per 
cent level and beyond) then “then generations of politicians must have been 
overlooking proverbial money on the street” (Reinhart & Rogoff 2011, p. 27). 
The reason why debt adversely affects growth is because, they argue, “high 
public debt burden implies higher future taxes (inflation is also a tax) or lower future 
government spending, if the government is expected to repay its debts” (ibid., p. 28) 
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which dampens consumer, household and firm expectations, dragging down growth 
as a result. This kind of ‘debt deflation’ continues until public debts drop below the 
threshold. Until then the debt overhang, as they describe it, casts a shadow over 
growth even when the immediate threat to the solvency of an indebted government 
is not in question.  
Clear in Reinhart & Rogoff’s neoclassical account about the dangers of debt 
is the lineage to the classical political economists. Like Smith especially, but also 
Ricardo, their depiction of public debt is that it acts, eventually, as a drain on supply 
in an economy, undercutting the productive capacity of an economy and the ability 
of a government to raise sufficient revenue from tax to make debt servicing 
possible. Moreover, Reinhart & Rogoff share Smith’s suspicion of government’s 
weakness for excessive indebtedness and instinct for arbitrary intervention. In This 
Time is Different, they argue that ‘eight centuries of financial folly' have proved that 
politicians have no aversion to accumulating high debt levels, and Reinhart & 
Rogoff repeatedly express their concern that excessive debt, if not solved through 
fiscal retrenchment, will be tackled instead through ‘financial repression’, that 
involves forcing a ‘captive domestic audience’ - usually pension funds - to extend 
credit to government instead of more productive purposes.  
The lineage to classical political economy present in such an idea also 
displays a curious inversion of the critical depiction of the creditor-debtor 
relationship. Rather than creditors getting to discipline government and exercising 
their power through financial markets, excessive debt will lead a government to 
interfere with and indeed actively restrict the proper running of financial markets 
through ‘financial repression’, the result of which is to greatly empower 
governments and subordinate creditors. There is, in this way, a sense of how 
governments have the power to shape the terms of their financing, but this power 
can only be found through withdrawing from the market. A freely operating financial 
market works as a check on government power, in the classical liberal mode.  
Obviously in their neoclassical assumptions and links to conservative 
political programmes, Reinhart and Rogoff are the subject of much critique (for 
example Eaton, 2012; Skidelsky, 2015). Yet as I will show, their broad framework 
that sidelines the monetary aspect of debt altogether, and uses the lens of public 
debt as a bottom line that can speak in abstraction of institutional contexts, and 
their reading of the politics of public debt from the perspective of abstract creditors 
acting on abstract credit markets, is something shared by more critical literatures. 
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Despite the attempt not to. This is because they share the same foundation of 
anchoring their inquiries into debt on the assumption that debt must be repaid, 
something that renders a public borrower vulnerable to the whims of the private 
creditors acting on financial markets. 
Mark Blyth: The folly of dangerous ideas 
One of the most influential ways scholars have used debt to anchor an 
understanding of the shift to neoliberalism has been through the idea of austerity 
(Bear, 2015). The excessive debts built up by the state are resolved through 
policymakers adopting a harsh programme of public sector cuts that are eventually 
supposed to bring the public books back into balance and ensure debts get repaid. 
The stated purpose of austerity, from those who advocate it, is to rectify excessive 
public spending, and it is on that criterion that many critical accounts have found 
grounds to interject. One particularly resonant voice has been Mark Blyth. His 2013 
book, Austerity: The History of a Dangerous Idea, argued that austerity is a political 
agenda forged on the misguided notion that public debt is inherently malevolent. 
The programme of public sector austerity is critiqued on two grounds: First on 
fairness: the impacts of public sector cuts are distributed unevenly, because those 
who rely on public sector spending are generally poorer than those who do not. 
Second on efficacy: if the government cuts public spending at the same time as the 
broader economy, growth suffers and public debt actually expands. As Blyth (2013, 
p. 8) writes: “Although it is true that you cannot cure debt with more debt, if those 
being asked to pay the debt either cannot afford to do so or perceive their 
payments as being unfair and disproportionate, then austerity policies simply will 
not work.”  
The situation Blyth diagnoses is one where the notion of austerity, a 
“dangerous idea” with a history he traces back to classical political economy, takes 
hold of public life. Having clarified how the paradox of thrift makes austerity fail on 
its own terms, the only explanation Blyth has for its continual imposition is brute 
ideology. Austerity, as a (poor) remedy for excessive public debt, is imposed by 
conservative politicians because it enables them to “run the detested welfare state 
out of town” (ibid., p. 10). At a common sense level this appears persuasive. 
Conservative politicians, from Thatcher to Osborne to Theresa May, have rarely hid 
their disgust for welfare and the people that need it. The neoliberal period does 
seem associated with a particularly punitive approach to welfare provision 
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(Wacquant, 2012). When viewed through this lens the transition to neoliberalism 
appears as a triumph of the ideas suited to conservative politicians in 1980s Britain. 
It is precisely why Blyth places such importance in the influence of the neoliberal 
theorists like Milton Friedman and James Buchanan. Both articulated a limited 
capacity of the state to deliver economic growth, and the danger of democracies 
that allowed non-elites to demand through the state an undue share of resources 
that can only be met by the state taking on more debt. Blyth argues that these ideas 
first became dominant in the 1970s, before being put into practice by Thatcher in 
the 1980s. In this way he casts the transition to neoliberalism, and the imposition of 
austerity, as anti-democratic and directed in the interest of creditors. As he writes 
(2003, p. 9) the anti-inflationary politics of Friedman-era Thatcherism was about 
ensuing “creditors win” and “debtors lose”.  
Inevitably such an account depicts the reaction to the state’s supposedly 
unsustainable debt as curtailing its discretionary power. Blyth rallies against the 
creditors’ knee-capping of the state’s productive potential and its ability to pursue 
social good. His whole story is one where the imposition of the austerity idea 
achieves the curtailing and limitations on the state by dissolving the infrastructure of 
postwar governance and establishing the liberal conditions classical political 
economists had always called for.  
This makes it very hard to conceptually account for the other side of the 
relationship, the government as debtor and the way the state has used public debt 
securities as a basis for its own empowerment. The policy programmes that unfold 
in the age of austerity become cast as market-led triumphs. It is precisely why his 
2002 book, Great Transformations, sees the neoliberal period as a triumph of 
‘market’ ideas over those (postwar ideas) that emphasised social institutions. In this 
way the response to excessive debt in the transition to neoliberalism is the 
emergence of a policy programme of marketisation and public sector cuts that work 
to empower credit markets over the indebted state.  
There are problems with the way Blyth grounds his account of contemporary 
debt politics as a triumph of the ‘dangerous idea’ of austerity. Firstly, it assumes too 
neat a translation from policy ideas - and the intentions behind them - to their actual 
implementation in practice. Secondly, it assumes too much coherence in the ideas 
themselves, and too much symmetry between such ideas and the interests of a 
generic class of creditors and conservative politicians. For these two reasons the 
transition to neoliberalism in Britain appears too smooth and coherent. The difficulty 
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Blyth creates is that he presents an account where the politics of 1970s and 1980s 
Britain is a reaction to over indebtedness built up through the decades before, and 
takes the form of an austerity programme. As such his explanation of the 
importance of the policies that get enacted proceeds independently of the policies 
themselves. To fill the gap between the divergent promise of austerity and the 
practice of increased public spending, increased state involvement and indeed 
increased public debt, Blyth has to mobilise the notion that the idea is a ‘folly’, a veil 
for the real ideology that actually drives the austerity policies.  
It is this abstract vantage point that allows Blyth to draw a straight line 
between the austerity that followed the 2008 financial crisis in Britain and Europe all 
the way back three centuries to Adam Smith. The empirical content of, say, 1930s 
Britain was remarkably different to 1970s Britain which was different again to 2008. 
Though Blyth is highly critical of the classical liberal account of public debt, the fact 
that the monetary aspects remains occluded means he retains an idea that those 
concerned about public debt “are not tilting at windows… why would any state want 
to carry and pay for such a debt load if it didn’t have to? (2003, p. 13). This framing 
means that it becomes difficult to examine the ways in which the state has 
empowered itself through debt to reach a point where, for example, at a time when 
the discourse of austerity ruled, the British state could use its central bank to buy 
government debt and increase asset prices in the broader economy through the 
programme of QE. There is no way Adam Smith could have conceptualised such a 
policy, let alone advocate for it. Episodes of QE in Europe and America, where 
state institutions did appear to have a discretionary power to shape credit market 
relations, Blyth sees as temporary and scarcely relevant. The fact that the state 
was able to do that in 2008 but not in the 1970s speaks to the way its discretionary 
power grew, rather than shrunk in the period that followed the transition to 
neoliberalism. Blyth does not provide a framework for examining this precisely 
because he is limited by the terms of classical political economy that he aims to 
critique. 
Geoffrey Ingham & Jeremy Green: The City-Bank-Treasury nexus 
An alternative approach is one that sidesteps questions of grand ideology, and 
instead roots the shift to neoliberalism in Britain in what aspires to be institutional 
terns. This depicts the neoliberal transition as the driven by the longstanding power 
of the financial sector - and international financial interests - in Britain’s political 
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economy. This is a perspective developed by Geoffrey Ingham’s (1984) work on the 
historical dominance of the City-Bank-Treasury nexus in British capitalism, that has 
been recently expanded upon by Jeremy Green (2013; 2016), who argued that 
American finance became an important part of that nexus after the second world 
war.  
In this view the British state has long pursued ‘monetary discipline’ over all 
other priorities. This stems from the overlapping interests of the City of London, the 
Bank of England, and the Treasury in the promotion of international finance. The 
nexus has overpowered productive and manufacturing interests throughout British 
history via a pursuit of monetary discipline and liberalised financial markets that 
ensured a ‘stable currency’, and the “unwillingness [of the state] to regulate the 
City’s activity in any effective way” (Ingham 1983, p. 41). The commitment to 
monetary discipline was historically articulated through the interest in ‘sound 
money’ and manifested itself most importantly with the establishment and 
maintenance of the Gold Standard. After the second world war, when Britain’s 
financial position in relation to the rest of the world reversed, and America took 
over, monetary discipline was forced through by American financial interests. This 
American aspect of the financial sector’s postwar dominance was explored by 
Green (2013) who describes how Britain was integrated into an ‘Anglo-American 
developmental sphere’ that centred upon a collaboration between the financial 
centres of New York and London.  
Green argues that the British state had the option, after the second world 
war, to break with a historical dominance of the City-Bank-Treasury nexus, but did 
not take it because of its dependence on American credit. Britain’s bilateral debts 
with America gave the latter great bargaining power over the construction of the 
postwar monetary order, and in particular, the plan for sterling convertibility (into the 
dollar that dominated world trade). This left sterling forever vulnerable to 
international speculators throughout the postwar era. Rather than capitulate 
entirely, Britain established a role for its financial sector through the Euromarkets 
and it was in this space that the updated, Atlanticised City-Bank-Treasury nexus 
reasserted itself.  
The Euromarkets allowed the City to flourish irrespective of what happened 
to the broader British economy, and indeed the value of sterling. Moreover, it 
provided the opportunity for American power to shape British capitalism. British 
banks were only able to maintain their international standing by switching to the 
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dollar which “led to a synthesis of Anglo-American banking practices, increased 
Anglo-American interest rate interdependence and constraints upon the autonomy 
of policy makers on both sides of the Atlantic” (Green, 2016, p. 433). The 
integration of banking practice, and dependence on American credit, meant that 
American financial interests were in a privileged position to push forward the kind of 
regulatory changes that they and their partners in the City wanted. Moreover, the 
Bank and the Treasury were locked into a dependence on American financial 
institutions, which drove what Green describes as more ‘liberalised’ and 
‘marketised’ forms of finance in Britain. Ultimately, the establishment of market 
finance provided a ‘natural basis’ for Thatcher to complete the liberalisation of 
finance and ‘re-impose monetary discipline’ to Britain after three decades. In doing 
so any hopes of industrial modernisation were curtailed.  
The basis for the entire analysis is to demonstrate how the institutional 
evolution of Britain’s political economy privileged the financial sector over 
competing interests. In the effort to explain why Britain’s manufacturing sector had 
declined and was unable to revive despite favourable conditions after the second 
world war, Ingham and then Green present the nexus as the ultimate block. As 
such they necessarily paint the emergence of neoliberalism in Britain as something 
established by the institutional privileging of financial interests, to serve financial 
interests, irrespective of the costs to society as a whole. Monetary discipline is 
pursued because it suits the interests of creditors, and financial deregulation and 
attempts at monetarist governance are all part of that same exercise in creditor 
power. The problem with such an account is that it risks an instrumentalist depiction 
of financial politics, that relies on an overall coherence of interests in the financial 
sector, and the ability of the financial sector to simply translate that interest into 
action. The notion drawing all this together is that of ‘monetary discipline’, which is 
supposed to have acted as a check on the discretionary power of the state 
historically before the second world war, and again after Thatcher re-imposed 
discipline in the 1980s. 
Yet the reality of monetary discipline differs from the conceptual ideal. 
During the period of the Gold Standard government budgets were not balanced, 
rather the public debt expanded greatly. Similar happened during Thatcher’s 
experiment with monetarism when government budgets were mostly in deficit and 
private credit expanded rapidly. Perhaps more significantly both the gold standard 
  
37 
and monetarism were attempts to control private sector finance. It is peculiar, then, 
to depict monetary discipline in instrumental terms.  
Part of the problem is that Ingham and Green’s accounts sideline the way 
debt issued as money has historically empowered the state. It is only from that 
basis that they can depict a fundamental contradiction between the interests of 
finance with those of democracy. The assumption runs that credit can only be 
provided in conditions of a stable currency, which can only be guaranteed if the 
state steps back from social provision or economic intervention. Both these 
conditions are assumed rather than examined and leads their accounts to 
emphasise how the financial nexus of power lifts the operation of the state out of 
popular democratic scrutiny with the move to neoliberal governance working to take 
monetary politics out the realm of formal democratic institutions.  
This incredibly broad framework exists in abstraction from the specific 
policies that unfolded. In Green’s account there is detailed historical description of 
the practice of American and British financial actors, but the history does nothing to 
shift the (already well established) notion that neoliberalism amounts to the 
imposition of monetary discipline. Ultimately it is still in that sense a reading of the 
politics of finance from the perspective of creditors, where creditor interest in ‘sound 
money’ is depicted as the ultimate force driving monetary politics. As such it 
becomes very difficult to conceptualise the state, how it acts and to what ends. On 
this basis the only way to account for the discretionary power of the state is to 
assume that government gets mobilised by creditors for their own ends. This is 
precisely how Green depicts episodes of state power like the Big Bang re-
regulation of London’s securities market in 1986 (Green, 2013) or the contemporary 
Conservative government’s austerity and QE programme (Green and Lavery, 2015) 
Wolfgang Streeck: The crisis of the debt state 
The final example comes from a rich strand of Marxist scholarship that analyses the 
politics of the state’s indebtedness and the transition to neoliberalism within the 
broader dynamics of global capitalism. From this perspective the state’s growing 
dependence on debt comes from its declining tax revenue, which itself comes from 
the secular crisis of capitalist profitability since the 1970s. Without a growing tax 
revenue to draw on, governments across Global North are structurally dependent 
on international creditors for finance, who use this leverage to force through a 
reorganisation of society in their own interests. The transition to neoliberalism is the 
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moment at which the debt amassed by the state left it suddenly over-dependent on 
creditors, who, now equipped with market power, leapt at the opportunity to force 
through social change. This account has been made most influentially by Wolfgang 
Streeck in his 2014 book Buying Time.  
Streeck articulates his argument by referring to aggregate ratios of debt to 
GDP across OECD countries, and references to the relative composition of OECD 
governments’ tax and debt financing ((Streeck, 2014a; Streeck, 2014b; Streeck, 
2015). The case he makes is that good credit becomes bad debt when a 
government becomes over dependent on debt financing because of a declining tax 
take. His is an explicitly abstracted argument that cuts across different countries 
with vastly different institutional contexts, and is based on what he considers to be 
a Marxist twist on the classical ‘common pool’ story of public credit. Governments 
finance their spending through tax revenues and debt, and the former relies on 
there being sufficient value created in the broader (private) economy which the 
state can draw through taxes on income and profits. As profits decline, and wages 
decline, companies and individuals are less willing to pay taxes to the state. This 
‘tax rebellion’ and the growing anti state sentiment that seemed to form around the 
1970s forced this potential tax revenue down, which deepened the problems 
caused by the ‘ultimate’ issue: the decline of capitalist profitability and the 
“subsequent inability to honour the promises of economic and human progress on 
which [the state’s] legitimacy depends” (Streeck, 2014b).  
With no tax revenue to turn to the state is dependent on debt from private 
financial markets. The important innovation Streeck makes at this point is in 
recognising how sustainable this situation has proved. Financiers have been happy 
to bestow on governments the finance needed to meet government’s spending 
commitments, and more often than not, the money to meet debt servicing costs too. 
Indeed, as Streeck argues creditors do not want the government to be free from 
debt. Rather they want a government with the ability to continually service a 
growing pile of debt. It is the wealthy who buy government bonds and in doing so 
find a safe haven for storing the value of their wealth, while earning a return through 
receiving interest. This has allowed the state to continue to borrow ever increasing 
amounts. Such rollover debts are the creditors’ ideal. Moreover, they gain twice 
because they also do not pay out as much in taxation.  
Despite this apparent abundance of public credit, Streeck having 
established a common pool framework, still relies on the potential scarcity of credit 
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for his account of why creditors dominate. He conceptualises creditors as a ‘class’ 
that organises its interests on financial markets, similar to the activist shareholders 
in the corporate world who, under their doctrine of shareholder value, have 
distorted corporate strategy to maximise their own returns. In public life the ‘market 
power’ of bond-holders allows them to use credit markets to push their claims 
ahead of other citizens. Much as businesses could threaten an ‘investment strike’, 
bondholders could threaten a ‘bond buying strike’ and this power is used to force 
governments into serving creditor interests.  
There is here, an interesting tension where, having shown how states can 
‘buy time’ through loading up debt (and have done so for nearly four decades), he 
still treats the threat of a ‘bond buying strike’ – effectively the power of ‘exit’ – as the 
key principle to understand the politics of the debt state. Since the financial crisis, 
he argues, OECD states have no more time to buy and instead must face the 
consequences.  
Neoliberal rule is one where the creditor imperative trumps all, where the 
‘Marktvolk’ trump the ‘Staatsvolk’ and democracy is sacrificed at the altar of 
financial markets. Streeck explanation of the triumph of creditors differs from pure 
ideological triumph, in the way Blyth (2013) described, and from the account of 
financial power in Britain that Ingham (1984) and Green (2013) outlined. Rather 
Streeck’s suggests a secular problem that affects all OECD countries, of which 
Britain is just one. The fact that the state has successfully expanded its debt and, in 
the case of Britain and America, can draw on credit at very low prices, does not 
alter that politics of neoliberal governance as Streeck sees it. The power of the 
state exists only to function creditors, and debt exists only to fill in the gap created 
by the secular crisis of growth in capitalism. Moreover, because his analysis 
proceeds at a highly abstracted level Streeck makes no attempt to examine how 
different creditors might have different interests, or how particular policies of 
financial deregulation and fiscal contraction specifically chime with creditor desires. 
Though Streeck makes passing mention of the state’s role in creating 
money through its issue of public debt, this occupies a footnote in his account that 
remains anchored on a classical idea that a state issues debt from a base of 
resources, and as such the monetary aspect is negated. The result is a necessarily 
highly instrumentalist reading of debt politics that sees only the creditor side of the 
creditor-debtor relation, and is founded on the idea that the problem of debt stems 
from its unsustainability. As I have argued throughout this assumption has actually 
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proved historically problematic. The British state has long been reliant on debt, but 
historically this has been issued as a form of money and has worked to greatly 
empower the state (Braudel, 1982; Brewer, 1990). The monetary aspect makes the 
political dynamics harder to account for than in Streeck’s framework. Britain, for 
example, was heavily indebted in the period after the second world war but this was 
not a time when creditor interests, in Streeck’s formulation, were dominant.  
One possibility not explored by the authors is to avoid separating out the 
monetary aspect of public debt. This would allow for an account more comfortable 
with the historical experience of the British state continually piling up a mountain of 
debt. In turn this forces a departure of the unsustainability foundation, and 
reconceptualises what was involved in the emergence of neoliberal techniques of 
financial governance in Britain. Rather than a response to the unsustainability of 
public debt, I argue, the construction of neoliberal governance in Britain took place 
in the context where the state was finding ways to extend the size and liquidity of 
debts. As such it is misleading to ground an understanding of neoliberal 
governance on the idea that it involved a restriction of the discretionary power of 
the state. 
1.4 Rethinking the debt state 
The four literatures I outlined above demonstrate the problems with the way 
existing approaches have tried to use public debt as the basis for understanding the 
shift to neoliberalism in Britain. Simply, it becomes very difficult to conceptualise 
both sides of the creditor-debtor social relation when the moneyness of debt is 
occluded. The politics of debt is instead read in terms of its ‘excess’ and 
‘unsustainability’. Such an unspecific and ultimately normative anchor makes the 
creditor imperative of repayment seem overwhelming, and it follows that a condition 
of indebtedness is read predominantly in terms of empowering creditors. Despite 
historical findings that have demonstrated how the institutionalisation of the 
monetary functions of public debt has allowed the state both to sustain vast and 
growing levels of debt and govern liquidity in the economy more broadly, the 
literature remains entrenched in the tenets of the classical liberal political 
economists it intends to critique. 
The result is that the transition to neoliberalism is presented in quite 
instrumental and abstract terms: For Blyth (2013) it was the ideological project 
forged on the ‘dangerous idea’ of anti-state austerity. For Ingham (1984) and Green 
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(2013) it was an outcome of the historical domination of financial interests in British 
capitalism and its postwar dependence on American credit, which gave financial 
institutions of both countries the power to liberalise finance in the pursuit of 
monetary discipline. And, for Streeck (2014), the transition to neoliberal governance 
came from the inability of capitalism to deliver the growth that would support the 
government’s tax revenues. A state had no choice but to take on excessive 
amounts of debt which gave creditors the power to script political economic reform 
in Britain. Each perspective risks an instrumental story of debt politics where the 
power of the state is repurposed by creditors for their own use. In this way 
neoliberal governance appears as a case of governments ceding discretionary 
power to credit markets.  
This thesis moves away from such assumptions and aims to recover the 
monetary aspect of public debt that demands a more rebalanced reading of the 
creditor-debtor dynamic. To do so I argue that precisely because of its monetary 
functions, understanding the politics of public debt means switching the focus away 
from the question of solvency, and the steps a state must take to ensure it remains 
solvent, to instead explore credit and debt relations as a question of liquidity. This 
means examining the process by which public debt acquired monetary functions 
and the governance infrastructure this created. Taking seriously the moneyness of 
debt means abandoning the notion of the ‘common pool’ of resources that the state 
can only erode when it raises debt finance. In simple terms, it is misguided to base 
our understanding of credit in terms of its potential scarcity, when the last four 
decades have been near defined by the abundance of credit in the financial system. 
In that sense unlike previous debt-based inquiries into the neoliberal transition I 
focus not on the power of creditors in financial markets, but on how the state as a 
debtor has used public debt as a basis for its own empowerment. As I will show, the 
construction of neoliberal financial governance in Britain did not entail the state 
passively devolving governance responsibilities to credit markets but instead 
entailed a process of the state trying to empower itself and gain leverage over 
financial actors to give itself greater flexibility in the control of the monetary aspects 
of its debt. 
As such the methodological contribution the thesis makes is to establish a 
framework of inquiry capable of grasping the politics of public debt without 
separating out the monetary aspect from debt. My focus on the role of the state, as 
a debtor, is not posed in terms of regulation (or more often deregulation) as in the 
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current literature (for example Bear, 2015; Streeck, 2014b; Streeck, 2014a). Instead 
I follow Knafo (2013) in prioritising ‘empowerment’ because, as I will show in the 
chapters, debt could not grow in a vacuum of institutions, rather the capacity to 
borrow, refinance, service and repay public debt, had to be constructed. The 
repayment imperative alone, and the focus on credibility it necessitates, says 
nothing about what kind of institutions were created in response and nothing about 
their political implications. State institutions develop techniques of monetary 
governance in a pragmatic and piecemeal manner, solving particular policy 
problems they confront at different moments, and never with a pre-formulated 
grand strategy. As such, these techniques and their importance cannot be grasped 
in abstraction by appealing to notions of ‘creditor interests’ or ‘debt dependence’ or 
indeed ‘monetary discipline’. Rather the importance of these techniques are better 
grasped by assessing how they related to the monetary infrastructure through 
which the state had developed a means to govern the broader economy.  
There is a difficulty with historicising the social relations of debt that this 
thesis has to overcome. The recent scholarship clustered around David Graeber’s 
(2013) highly influential anthropological history, Debt: The First 5000 Years, has 
tried to show how contemporary society is uniquely structured by the creditor-
debtor relation in a way that was not the case previously (for example Lazzarato, 
2012; Di Muzio, 2016; Soederberg, 2014; Hager, 2016; Bjerg, 2015; Streeck, 
2014a). Despite different theoretical inflections they outline how creditors have 
developed the whip hand over society, and anchor their accounts on the notion that 
creditors’ structural power over debtors equips them with the capacity to dissolve all 
other social relations and transform a political economy, disciplining its subjects so 
as to make debt repayment the fundamental principle of society (Lazzarato, 2012).  
There exists a deep theoretical assumption that creditor power emanates 
from credit markets, and the more markets expand the more power creditors have. 
There is a tendency, as a result, to lend too much weight to the capacity of creditors 
to script public life to their choosing. When the social relations of debt are read off 
market dynamics, examination into debt politics too often becomes an examination 
of the size of credit markets, a quantitative issue, rather than an exploration of the 
relations that get established through credit market socialisation (for example Di 
Muzio, 2016; Hager, 2016). In this framing, the politics gets ‘filled in’ external to the 
market socialisation, by diagnosing how and why ‘restrictions’ on market expansion 
were lifted. Empirical detail matters only in the terms laid out by the framework of 
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the market power of creditors, which means that the accounts that do mobilise 
empirical detail, be it ethnographic (Bear, 2015; Montgomerie et al., 2015), 
historical (for example Soederberg, 2014) or political (Chick and Dow, 2013), focus 
on debtors as victims of a rigged system (Streeck 2014) and creditors generally as 
an aggregated and unspecified social group constituted by and acting through 
credit markets (Hager, 2016). Not only does this rely on too coherent a conception 
of creditors but also relies on the idea that creditors are readily distinguishable from 
debtors, which in the age of securitisation is simply not the case. Moreover, 
accounts of debt dependence necessarily mobilise the idea of a structural market 
relation that presumes creditors’ ability - and debtors’ inability - to act and shape 
their context. Yet the ability of creditors to act does not come from a market position 
and must instead be constituted. Similarly, debtors can mobilise financial markets 
for their own ends to shift the context in which they operate. In the structural 
framing the only way a debtor can gain room for manoeuvre is by exiting the market 
(for example Lemoine, 2016).  
It is precisely because empirical material is made to follow a rigid theoretical 
framework of creditor market power that debtors have fallen out of the picture in the 
literature. In this thesis I recover the power of the state by examining how public 
debt came to serve as money and how the monetary infrastructure that emerged as 
a result provided the state an avenue to intervene into the economy. Consequently, 
the expansion of indebtedness cannot be conceptualised as a dissolving of social 
relations and the transformation of a clutch of non-economic social institutional 
bonds into an economistic creditor-debtor relation that is upheld by the abstract 
rules of the market. Rather the expansion of indebtedness means a further 
complexification and intensification of social relations (Konings, 2015), the 
development of new institutions and new connections that bind disparate actors 
together in the political economy. In the case I examine in this thesis, the British 
state as the debtor, these relations of credit were used to form the basis of 
economic governance.  
As such, following Knafo (2010, 2013) this thesis argues that relationships 
like a state’s dependence on credit markets should be read in terms of power: how 
agents gain the capacity to act. This does not imply voluntarism, it is not that a 
debtor, even the state, can, consequence-free simply opt-out of its obligations to 
creditors. Indeed, policy debate is often articulated in terms of the limitations to 
which governments were subjected. Yet it is in responding to these impositions that 
  
44 
states develop policies and institutions that aim to try and make themselves 
effective on credit markets. As I demonstrate through the thesis, the difficulty of 
establishing the capacity to do so means there is always a necessary disjuncture 
between the policy intentions and policy outcomes. For this reason, it is more 
revealing to examine policies in terms of the means of their implementation, rather 
than the intention of policymakers.  
Through the thesis I trace the evolution and strategies and institutions 
developed by the British state in its effort to raise debt and ensure its stable 
financing. By revisiting the history, I hope to build an understanding of neoliberal 
monetary governance that is sensitive to the moneyness of public debt and thereby 
breaks out of the idea that the state’s dependence on debt made it a helpless agent 
of the creditor class. In doing so I show how the construction of neoliberal financial 
governance was shaped by the state. In that sense the thesis mobilises history to 
provide a theoretical contribution of bringing the state ‘back in’ to the story of debt 
politics, and the broader argument that states play a role establishing and 
reproducing markets (Panitch and Gindin, 2012). It shows how public debt is a 
basis of state power. 
Conclusion 
It has proved very difficult to come to terms with the monetary aspects of British 
public debt. Though the British state has been successfully monetising its debts for 
three centuries since the Financial Revolution, the implications this holds for public 
finance have been difficult to comprehend. Put simply, while many may now be 
comfortable with the idea that money is a form of debt, there is a tendency to 
neglect the other side of the coin, the way debt can act as money. 
For that reason, commentary about public debt has been gripped by the 
challenge of establishing the ‘limit’ to the level of borrowing a nation can sustain. 
This led to a depiction of the national economy as a common pool of resources that 
government draws from whenever it raises debt. The more notes it issued the more 
it etched away at the common pool and the more distant the monetary world of 
bank notes grew from the underlying real economy. Unless the productive capacity 
of the nation developed, growing the common pool of taxable resources, increasing 
public debt will court disaster, be it inflation or default. The result of which is to 
supposedly leave indebted governments striving for ways to ‘prove’ to creditors that 
their policies would grow the economy, avoid inflation, and lead eventually to less 
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dependency on external finance. Neoliberal reforms are cast then as examples of 
governments trying to reorganise their political economies in pursuit of this 
credibility.  
Yet taking into consideration the monetary features of public debt throws the 
entire question of debt politics into a different light. Because if debt can readily 
circulate as money, its possible redemption becomes a less pressing concern. 
Rather if public debt is used as money it provides the state with power not just to 
finance its own outgoings, but a scope for much broader governance of liquidity in 
the economy as a whole. For precisely this reason the British state has been able 
to repeatedly ramp up its borrowing, well past the level at which repayment could 
be reasonable accepted, without crippling inflation or threat of explicit default. This 
offers a different vantage point from which to consider the emergence of techniques 
of neoliberal financial governance in the 1970s and 1980s. The question becomes 
less one about what sacrifices were necessary to acquire credibility in the eyes of 
international financial markets, and more about how the public debt acquired 
monetary features, and what role the state played in the gradual institutionalisation 
of monetised public debt. From here it becomes easier to see what interests the 
state had in the development of neoliberal techniques of financial governance. In 
the next chapter I begin this process by first exploring how public debt acquired 
monetary features through the seventeenth century Financial Revolution, and how 
public finance shaped the development of banking in Britain over the centuries that 
followed. 
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2. The long history of the British 
debt state 
Introduction 
The British state has a long history of debt. If, to use Wolfgang Streeck’s (2014b) 
terminology, a ‘debt state’ is one dependent on borrowed money, Britain has been 
something of a debt state for over three hundred years. Yet rather than present a 
problem, the growth of its public debt has been a basis for a great empowerment of 
the British state. This is because the Financial Revolution and the establishment of 
the Bank of England in 1694, gave the state a unique capacity to borrow on the 
basis of issuing banknotes. This monetisation of public debt meant debt could 
stretch well past the levels at which repayment could ever realistically be expected. 
This unleashed a very particular monetary dynamic in Britain that shaped the 
development of its financial system and the possibilities of public finance and 
economic governance. The longer history of public finance in Britain is easy to 
overlook in the familiar framing of British industrial decline, where Britain’s growing 
debts are taken as yet another sign of its waning economic significance (for 
example Schenk, 2010). Once a powerful creditor to the world, by the end of the 
first world war it had amassed vast liabilities to itself and the wider world 
(Cairncross, 1991). In this story Britain’s debt is a burden that grew heavier as 
empire receded and industry declined. External balances were a theme that 
dogged governments throughout the postwar years and many authors use this as a 
template for considering the hegemonic transition from Britain to America in the 
twentieth century (for example, Schenk, 2010; Green, 2016).  
This chapter throws the issue of indebtedness into a different light by 
examining how public debt acquired monetary features through the Financial 
Revolution and how this shaped the gradual integration of public debt into the 
broader economy. It is well established that debt and money are intrinsically 
connected. Indeed, the notion of money as a form of debt is foundational to a large 
branch of critical political economy. Yet there is much less clarity over what it 
means to examine the moneyness of debt historically. By tracking concretely how 
public debt became money in Britain, and what implications this had, I begin the 
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process of historicising the moneyness of debt. This is an especially British (and 
English, initially) story because it was the specific changes in the nature of money 
in Britain which emerged through the development of banknotes that underpinned 
the Financial Revolution and the establishment of the Bank of England. It is why the 
British classical political economists are so significant in shaping monetary thinking 
and why there was to become such a rich lineage of monetary thought in Britain in 
the centuries that followed. 
Through the chapter I demonstrate the necessity of conceptualising the 
monetary aspects of public debt in a specific way. What mattered was not simply 
that public debt was used as money, but that this shaped the development of 
financial institutions in the country and worked to provide the British state a unique 
avenue for intervention in what became a broad national economy. As I show the 
national debt was central to the formation of a national system of banking and 
finance and Britain, and this worked to empower the central government, laying the 
foundations for what became the Keynesian revolution. In this sense I use this 
chapter to examine more deeply the fundamental, revolutionary changes that took 
place in the period between the time the classical liberal political economists raised 
their concerns about public debt, and the postwar period in Britain that is my focus. 
In doing so I show how the politics of public finance has never been simply about 
the state taking the necessary steps to establish credibility in the eyes of financial 
markets. 
The chapter is divided into three sections. I begin by examining the 
emergence of state debt in England in the Financial Revolution and the monetary 
politics entailed in the foundation of the Bank of England. I draw on Samuel Knafo’s 
(2013) work on the rise of the Gold Standard to show how England’s early financial 
development was shaped by banknote issuing. The second section examines the 
rise of a national banking system centred around the clearing banks, the discount 
houses and the Bank of England. This put one form of national debt securities - 
paper money - into the heart of the banking system. A new dimension to the debt 
state emerged as the relationship between liquidity and the monetary base in gold 
loosened. In turn this opened a new aspect to the operation of debt management 
because the national debt became embroiled with liquidity control. The new 
institutional linkages that emerged helped develop a new capacity for the state to 
use debt management to intervene into the economy through adjusting liquidity. In 
the third section I show how this dynamic was magnified through the enormous 
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expansion in Treasury Bill-financed first world war debt, while again another 
dimension to the debt state was added through the emergence of 
intergovernmental debt, especially Britain’s war debts owed to America. This meant 
the operation of debt management had to speak not only to domestic liquidity but 
also external liabilities and the issue of convertibility. 
2.1 The origins of public debt 
The Financial Revolution of the seventeenth century was crucial to establishing a 
unique trajectory for British political economic development. Through the revolution 
the British state established the ability to issue its debt as banknotes, dramatically 
shifting the politics of public finance as a result. The revolution, which occurred as 
part of a sophisticated financial architecture based on discounting that took hold in 
England, established the possibility for the state, as a debtor, to greatly empower 
itself through borrowing vast sums sustainably. It was this financial power that John 
Brewer explored in his classic work The Sinews of Power (1990). Brewer outlined 
the broad links between state power and the financial system by demonstrating 
how Britain’s military capacity grew alongside the Financial Revolution. He argued 
that through the development of a sophisticated and centralised regime of tax 
collection, the English state was able to establish a collateral on which to secure 
vast public credit, which funded its repeated wars in the seventeenth, eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. In this respect Brewer successfully demonstrates how the 
state was able to use debt. Yet he and others (for example Dickson, 1993) depict 
the Financial Revolution as part of the broader Glorious Revolution in England that 
put in place the contours of the liberal state. In traditional readings the liberal state 
is supposed to be limited. As such Brewer squares the contradiction of the growing 
power of the state that he identified, and its supposedly liberal formation, through 
the idea of ‘credibility’. He argues that the fact that the state could raise credit in this 
way was forged on - and symptomatic of - the faith private financiers had in the 
credibility of the state and the newly formed Bank of England, that would protect 
them from arbitrary extraction by the crown. Brewer’s account is typical of the way 
public debt is treated, where the state’s debt-raising capacity is read off a template 
of ‘credibility’. It shapes how Brewer reads the monetary politics of the Bank of 
England, which for him emerges precisely because of the crown’s commitment to 
maintain sound money and resist any attempt to debase and inflate the currency.  
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The Bank itself is taken as a classic marker for textbook histories of public 
finance because it seems to epitomise the early emergence of England as a ‘liberal’ 
state. Yet the origins of the Bank of England and the way it developed with the gold 
standard challenges this story. To recall the Bank of England was established in 
1694 when William of Orange borrowed £1.2 million to fund war against France. 
This is often presented as the first ‘public loan’, with the contemporary public 
explainers stating that its founding loan can be thought of as the first ‘gilt’ issue 
(Choudhry et al., 2003, p. 1). The loan was raised at 8 per cent in perpetuity and, 
somewhat incredibly, remained on the Bank of England’s balance sheet for another 
three hundred years (ibid.). 
Yet public debt did not begin with the Bank of England. And, as Knafo 
(2013) outlines, it is more fruitful to read the establishment of the Bank in the 
context of the broad transformation in English finance brought about by the rise of 
discounting, rather than as the manifestation of the credibility brought about by an 
emerging liberal state. When viewed from the generic perspective of abstract 
‘creditors’, seventeenth century ‘credibility’ was a question of ensuring sound 
money: that metal currencies were not debased and that discounted bills of 
exchange would be redeemed into the agreed weight in gold. This theory would 
assume that the crown’s commitment to sound money would empower financiers 
as creditors, and help establish the conditions for the financial sector to develop in 
Britain. Yet the history worked out the other way, because the way ‘sound money’ 
was pursued actually undermined financiers. When read in terms of the specific 
struggle within the English state between landlords and the banking community, the 
politics of sound money are better understood. The crown’s commitment to sound 
money came not from financiers as creditors, but came from the way landlords, not 
wanting their rents dented by inflation, lobbied the state. Indeed, such was the 
power of landlords that even the fiscal capacity of the crown was undermined 
because landlords had grown wary of constant taxes on land, and used the power 
of parliament to make it harder for the crown to extract revenue in this way. As such 
the crown was forced to turn to other sources of financing - notably mercantile 
companies - which posed a challenge to the sound money framework which had 
underpinned state intervention. Merchants had found it difficult to trade English 
exports (of wool etc) for Asian goods and as such relied on specie (silver coins, 
mostly) for payment. Previously, during the Middle Ages, merchants predominantly 
exported English goods and returned with specie. This worked well in a context 
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where the crown’s pursuit of sound money meant it had banned the export of 
bullion. However, once the merchants’ dynamic reversed, the policy became a 
problem. The merchants needed to export specie if they were to import goods from 
the East but the crown wanted to pursue sound money and maintain the value of 
the pound. The limits on money exchange and minting of specie meant there had 
been frequent financing and liquidity problems for both the state and private 
business.  
It was in this context that the development of discounting that had begun 
with the London Goldsmiths and found institutional form politically through the 
establishment of the Bank of England should be read. The Goldsmiths had 
established themselves as safe-guarders of wealth assets - gold, silver and other 
jewels - which was especially important in the fervent political environment of 
revolutionary England. As Knafo (2013, p. 88) outlines: 
“Goldsmiths accepted bills of exchange from merchants and gave in return 
promissory notes that were convertible into gold. These banknotes were 
probably issued initially as a convenient means to deal with the shortage in 
means of payment. They quickly began circulating within mercantile 
networks of London, and gained credibility as means of payment.”  
What the London Goldsmiths did was to hand out banknotes instead of coins when 
they discounted bills of exchange (Knafo, 2013, p. 54). Their deposits were the 
foundation for the development of a significant growth in liquidity. Using the capital 
they stored they extended credit to feed the growing liquidity demands of the 
merchants and then, the expanding financial needs of the state.  
This is pivotal because it is here where you see state debt first acquire 
monetary functions, and transformed the ability of the state to borrow large sums 
sustainably as a result. The implications were startling; in effect the state could 
finance itself by creating money ‘out of nothing’. There has been much debate3 
about how to conceptualise this, but whether viewed as credit money, or fractional 
reserve intermediation, the practice of lending money as notes rather than coins 
transformed the sound money/limited liquidity problem, because the same amount 
of specie could transform into greater liquidity. Goldsmiths were drawn on to 
                                                      
3 The financial practice established by the Goldsmiths has been variously described as 
fractional reserve banking, ‘real-bills’ intermediary banking, or more recently an early 
development of securitisation. See Werner (2015) and Sgambati (2016) for a full 
discussion.  
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provide liquidity to the state, using banknote issuing to discount treasury bills issued 
by the state. As a financial practice that was removed from currency exchange it 
was an innovation of, and suited to, the sound money regime (Knafo, 2013). For 
this reason, the pre-history to the establishment of the Bank of England matters, 
because it was the development of the practice of banknote issuing that was 
institutionalised through the Bank of England, and it provided the state an 
enormous flexibility in financing.  
The brute numbers tell a story: At the end of the Nine Years War in 1697 
government debt stood at nearly £17 million and over the century that followed the 
national debt grew rapidly. By 1793, unredeemed public debt stood at an 
unprecedented £245 million, a fifteen fold increase (Brewer, 1990, p. 94). 
Moreover, the interest rate on public debt fell substantially, from 8 per cent to 3 per 
cent between 1694 and 1750 (Knafo 2013, p. 82) and the scheduling of debt was 
transformed. Between 1688 and 1697, 70 per cent of the Crown’s debt was on 
short-term contracts, this had fallen to 14 per cent by the time of the Austrian 
succession wars of 1739-1748 (ibid., p. 91). In this way the fiscal operations of the 
state (which were overwhelmingly directed at warfare) were underpinned by debt. 
Indeed by the time of the American war 40 per cent of public expenditure was 
funded by loans (Brewer, 1990, p. 94). In the contemporary terms of Streeck 
(2014b), eighteenth century Britain was very much a ‘debt state’ and its level of 
indebtedness - enabled through banknote issuing - far exceeded other European 
countries, whose public banks still revolved around monetary exchange and 
clearing. It was what fuelled England’s political dominance in the region (Mann, 
1986 in Knafo, 2013). England’s reliance on debt was not unique. Rather it was the 
fact that this was debt issued as banknotes that marked it out (Knafo, 2013). 
2.2 Debt management after discounting revolution 
The emergence of this early ‘debt state’ set up a particular dynamic for the English 
state that did not exist previously. Its ability to issue its debt as banknotes meant 
that the management of public debt soon became a crucial apparatus of statecraft. I 
focus here on the way the state developed a capacity to raise and sustain large 
debts and what institutional connections were forged through this, which could later 
be repurposed for policymaking. Debt management consisted of two channels and 
involved mobilising different social coalitions. First, there was an effort to 
reorganise, repackage and rollover loans to extend their maturity and lower their 
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interest rates, which entailed partnering with the goldsmith bankers. Second, there 
was ensuring the continued stability of the underlying collateral, which was the 
constant extraction of private wealth through taxes and Crown licensing of 
incorporated ‘public companies’. This extractive taxation is the familiar problem with 
debt laid out by the classical political economists and entailed partnering with 
merchants and needed parliamentary support. Taken together these two strategies 
of managing the growing public deficit spawned political tensions between landlords 
and merchants, a conflict that is covered in depth by Knafo (2013). My focus is on 
how, given its monetary aspects, the operation of public debt management resulted 
in the state assembling a particular capacity for intervention. Initially, I argue, 
though the state tried to develop refinancing strategies, its primary mode of debt 
management was extractive, fiscal interventions of the classical imaginary.  
To begin I focus on the effort to improve the terms of debt financing and the 
growing role this provided merchant bankers. The initial loans made to the crown by 
the Bank of England and the goldsmiths that preceded it were self-liquidating 
annuities (Caselli, 2015). Their success was helped by the establishment of a 
secondary market for government debt. This involved the incorporated bodies of 
public creditors, led by the Bank of England, developing a securities market in 
London that allowed lenders to sell their public (or merchant) debt onto third parties. 
This secondary market was crucial in getting the government’s system of long-term 
financing off the ground (Dickson, 1993) and integral to the growing sustainability of 
public debt because it improved the liquidity of debt securities. There were clear 
advantages for private firms, like the Bank of England, to partner with government. 
Secured against tax revenues as they were, public loans were comparatively low 
risk and guaranteed their holders a regular income, which in turn provided them 
with enormous power in the private money market (over other creditors). Indirectly 
underwritten by the state, merchant banks could dominate the private lending 
market. There was, as a result, much competition among private companies to try 
and collect a larger slice of the public debt market (Knafo, 2013). 
“In 1707, for example, the Sword Blade Company tried to wrest part of the 
debt away from the Bank of England. The incorporated creditors also fought 
amongst themselves for a larger slice of the fiscal pie. In the same year that 
the Bank of England had to fend off the attentions of the Sword Blade 
Company, the East India Company orchestrated a run on the Bank to 
weaken its rival” (Brewer 1990, p. 97). 
With the market for public debt seemingly strong, successive governments tried to 
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repackage short-term loans into a single fund to extend their maturity or lower their 
interest rate. For example, Walpole established the Sinking Fund in 1716, which 
initially was supposed to be about building up a ‘war chest’ from which to pay back 
the principle on public debt, but quickly transformed into being a fund for 
restructuring the debt instead (Brewer, 1990). Moreover, the partnership with 
merchant bankers helped management of the public debt because their 
administrative and bookkeeping methods were better suited to the new practices of 
discounting than the more cumbersome procedures of the Exchequer (Brewer 
1990, p. 97). It shows an early awareness that intervening in the liquidity of debt 
could be used to ‘buy time’ before its repayment, but at this stage the state’s 
engagement with these kinds of monetary techniques of debt management were 
fairly rudimentary and it was more concerned with the second channel of debt 
management more familiar to the classical liberal imaginary: taxation.  
It was still taxation and incorporation licences that underpinned the security 
of the note issues and formed the backbone to the state’s operation of debt 
management. As such specific taxes were raised for the purpose of underwriting 
and repaying public loans. This was in part due to the uniquely centralised tax 
system in England (Wood, 1981), with uniform fiscal arrangements across the 
country ensuring that taxes were levied on a national rate, allowing greater consent 
to the system of taxation and making revenues more predictable and loans secured 
on their revenue more stable (Brewer, 1990). As taxes on land became harder to 
levy because of the resistance of landlords in parliament, many of the new taxes it 
raised were indirect taxes on consumption. Indeed, the use of the Sinking Fund to 
lower borrowing costs, rather than actually pay off the national debt, reflected the 
authorities’ changing attitude towards public debt and the gradual acceptance that it 
was becoming a permanent part of public life. The other extractive mode of debt 
management was to charge companies for incorporation, with the East India 
company, the South Sea company and indeed the Bank of England, all having to 
pay for the privilege of having the licence to, for example, trade in the name of the 
Crown. Yet, as Knafo (2013) describes, the problem with this dependence on fiscal 
means of management was that it exacerbated the clear tension between the 
extractive power of the state and private merchants. 
The growing acknowledgement of the debt and an understanding of fiscal 
means of sustaining it did not translate as yet to an understanding of a more 
‘monetary’ approach to intervention into the broader economy. While the state’s 
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fiscal extractions were distributed fairly evenly across the country, monetarily, the 
state’s interventions and partnerships were all clustered around the City of London 
and the merchant banks. In that way the operation of debt management and the 
discounted bills issued by the Bank of England were fairly removed from the 
monetary system more broadly. It was not until the nineteenth century that the Bank 
of England and the system of discounted bills hooked into the broader industrial 
English economy outside of London (Knafo 2013). It is this ‘monetary’ operation of 
debt management, and the coordination and establishment of a ‘national’ financial 
system that was established through it, to which I now turn. 
2.3 Forging monetary governance of the debt state 
The growing national debt and increasing political tension between the landlords 
and merchant banks in England over who should bare the brunt of ensuring ‘sound 
money’ brought about enormous changes to the financial landscape in England. I 
argue that state established a more ‘monetary’ means of managing the national 
debt - focussed less on solvency - which was to lay the foundations for the 
Keynesian interventions that followed in the twentieth century. In this section I show 
how by the end of the nineteenth century a national financial system was 
established where the payments system revolved around a small number of 
clearing banks, with branches across the country, who accepted cheques from 
each other as a primary means of payment. What was not paid for by cheques was 
paid for in cash, of which the Bank of England was the sole provider (Chick, 1993). 
This meant that by the end of the nineteenth century clearing banks were 
dependent on the Bank for liquidity. This was liquidity that was secured on 
government debt, which meant that the newly forming monetary apparatus was 
entirely embroiled in the operation of debt management (ibid.). It is very difficult to 
grasp these developments from a perspective focussed on the power of creditors, 
instead they are better understood in terms of the effort to examine how the state 
as a debtor developed the capacity to manage its debts.  
To reach this point, however, there first needed to exist a national system of 
payments, something that would give meaning to the very notion of a ‘national 
financial system’. As such, I begin by examining how this national financial system 
emerged and what it meant for the way the state managed its debt. This involved 
the transformation of England’s financial landscape, where the localised note-
issuing country banks that underwrote eighteenth century industrialisation were 
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replaced in the nineteenth century by centralised, joint-stock clearing banks 
(Seabrooke, 2006) coordinated by the notes issued by the Bank of England. This 
left in place a highly politicised system of national financial governance that was 
subject to intense debate. By the start of the first world war, the monetary 
infrastructure constructed through public debt embedded public finance deeply into 
the workings of the broader economy. Through the twentieth century this became a 
basis for government to take an active role in economic governance, and especially 
in managing the problem that was to develop with Britain’s external liabilities. 
Country banking and the industrial revolution 
While the Financial Revolution and emergence of the first ‘debt state’ may have 
come from the London banking system, the Industrial Revolution in England was 
actually fuelled by the country banking system. These were banks that arose 
alongside, and directly supported, industrialisation and had intimate ties to industry, 
and they provide a different perspective on the nature of British finance to the 
London merchant banks that usually dominate readings of British economic history 
(for example Ingham, 1984; Anderson, 1964). The country banks played an 
important role in laying the foundations of a national system of finance on which the 
twentieth century forms of debt management were forged.  
The country banks were born out of commercial or industrial ventures and 
were adapted to the needs of specific industries by drawing on the practice of 
discounting developed by the London Goldsmiths (Nevin and Davis, 1970) that I 
described earlier. As is well known, the manufacturing firms that emerged in the 
midlands and North of England did not rely on external finance. Instead their 
ventures were usually funded from family and social networks and their expansion 
was based on existing profits (Hall, 1986). This meant these industrialists had little 
need for the type of investment houses that supported, say, German 
industrialisation. Country banks were typically clustered around a particular industry 
or geographical region where these industries formed. These areas were often 
poorly served by the monetary system centred on mercantile exchanges in the City 
of London (Knafo, 2013). As the industrial revolution unfolded there emerged in 
England a uniquely dense network of domestic trade, distinct from the long-
distance mercantilism that characterised British trade previously, and the 
continental economies of the time. For industrialists, the primary problem was less 
one of obtaining investment finance and much more an issue of finding means of 
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payment (Knafo, 2013 p. 114) for the domestic trade. This meant a different 
dynamic for financiers too. Instead of profiting through long-distance currency 
exchange and arbitrage, or financing domestic industrial investment, the main issue 
in supporting industrialisation was providing liquidity to facilitate this flourishing 
domestic trade. It was in this context that the country banks arose.  
 They were founded by already wealthy entrepreneurs in response to the 
need to provide local means of payment (Pressnell, 1956, p. 14). Country banking 
provided a solution through issuing banknotes secured against bills of exchange. 
The credibility of the banknotes was ensured because they were convertible into 
gold very soon after the bills of exchange had matured. As such note issues in this 
way allowed the money supply to increase quickly and easily with demand, but 
would not stay in the system, because the notes expired when the underlying 
assets matured. Discounting in this way meant country banks could provide liquidity 
to people whose financial assets were themselves not readily useable (Knafo, 
2008). 
The banking system of the time was, therefore, geared towards note-
issuing. For the banks, this practice of discounting established an incentive to gain 
through lowering reserves as much as possible because the more notes were 
issued, the greater the profits. The only thing that needed to be managed was 
ensuring there was enough gold to meet maturing notes. This demanded a very 
close relationship with the industrialists to whom they issued notes, because the 
banks needed to be sure of the credibility of the assets the notes were issued 
against. This close relationship meant that country banks offered short-term credit 
too. The fact credit was provided on a short-term basis has since been taken as a 
sign of the speculative bias (for example Ingham, 1984; Hutton, 1996). But far from 
reflecting the separation of industry and finance, it was actually the demands of 
industrialists and their close relationship with financiers that ensured short-term 
credit availability (Knafo, 2008). Industrialists tended to finance more long-term 
capital expenditure from their existing savings, and drew in banks to for their 
liquidity needs, which made country banks’ overdraft facilities ideal. Long-term 
needs, if they could not be met from in-house profits, were served by rolling and 
renewing short-term facilities (Newton, 1996). This demanded a much closer 
relationship between bankers and industrialists in Britain than the image painted by 
the caricatures of aloof London merchant financiers. 
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 Country banks were small, locally-focussed and, because they were set up 
more to provide means of payment than provide investment finance, did not really 
need to chase greater deposits. As such they had no real interest in expanding 
through opening new branches. In this way the banking system was quite disjoined. 
In contrast to the fiscal apparatus of the state, which was more centralised and over 
which the state had clear control, monetary relations in England, even by the late 
eighteenth century were more haphazard. Indeed, the system of hundreds of 
different banks each issuing their own banknotes created a problem whereby it was 
difficult for any one bank to determine the quality of banknotes from any other 
(Knafo, 2013, p.115). As such banknotes were mostly issued for clients to use 
locally and banks were reluctant to issue to people who were not already their 
customers. Indeed, such was the closeness of their relationships that there was 
often a bias in credit allocation (Coterell, 1980, p.211). Banks sometimes 
overlooked dubious bills of exchange and entered into informal arrangements with 
industrialists for the sole purpose of getting banknotes in return (Knafo, 2013, p. 
139). Unsurprisingly, come the nineteen century, there were repeated crises among 
the country banks stemming from over leverage that left them short of liquidity. The 
more widespread the use of notes became, the greater the potential danger of 
liquidity problems and banking crises. In one case, in 1825, one crisis led to the 
bankruptcy of 60 banks (Knafo 2013, p. 140), demonstrative of the fact that there 
was clearly a problem with the operation of country banks. Yet even at this stage 
country banks were quite isolated from each other and insulated from the wider 
economy as a whole.  
As country banking grew with industrialisation, and notes became more 
widespread, however, the country banks began to become a crucial part of the 
discounting activities in the City of London. This brought the country banks and 
their regional bank notes into the same monetary sphere as the state’s debt and as 
such country banking crises became a more significant problem for the state’s 
monetary authorities (Knafo, 2013). Such potential for contagion never existed 
previously. The famous South Sea Bubble, for instance, despite its longstanding 
cultural legacy, did not actually undermine the broader financial system, indeed 
bankruptcy levels were barely affected by the crisis (Hoppit, 1986). Yet once the 
country banks had hooked into the London discount houses, this dynamic changed. 
Disparate parts of the nation’s banking institutions were linked together, drawing 
the early contours of a more national banking system, with the potential for national 
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banking crises. The more frequent crises became and the more widespread their 
influence, the more their potential to pull the entire national economy down with 
them, and this presented a problem to policymakers. The more the national 
financial system could rise and fall together, the more important it became for the 
authorities to be able to foster stability (Knafo, 2013).  
By the 1820s the Bank of England would be forced into taking greater 
control of the financial system precisely because of the way country banks became 
so vulnerable to crises. As a result, the liquidity of the payments system became 
the national issue we now know it to be. As Knafo (2013, p. 116) writes:  
“As banking reinforced synergies between different economic regions 
(Hoppit 1986), the economy began displaying more regular business 
cycles. As the economy rose and fell together it foregrounded the issue of 
financial crises and liquidity and banking regulation became public issues 
with bank-note issuing a genuine public concern.”  
The response from the Bank of England was to try to restrict banknote issuing in a 
way that targeted creditors, rather than suited them. Again this revolved around the 
pursuit of ‘sound money’. The landed aristocrats in parliament at the time had no 
faith in the ability of decentralised, private bodies to control the money supply 
adequately and as such wanted strong, central regulation. As rentiers, they were 
especially keen the value of the rents they charged not be dented by irresponsible 
and inflationary monetary manipulation from financiers using their discounting 
practices to inflate the money supply (Knafo, 2013). The move to restrict note 
issuing was clearly against the interests of industrialists, who relied on country 
banknotes for means of payments, but was also an attack on the financiers in 
London, who gained from discounting country banks bills. Yet it was still pushed 
through.  
What this demonstrates is that in the construction of the financial order that 
existed at the time of Britain’s early indebted state, government did exercise power 
over some creditors. It is difficult to conceptualise these battles, polices and 
institutional linkages from a perspective on debt politics that lines creditors up 
against debtors, and assumed the former’s ‘market power’ can explain political 
economic developments. What is instead revealed is how political struggles around 
credit and debt are articulated and fought through more concrete social groups with 
more immediate interests. Moreover, in the case of the demise of the country 
banks, it is revealed how ‘sound money’ was pursued by the state targeting a key 
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group of creditors. I now turn to the new linkages that formed through the demise of 
the country banks by switching my focus to the newly forming joint-stock banks.  
The emergence of joint-stock banks and a national financial system 
The key task facing the monetary authorities was regulating the supply and quality 
of banknote issues. To this end the Bank of England targeted the country banks, by 
imposing ceilings on their note issues and actively supporting the rival joint-stock 
banks that were emerging during the first few decades of the nineteenth century 
(Collins, 1988). These were banks that relied on deposits rather than note issuing 
for business and the authorities supported their development by granting them 
various privileges, most significant of which was limited liability. The success of the 
joint-stock banks, cultivated as it was by the state (Seabrooke, 2006, p. 58), came 
at a direct expense to the country banks, who were quietly suffocated out of 
existence. Though in 1880 there were still 157 note-issuing banks in England and 
Wales, issuing over £6 million of banknotes, they were easily overtaken by the big 
joint-stock banks which appeared in the nineteenth century (Knafo, 2013, p. 142). 
As country bank financial provision subsided, the right to issue banknotes was 
granted solely to the Bank of England. This laid the foundations for modern central 
banking and monetary policy management (Knafo, 2013). In what follows I describe 
how the significance of this was to loosen the tie between the various means of 
payments (money) and central bank (gold) reserves even further, and solidify a 
‘national’ payments system while also creating a new role for national debt 
securities.  
The joint-stock banks dominated the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century and remain familiar high street names even today4. These banks became 
the dominant supplier of credit in the market and, towards the end of the nineteenth 
century, were pulled more into the orbit of the London financiers (Seabrooke, 
2006). The character of the British financial system as we now know it – 
commercial, speculative, and highly concentrated – can be traced back to the later 
development of the joint-stock banks in England. Their emergence also helped 
establish the Bank of England at the apex of the emerging national financial system 
because it was the sole provider of cash. The Bank was happy to see the clearers 
                                                      
4 Though they have undergone mergers, banks like Barclays and National Westminster 
remain high street names. 
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grow and develop wide branch networks of customer deposits because of its belief 
that greater capitalisation would help shore-up the financial system that had 
suffered repeated crises and would lessen its dependence on the London financiers 
(Seabrooke, 2006). The Bank of England looked at the Scottish example of joint-
stock banks, with their bigger deposit base, and saw a stability lacking in the old 
English country banking system. As such the monetary authorities licensed the 
creation of joint-stock banks in London (on the condition they did not issue notes) 
which allowed them to tap into the vast resources of the City. England’s financial 
system was being tilted away from banknote-issuing country banks and towards 
deposit-taking joint-stock banks.  
The rise of joint-stock banks set up a new dynamic in the financial system 
which multiplied liquidity. The country banking system relied on discounting gold 
reserves and increasing liquidity by issuing notes. Yet the joint-stock banking 
system worked by clearing banks issuing cheques drawn against deposits, as a 
means of payment (Chick, 1993). It created an extra layer between the broad 
money supply, the stock of Bank of England notes, and the country’s gold reserves. 
Simply, claims on deposits could now act as means of payment. The clearing banks 
could increase loans by issuing cheques, something that did not require new note 
issues by the Bank of England, or an increase in gold reserves. Cheques had not 
really developed as a system of payment in continental countries (Hughes, 2016) 
and set up in Britain a fundamentally different financial trajectory. Joint-stock 
banking in this way helped to decouple money from gold, and instead made public 
debt securities - banknotes and other short-term public securities - the monetary 
base of the payments system (Chick, 1993).  
Within clearing banks themselves, the incentive was to branch out so as to 
deepen the pool of deposits. This is reflected in the growth in deposits from £9m to 
£43m between 1844 and 1857 and a vast expansion in the number of bank 
branches (Nevin and Davis, 1970). The effect on liquidity was vast and meant that 
lending could be extended as long as the clearing banks felt able to obtain liquid 
liabilities. This was helped by a developing practice of commercial banks lending to 
each other. This was done in large part in Britain through what were known as 
discount houses. The importance of this was again in facilitating a great expansion 
of liquidity without having to obtain more commodity money, gold. The growing use 
of cheques as a means of payment, interbank lending through the discount houses, 
and the resultant distancing of the payments system from gold, necessarily involved 
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an intellectual transformation in how money and the financial system were 
perceived. Firstly, the notion of money as a commodity, which underpinned the 
sound money focus on limiting the minting of coins, had grown outdated. By this 
stage and there was instead more emphasis on money as an intermediary, a 
means of payment (Chick, 1993).  
In terms of the governance and the pursuit of sound money this meant a 
change in strategy for the monetary authorities. With a national payments system 
increasingly removed from commodity money, the goal of limiting inflation took a 
different form. The authorities had to ensure that bank notes were not over issued. 
This was in part achieved by curtailing country banks from issuing notes, and 
crucially by trying to tie the hands of the Bank of England through an imposition the 
gold standard (Knafo, 2013). Not only did this limit the ability of the Bank to create 
liquidity but, with the carefully cultivated emergence of the joint-stock banks, meant 
there was an ability to control credit creation more generally. The clearing, joint-
stock banks created liquidity through cheques and cash. They could originate 
cheques, but the Bank was the sole provider of the fraction of means of payments 
that was not made through drawing on cheques: cash. As such when the clearing 
banks needed access to cash they had to borrow it from the interbank market - 
cleared through the discount houses - who in turn were dependent ultimately on the 
sole supplier of cash, the Bank of England (Collins, 1988). 
The more the clearing banks extended their branch network, the more 
liabilities they had to manage. There was a tension here. Because the banks did 
not want to store excessive amounts of cash deposits - on which they received no 
interest - they wanted to invest some of these. At the same time, they needed to be 
sure they had sufficient cash reserves to meet any sudden surge of customer 
demand for cash. So this delicate management of liquidity was the responsibility of 
the joint-stock banks (Nevin and Davis, 1970). But the way they balanced these 
twin imperatives was through the discount houses. They put a proportion of their 
deposits in discount houses - which were short-term loans on which they earned a 
slim return - but were easily retrievable (Collins and Baker, 2001). If any bank 
needed to fund a sudden surge in cash demands, they could then borrow liquidity 
from the discount houses (at a slim cost), and that way the payments system could 
operate securely. If, however, there was a systemic withdrawal and the discount 
houses were short of cash, they could go to the Bank of England (Allen, 2014). This 
was the hook between the Bank of England and the national financial system. The 
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Bank set the rate at which they lent cash to the discount houses, and therefore the 
clearing banks, which was called the Bank Rate. The terms by which the Bank 
provided funding to the discount houses had an effect, therefore, on the entire 
financial system. 
National debt in the national financial system 
At this point it is worth outlining just what had happened to the debt in the years 
between the establishment of the Bank of England and the end of the nineteenth 
century. The Financial Revolution had granted the state a capacity to issue its debt 
as money. Nonetheless until the nineteenth century the national debt could 
primarily be thought of as part of the fiscal-military state as described by Brewer 
(1990), with the state’s debt management a fiscally-driven operation. War had 
made the parts of the debt seemingly immovable while peacetime generally slowed 
its expansion, but did not foster significant reduction the principle total. The 
Napoleonic wars between 1803 and 1815 substantially increased the debt from 
£324 million to £834 million (Hicks, 1954, p. 174) and secured England’s dominant 
position in Europe (Braudel, 1982). This was financed in the usual way, with the 
state issuing gilt-like securities through the Bank of England to London merchant 
banks, the colonial banks, and by the Bank of England’s Means and Ways 
advances (Hicks, 1954). By this point, however, as I outlined above, the national 
debt was beginning to have a crucial impact on the broader economy. This was 
because advances counted as an asset that backed note issuance, so the more 
that the government borrowed in this way, the more notes the Bank of England was 
able to bring into circulation. The notes themselves were as source of greater 
liquidity but these effects were multiplied because of the way cheques could be 
drawn against them, and used as a means of payment within the clearing bank 
network (Werner, 2015). In that sense, the moneyness of public debt was being 
steadily embedded into the deeper workings of the economy as a whole. 
The Bank of England was very happy to keep expanding note issues, but 
this ran up against the belief that the ever increasing gap between gold reserves 
and the money supply risked inflation and needed to be closed. As such 1821 saw 
the imposition of the formal gold standard (Knafo, 2013). This was driven by the 
desire of landlords to restrict note issuing by the Bank of England (and the declining 
country banks) and - contrary to the common assumption of indebted state being 
dictated to by its creditors - thereby ensured that the London bankers who had 
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been financing the state gained no further power, and blocked the possibility of 
inflation damaging the rents landlords received. The financial sector, as such, was 
deeply opposed to the imposition of a Gold Standard (ibid.). The fact it was driven 
through set up a particular problem for the monetary authorities who needed to be 
sure that there was enough gold at any time to meet any surge for convertibility. 
This set up a mercantilist like imperative to amass gold and demanded an 
especially extractive monetary arrangement from the colonies. The traditional 
accounts of the impact of British finance and empire sees the Gold Standard as 
helping attract capital from abroad by ensuring stability that made the use of 
sterling attractive. The reality was more that the imposition on the Bank of England 
to ensure convertibility meant that colonial countries were bled of their gold: 
“In the early 19th century, the Bank of England in times of difficulty would 
enquire of the East India Company as to know whether there were 
significant treasures in bullion heading towards England (Clapham 1958). 
To exploit this source more readily, monetary relations with India were 
increasingly formalized so as to draw out gold bullion and respond to the 
new imperatives of banknote issue convertible into gold” (Knafo, 2005, p. 
269). 
While the value of gold was high in Britain it made sense for gold to be sent there, 
and the gold standard was supported by appropriation of gold in the colonies which, 
given the Bank of England’s influence over the gold market, could then feed the 
expansion in banknote issuance domestically. In this sense monetary policy in the 
mid 1800s was largely an international affair, all about maintaining the external 
value of the currency and an international monetary order based on sterling, which 
meant ensuring sterling did not inflate (Chick 1990, p. 85). At this stage it meant in 
practice little active intervention domestically by the Bank of England, just a general 
nod to the flows of gold in and out of London (Tomlinson, 1985, p. 32). The rate of 
interest was directed towards managing the external value of sterling, while banks 
were largely left to themselves to manage their liquidity.  
This, however, began to change when the use of the Gold Standard spread 
to European countries in the late nineteenth century. European countries switched 
away from a silver or bimetallic standard to gold instead, and established a regime 
of fixed exchange rates between countries (Knafo, 2013). This provided an 
opportunity for financiers to arbitrage between countries and in doing so put 
pressure on central banks to amass reserves to meet these attacks. In this way the 
contours of the twentieth century balance of payments issues were being drawn, 
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with central banks in the middle of the dilemma. In the late nineteenth century 
Britain’s solution to the problem of maintaining convertibility was to further bleed the 
colonies. Forced trade with India, paid for not in products but in gold, ensured the 
British gold standard was supported through colonial exploitation (ibid.).  
Though it is often viewed as a restrictive form of monetary governance - 
limiting the state’s room for manoeuvre - the Gold Standard did little to inhibit the 
growth of public debt. Peace in Europe for the remainder of the nineteenth century 
allowed the level of the debt to drop slightly, along with Gladstone and the Victorian 
sensibility against excessive debt which saw the state pursue regular budget 
surpluses (Hicks, 1954). Nonetheless the debt-liquidity dynamic I described above 
was dramatically extended in 1877 with the invention of the Treasury Bill (ibid.). The 
Treasury Bill gave the state greater capacity for government to borrow from the 
financial system while at the same time solidifying the internal links between the 
state’s management of liquidity in the financial system and its operation in 
government debt management. In this way it was another crucial aspect of national 
debt that linked different monetary institutions together and helped build the 
capacity of the state to empower itself through public debt.  
The Treasury Bill was well suited to the apparatus of the London money 
market. Until then it was commercial bills - bills of exchange - that were the 
dominant means of short-term lending to finance international trade, and the main 
repository of commercial banks for their short-term funds, and the stock in trade of 
the discount houses (Hicks, 1954, p. 179). The Treasury Bill did all of these things, 
but - backed as it was by government - with substantially less risk. Moreover, 
Treasury Bills provided discount houses with a new source of liquidity. Previously, 
to borrow cash from the Bank of England, discount houses needed the collateral of 
high quality commercial bills of exchange. These were obviously in quite limited 
supply, especially during times of economic downturn. Yet the arrival of Treasury 
Bills not only provided an alternative form of collateral but also a discount house 
could hold them too maturity and collect the cash payout.  
As I will discuss in the third chapter this was to become a major issue after 
the second world war when the use of Treasury Bill financing had really swelled. 
Nonetheless for now, in part due to the austere Gladstonian principles of public 
financed described earlier, and the lack of expensive wars to fight in Europe, the 
new Treasury Bills was barely issued, except as a form of bridging loan before tax 
revenues came in. Even as late as 1914 there were just £13 million worth of 
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Treasury Bills compared to an estimated £500 million supply of commercial bills 
(Hicks, 1954, p. 180). The national debt, on the eve of the first world war, stood at 
its lowest ever level of 27 per cent of GDP (Goodhart, 1999, p. 44). However, the 
growing complication of monetary policy was to become entirely embroiled in debt 
management by the massive expansion in Treasury Bills used to finance the debt-
binge that was the two world wars. 
2.4 The first world war and the foundation of Keynesian intervention  
The national debt had long been embroiled in the military adventures of the state. 
The Bank of England was founded on war finance and it was debt that sponsored 
Britain’s colonial brutality for the following three hundred years. The relative 
(European) calm of the nineteenth century was exploded by the first world war and 
its cost necessitated a fundamental shift in the balance between public and private 
participation in financial markets (Hudson, 2003). The huge expansion in public 
debt, when allied to the developing national banking infrastructure, translated into a 
concentration of power within the Bank of England that ended up laying the 
foundations for the Keynesian revolution that followed. Britain’s debt state was 
remade through the war through the creation of number of internal institutional links 
between the state, the banking system and the broader economy.  
The increase in debt through the war was substantial. Government short-
term borrowing was £16 million in August 1914 and £1.5 billion by November 1918, 
most of which came from the clearing banks (Michie, 2004, p. 254). By 1919 
lending by banks to private customers had fallen to half its pre-war level - 32 per 
cent of available funds - with loans to government forming the majority of bank 
investment (ibid.). It meant that by the 1920s the relationship between the Treasury 
and the Bank that had developed through the war was necessarily very close. The 
Bank held government accounts and acted as the agent of the Treasury and gave 
advice on monetary policy. The Treasury, meanwhile, managed public debt while 
the Bank oversaw the money market (Green, 1991, p. 205). Clearing banks that 
had been primarily private-sector intermediaries before the war substantially 
increased their holdings of government securities (both short-term Treasury bills 
and longer-dated gilts) at the same time as the private sector contracted (Nevin and 
Davis, 1970).  
The nature of commercial banking also shifted in a way that provided for the 
state as a debtor another avenue (via the Treasury and Bank of England) through 
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which to influence the economy. There was a decline in the use of specie during 
the war, which meant paper money was quickly becoming the most common 
means of payment for everyday purchases (Chick, 1993). Accordingly, people 
expanded their use of current accounts where money could be withdrawn easily 
and quickly for everyday payments. This, in turn, made it more important for 
clearing banks to watch their deposit liabilities carefully, because mass use of notes 
meant made customers more willing to take out money at any one time. The 
reserve ratio - between deposits and cash liabilities - became an important figure 
that indicated to the public the credibility of individual banks, and to the government 
the stability of the broader financial system (Collins, 1988, p. 238). The political 
importance of these reserve ratios was reflected in the fact that after the Barings 
crisis in 1890 chancellor George Goschen and Robert Palgrave led a campaign 
about banking stability centred on a call for liquidity (Nevin and Davis, 1970, p. 
137). The actual utility of the reserve ratio figure to managing liquidity is in fact 
rather questionable. Many bankers of the time argued it was only one of a number 
of things they watched. The Bank of England, for example, also looked at specific 
markets - the like discount markets or gold losses - as indicators of wider economic 
trends (Moggridge, 1972, p. 146). In addition to these quantitative values, they also 
gleaned information from partners and contacts within the City. Nonetheless, the 
fact that the reserve ratio figure itself was publicly debated, with politicians wading 
in with recommendations of the “correct” ratio, demonstrates that the governance 
apparatus that had emerged through the nineteenth century had matured 
sufficiently to be a point of real political significance (Michie, 2004).  
The ratio of reserve capital to liabilities fell as banks sought greater profits. It 
had stood around 12-14 per cent in the 1890s, 10 per cent just before the first world 
war, 6-7 per cent during the war, and it remained around that figure thereafter 
(Collins, 1988, p. 237). This cash ratio became more and more important as 
bookkeeping methods improved and regular public statements about clearing 
banks’ cash position was made both possible and necessary (Nevin & Davis: 1970: 
137). The importance of these aggregates was reflected by the parliamentary 
Macmillan committee on finance and industry (1931). It argued that a fixed ratio 
was needed to ensure the Bank of England’s control over money markets 
(Macmillan committee, 1931, p. 12). The total cash position of the clearing banks 
was an important aggregate from the point of view of the Bank of England, who 
took it as an indicator of monetary wellbeing in the economy (ibid.). It is worth 
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remembering that a century before, such aggregates - and the Bank’s place in 
controlling them - could scarcely have been imagined. That it existed now was in 
large part due to the machinations of the debt state that had evolved over the 
previous centuries. The Macmillan report cited the fact that Britain lacked the legal 
requirement on a fixed ratio of deposits to liabilities that existed in the US, 
something the report argued, undermined the monetary authorities’ ability to ensure 
stability (Nevin and Davis, 1970, p. 137). This was because of the relationship 
between central bank money - secured on government debt - and the broader 
monetary system. The report argued that if the liquidity ratio was rigid, changes in 
the money supply of cash to the discount markets made by the Bank of England 
would show quickly in the change in level of commercial bank receipts and banks 
would be obliged to alter their loans and investments in order to re-establish the 
desired ratio. In that sense a fixed ratio meant the Bank could manipulate 
commercial bank lending more quickly and effectively (Collins, 1988, p. 241). In 
was in this way that monetary dynamics became such a crucial part of the 1930s 
debt state in Britain domestically.  
Alongside the significant expansion of war debts to the domestic monetary 
system the first world war entailed the first example of direct intergovernmental 
debt. Previously the state had raised finance from the private sector, to be repaid, 
in theory, by expanding domestic productivity, and collecting the tax receipts that 
resulted, and repaying creditors. This changed during the first world war as Britain 
especially racked up enormous “external liabilities” by borrowing from foreign 
governments, and one government in particular: America (Cairncross, 1991). This 
created a new dimension to the debt state. As Keynes wrote in his Treatise on 
Money “war concentrated gold in the vaults of the Central Banks; and these banks 
have not released it” (Keynes 1930, p.291). The dynamic where central banks had 
to amass reserves in order to protect their currencies took on a new dimension. 
Britain had used its colonial position to be a creditor to the world but the vast 
expansion of debt needed to fight the first world war meant this situation reversed. 
The difficulties it had had sustaining itself during the internationalisation of the gold 
standard after the 1870s was magnified as it was forced to borrow from America. In 
order to finance the war effort Britain suspended the promise of convertibility into 
gold and instead afterwards tried to establish a relationship to the US dollar. Having 
borrowed so much from America it faced the issue of amassing dollars (Schenk, 
2010). Arms sales were bought ‘on credit’ to the American Treasury and as such 
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after the war Britain had to find ways of amassing dollars to repay the debt. This 
was to become an enduring problem for the next fifty years. Initially, India came of 
use once more. Forced trade, this time paid for in dollars, worsened India’s own 
balance of payments but helped Britain with the resources to finance its external 
liabilities (Knafo, 2013, p. 170).  
This meant that by the end of the first world war there were three aspects to 
the activities of the Bank of England: primarily, it still had the responsibility for 
raising loans for the state. Attached to this it had a role in managing liquidity of the 
domestic economy and ensuring that note issuance didn’t lead to inflation. Finally, it 
had a problem of ensuring sterling notes could easily be converted into dollars. The 
national debt had evolved from its 1600s origins in such a way that by the 1930s 
the Bank of England was absolutely pivotal to the politics of the country. Moreover, 
the Bank operated through a new imaginary of metrics that did not exist when it 
was first founded. It was in control of a national banking system, a national 
currency, there were aggregate estimates of deposits, of reserves, of ratios, and a 
national balance of payments account. These were all aggregates that rose and fell 
on something resembling a national economic cycle and the Bank of England had 
the capacity to affect all, and in that way was in the process of crafting linkages 
between the central state as a debtor and the broader national economy that came 
to radically empower the central state in the decades that followed.  
What was missing at this stage was a clarity over the precise nature of the 
relationship between the Bank Rate and the broader effects domestically and 
internationally. There was a well-established tradition, starting with the landowners 
of the seventeenth century, to control credit creation by controlling the quantity of 
money minted so as to deflate the economy. Yet it was increasingly clear that in the 
debt state that was taking shape credit creation was seemingly more distant from 
the commodity money base, and as a result, it was possible to use monetary 
interventions into the economy (through the Bank Rate) to shape the interest rate at 
which debt financed is raised. It is in this context that we should read the rise of 
Keynesian ideas on money, debt and interest which I turn to in the following 
chapter.  
Conclusion  
The capacity to finance itself through the issue of banknotes was something unique 
to the British state. The fact that its debts could circulate as money since the 
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Financial Revolution meant the levels of debt it could raise grew well past that 
which could be realistically repaid. Though the monetary authorities in Britain tried 
repeatedly to develop fiscal policies that would contain and repay the debt, these 
soon became the basis for yet more borrowing. In taking the long view on the 
relationship between the British state and its debts, and tracking how public debt 
acquired monetary features, it became clear how these features compelled a 
number of regulatory reforms to British finance. The country banks had to be 
suffocated out of existence, and the Bank of England established as the central 
provider of liquidity to the economy as a whole. It meant that by the end of the 
nineteenth century government debt had ceased to be a mere means to finance 
fiscal expenditure, but was implicated in the workings of the national economy as a 
whole. This apparatus, in turn, was changed by the first world war which resulted in 
a huge expansion in Treasury Bill-financed, short-term government debt and the 
emergence of inter-governmental debt. The political economy of this context cannot 
be understood simply as creditor power: the clearing banks that financed much of 
the state’s debts through their Treasury Bill holdings were not dictating terms to 
government. If anything, it was the central government - through the Bank of 
England - that had the potential to affect the broader economy. The steady 
institutionalisation of public debt as a form of money meant an increasing 
politicisation of the terms by which government managed its debts. The Bank of 
England was the lynchpin of the financial system, making the Bank Rate a highly a 
contentious issue by the end of the first world war. Moreover, the ability of the state 
to use its debts to inject liquidity into the financial system and broader economy 
was something that would soon be harnessed for Keynesian style governance.  
In outlining this longer history to the British debt state, this chapter provides 
the backdrop for the thesis’s contribution in reconceptualising the relationship 
between the state and public debt by showing how the moneyness of public debt 
allowed the British state to sustain increasingly large volumes of debt. I have 
outlined some of the internal linkages between the state and the broader economy 
that were established through debt financing, linkages that are not easily accounted 
for when debt financing is seen as a near automatic response to insufficient tax 
revenues or driven simply by overexploitation of the ‘common pool’ of public 
finances as in the classical political economy imaginary. From this grounding, in the 
chapters that follow I develop an alternative perspective on the Keynesian state that 
emerged, showing how it represented an acknowledgement of the capacity built in 
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the centuries before for using the national debt as a tool of economic governance in 
a way that had not happened previously. 
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3. The making of the Keynesian 
debt state 
Introduction 
The question of public debt was transformed by Keynes. He broke with the 
orthodoxy that preceded him to argue that, if used correctly, public debt finance 
could pay for itself, and grow the common pool of a nation’s economy. Far from a 
poison to avoid, debt was a tool to be used. The significance of this shift is well 
recognised in the way Keynes’s name is so readily associated with debt. This is 
apparent in the discussions of the military Keynesianism of Cold War America (for 
example Griffin et al., 1982), or the asset price Keynesianism of contemporary 
America (Brenner, 2007), and privatised Keynesianism in Britain today (Crouch, 
2009). Which are each united through their general dependence on debt-based 
growth.  
Yet despite the focus on the importance of debt to Keynesianism, the 
monetary aspect of Keynes’s thinking is often overlooked. This is especially so in 
the debate over whether there was ever a ‘Keynesian revolution’ in British 
economic policymaking (Tomlinson, 1981; Booth, 1984; Booth, 1985; Tomlinson, 
1984; Clarke, 1998). The debate is framed as a conflict between Keynes and the 
orthodox ‘Treasury View’ that surrounded him (Peden, 1984; Booth, 1985). This 
battle centred on Keynes’s idea to use debt-financed fiscal spending to guard 
against recession, instead of the traditional Treasury preference for balanced 
budgets (Peden, 1984). Precisely because the monetary aspect of public debt is 
occluded, the Keynesian revolution is framed in fiscal terms.  
In this chapter I recast the Keynesian revolution in Britain. I show that the 
importance of Keynes’s thinking was to embrace the moneyness of debt and 
transform economic policymaking in Britain by making public debt securities a basis 
for the state to manage system wide macroeconomic liquidity. In that sense I show 
how Keynes’s intellectual thought and the apparatus of Keynesian governance 
came out of the monetary infrastructure that had developed in Britain since the 
Financial Revolution. By the time Keynes came to dominate economic policymaking 
in Britain, during and after the second world war, the state had amassed a huge 
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national debt (Nield, 2012), and for the first time was a debtor rather than creditor to 
the global economy (Schenk, 2010, p. 54). As such management of the national 
debt had become a central part of economic policy, providing challenges and 
opportunities that were unique to Britain and its financial system that had developed 
in the two centuries before.  
I argue that Keynes’s impact on economic governance can be better 
understood by reassessing the supposed rift with the Treasury View. These were 
not diametrically opposed positions, rather Keynes shared much with the key 
author of the Treasury View, Ralph Hawtrey. Hawtrey was the intellectual force 
behind the Treasury (Peden, 1984, p. 168; Howson and Winch, 1977) and was 
concerned primarily with monetary, rather than fiscal governance (Hawtrey, 1919; 
Hawtrey, 1926; Mehrling, 2010). I join monetary Keynesians like Geoff Tily (2010) 
and Ann Pettifor (2014) in arguing that Keynes’s influence on economic governance 
in Britain is better cast in terms of his monetary thought, rather than the fiscal 
caricatures by which his influence is now often defined. This puts the Keynesian 
state and its use of public debt in a new light. The state did not simply use public 
debt as a means to finance counter-cyclical fiscal spending - the classic notion of 
Keynesianism - but precisely because of the monetary infrastructure that had been 
constructed over previous years, debt could be a tool for wider economic 
governance. 
The chapter proceeds broadly chronologically, covering the period from 
Clement Attlee’s postwar Labour government in 1945, to Harold Wilson’s 
devaluation of Sterling in 1967, an era often referred to as ‘the Keynesian 
consensus’ (Kerr, 2001). In keeping with the chronology, I make four arguments 
over four sections. First I examine more deeply what is meant by ‘Keynesianism’ 
and the assessment of the Keynesian revolution in Britain. Here I show how 
Keynes was very much a successor, rather than opponent of Hawtrey and the 
Treasury View. Thereafter I examine how Keynes’s ideas were translated into 
practice and what institutional infrastructure was necessary to construct the 
Keynesian state. The second section argues that a key Keynesian influence on 
Attlee’s postwar governance was the use of short-term government debt securities - 
Treasury Bills specifically - to borrow directly from the banking sector so as to 
increase liquidity and keep public interest payments low. This period of ‘cheap 
money’ had profound consequences on the years that followed. In the third section 
I argue that a key impact of ‘cheap money’ was to render monetary policy 
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ineffective at controlling the domestic economy. As such economic governance had 
to take place through budgetary means. To do so effectively meant developing 
further the tools of national accounting and macroeconomic indicators, and place 
the Treasury at the centre of economic life. This empowered the Treasury in a way 
that it had never enjoyed previously. Finally, in the forth section I describe how the 
controls on the clearing bank sector intermeshed with the needs for financing the 
public debt, and made government spending the key lever of monetary control.  
3.1 Was there ever a ‘Keynesian revolution’ in Britain? 
On June 1 1944 William Beverage launched the White Paper on Full Employment 
that committed the government to deliver employment to all British citizens of 
working age. It was a document that turned the economic theories and moral 
commitments developed by Keynes over the previous two decades into political 
orthodoxy. The government would no longer be a neutral observer of economic life, 
it was to become the key protagonist, marking the start of what is considered to be 
nearly three decades of the ‘Keynesian consensus’ (Crouch, 1979; Brittan, 1971; 
Winch, 1970).  
Commentators like Peter Kerr (2001) have since come to define Keynesian 
governance as containing elements as diverse as a ‘mixed economy’, with 
nationalised companies, and a nationalised central bank, progressive taxation, a 
welfare state, and most centrally of all, the use of counter-cyclical demand 
management - usually through government spending - to iron out creases in the 
business cycle and ensure full employment. Entailed in this is a broader social 
reading of Keynesianism as a period of a ‘compromise’ between the interests of 
capital and the growing power of organised labour, brokered by the state (Clarke, 
1988).  
In Britain, assessment over the extent to which this Keynesian regime took 
hold is examined in terms of how far postwar policymakers departed from the 
Treasury View of ‘balanced budgets’ and ‘sound money’ that was previously the 
supposed orthodoxy (Booth, 1984). The importance placed in the Treasury View is 
bound up with the imaginary of Britain as an iconic liberal state where government 
refrained from intervention into private economic life as far as possible (Kerr, 2001, 
p. 56). It is why Keynesianism is supposed to somehow represent a departure from 
a liberal ideal (Cronin, 1991, p. 12).  
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In what follows I demonstrate that the debate on whether there was ever a 
Keynesian revolution in Britain is forged on opposing Keynesianism to the Treasury 
View, and questioning how far Keynes forced a departure. It is my contention that 
this opposition is misleading. By focussing on the differing fiscal implications of 
Keynesian thought compared with the Treasury View, this debate has negated how 
both the Treasury View and Keynes’s critique of it can alternatively be considered 
as monetary policy programmes - rather than fiscal - and shared much more in 
common than is often acknowledged. Moreover, examined in these monetary terms 
it becomes possible to see how the Keynesian revolution in Britain implied a 
broader role for the way public debt securities were used for governance than is 
often given credence to in the caricatures of Keynesianism as expansionary fiscal 
governance.  
This tends to get overlooked in the debate about the British Keynesian 
revolution. For example Kenneth Booth (1984; 1985) is one economic historian who 
insists that Keynes did revolutionise British economic policymaking. Building on the 
archival work of Howson and Winch (1977), Booth outlined how Keynes gradually 
won over officials in the Treasury to establish Keynesian analysis as the “dominant 
discourse in policy-making” (1984, p. 263). This involved persuading the Treasury 
that their classical assumptions about the nature of the market economy were 
wrong and that there was a place for state-led macroeconomic solutions to 
unemployment: including deficit spending, capital spending, public works 
programmes and monetary policy adjustments. Though Booth mentions monetary 
policy, the main focus of his work is tracing out Keynes’s influence on Treasury 
attitudes to unemployment and his advocacy for state management of the economy 
by making “state administrators see the government budget not simply as a 
statement of public finance, but as an instrument to regulate the whole of domestic 
expenditure so as to avoid, or at least control, inflationary pressures” (1983, p. 
107). Broadly this revolved on Keynes’s attempt to demonstrate to policymakers 
that in a market economy production was limited not by resources and productivity, 
but, ultimately by demand, and as such, if demand could be managed centrally, full 
employment could be reached. This meant using fiscal demand management to fix 
unemployment, something that necessarily meant a departure from the ‘Treasury 
View’ orthodoxy of balanced budgets (Peden, 1984). 
Keynes’s theoretical insight marked a radical shift in the minds of 
policymakers that previously, as the interwar period of crisis and recession 
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supposedly proved, had been bound by the Treasury View that was notionally 
critical of all government spending. By Booth’s reckoning Keynes made some 
headway trying to adapt the Treasury’s attitude to the budget during the second 
world war, but presented his arguments in terms of the unique demands of wartime 
conditions which meant there remained no general official acceptance of Keynesian 
ideas (Booth, 1983, p. 107). By 1947, Booth argues, Keynesian thinking had 
established itself as the Labour government switched from wartime planning of the 
economy to more generalised demand management (ibid., p. 121).  
When posed in this way, the Keynesian revolution is a revolution of ideas, 
rather than institutions per se. The belief in the efficacy of counter-cyclical spending 
and the disgust of unemployment gradually became a norm that guided postwar 
policymaking. In this account the significance of Keynes can be derived from 
policymakers’ commitment to the use of budgetary spending to counter 
unemployment (Booth, 1984). When, in the mid 1970s, the consensus appeared to 
turn against counter-cyclical spending, the apparently short-lived nature of this 
ideological shift forced many to question whether there really had been a 
meaningful departure from the old orthodoxy. Many, (for example Tomlinson, 1981; 
Kerr, 2001; Green, 2013; Seymour, 2016) depict Keynesianism as a “still birth”, a 
brief moment (from 1941-1955) when policymakers departed from the Treasury 
View and backed the potential of fiscal demand management. Keynesianism was 
undermined, and then strangled entirely by a return to the “balance-budgets 
orthodoxy” (Green, 2013, p. 78) soon after.  
This has implications for the way the literature conceptualises the role of 
public debt in Keynesian governance. A move away from the orthodoxy is 
supposed to entail a move towards an active use of debt to finance counter-cyclical 
fiscal spending (Tomlinson, 1981). That this shift proved so momentary is taken as 
proof that creditor and financial interests choked off any hope of a lasting 
Keynesian revolution. Geoffrey Ingham (1984) sees in this the power of the City-
Bank-Treasury nexus, while others identify the dominance of Gentlemanly 
Capitalism (Cain and Hopkins, 1993) or pre-modern, aristocratic political economic 
forms (Anderson, 1964; Nairn, 1977). No matter the theoretical inflection, the point 
remains the same: British Keynesianism was sacrificed at the altar of finance.  
Yet as I stated all this stems from a reading of Keynes in terms of his 
opposition to the Treasury View and a belief that Keynesianism is ultimately a 
matter of debt-financed counter cyclical fiscal spending on public works. It is my 
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contention that the difference between Keynes and the Treasury View has been 
exaggerated by scholars who assess Keynes in overly normative terms. Instead it 
is important to contextualise Keynes within his intellectual interlocutors, especially 
in the battle he was fighting with the ‘Treasury View’. Ralph Hawtrey is the key 
theoretical architect of the “Treasury View” (Howson and Winch, 1977, p. 27) and 
was Keynes’s friend at first Cambridge and later the Treasury (Clarke, 2009, p. 
120), and is a key foil for Keynes’s ideas. Hawtrey was a monetary economist, 
belonging to a rich tradition in Britain of monetary thinking5 that first coalesced in 
the nineteenth century around the issue of the lender of last resort, and the Bank of 
England’s place at the centre of the monetary system (Creedy and O’Brien, 1984, 
p. 21). Hawtrey’s concern with balanced budgets and ‘dear money’ came from a 
theory about the inherent instability of credit. Hawtrey argued that credit had a 
natural propensity to increase, fuel inflation, and then rapidly decrease leaving 
deflationary chaos in its wake (Mehrling, 2010). The broader tradition of monetary 
thinking in Britain - from William Thornton through to Walter Bagehot and then 
Hawtrey - was highly sceptical about the ability of ‘the market’ to self-regulate 
money, and outlined the need for active, centralised governance through the central 
bank. This built on Bagehot’s recognition that the financial system that had 
developed through discounting, and then the emergence of a national banking 
system orientated around the Bank of England, demanded that the central bank 
take an active role in restricting credit creation (Mattei, 2016). To curtail what he 
deemed the inherent drive for credit expansion he advocated ‘dear money’: a high 
Bank Rate to restrict private sector borrowing, and balanced budgets so that private 
banks would not see their assets swollen by ‘unfunded’ national debt in the form of 
Treasury bills and similar securities (Mattei, 2016, p. 16).  
It is as part of this broader theoretical apparatus - founded on the idea that 
liquidity should be governed - that Hawtrey made his (and as such the Treasury’s) 
case against the efficacy of Keynes’s ‘public works’ solution to unemployment in the 
1930s (ibid.). Simply, Hawtrey felt that credit was the key driver of economic 
activity, so any increase in credit would bring an immediate stimulus to economic 
activity and would work to combat unemployment. If public works were funded by 
                                                      
5 Hawtrey can be said to have built on the tradition of Bagehot and the broader Banking 
School, which traces its early articulation to William Thornton’s demand for the Bank 
of England to act both a as lender of last resort but more importantly as a manager 
of the banking system through active, discretionary monetary policy. 
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the government competing on private sector credit markets for investment funds (a 
debt funded by savings) then it would crowd out private uses of credit. If, however, 
public works are funded from bank credit then yes, this would act as a stimulus, but 
a stimulus caused by the increase in bank credit, irrespective of its use in the 
building of public works (ibid.). 
Part of Keynes’s theoretical innovations stemmed from participating in this 
conversation about monetary dynamics. Keynes had developed ideas about the 
liquidity preference in his 1930 Treatise on Money, which fed into the General 
Theory (Moggridge and Howson, 1974) and in the discussions that followed the 
publication of the Treatise he advocated for the use of monetary management to try 
and pull the country out of recession. “A reduction of the long-term rate of interest 
to a low level is probably the most necessary of all measures if we are to escape 
from the slump and secure a lasting revival of enterprise,” wrote Keynes in the 
midst of the Great Recession (1932, p. 415). He saw the Treasury as key to this 
goal, arguing that “the market should be supplied with securities of different types 
and maturities in the proportions in which it prefers them… Indeed, it must always 
be to the interest of the Treasury to supply the heterogeneous requirements of the 
market with securities of different types and maturities in the optimum proportion” 
(1932, p. 416).  
Keynes (1978, p.337) had identified “the high level of market interest rate” 
as the “most striking change” in the economic conditions that characterised the pre-
war to post first world war economy, and could best explain the depth of the 
recession that surrounded him. As such he advocated for low interest rates as a 
solution. His contemporary, and later biographer, Sir Roy Harrod (1983, p. 469) 
wrote later that by the 1930s Keynes “had become convinced that the time was ripe 
for a large and permanent reduction [of interest rates] throughout the world. This 
was to be the basis of all his future thinking on economic policy.” 
 In that sense, though the ‘fiscal Keynes’ dominates popular imagination, he 
can also be thought of as following Hawtrey as the latest in the tradition of British 
monetary thinkers, and in particular sharing Hawtrey’s interventionist approach to 
monetary policy (Moggridge and Howson, 1974, p. 232). In respect to this he wrote 
to Hawtrey in 1930, “I feel that ultimately I am joined in common agreement with 
you as against most of the rest of the world” (in ibid.). This focus is lost because 
Keynes’s political advocacy against unemployment, and the possibility of fiscal 
injections through public works programmes, dominate impressions of Keynes’s 
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thinking. But public works were only ever a very narrow part of Keynes’s 
programme for governance, to be used only to jump-start an economy out of 
depression, rather than as a basis for demand management (Tily, 2010).  
Where Keynes differed from Hawtrey was in his attitude to liquidity. Hawtrey 
saw credit as inherently expansive and in need of restrictive governance. Keynes 
veered in the opposite direction and argued that people had a liquidity preference - 
a desire to hold onto cash - because of the inherent uncertainty about the future 
(Tily, 2010, p. 186). As Keynes famously wrote, the “desire to hold money as a 
store of wealth is a barometer of the degree of our distrust of our own calculations 
and conventions concerning the future ... The possession of actual money lulls our 
disquietude” (Keynes, 1987, pp. 116–17). His argument was that people want to 
mitigate the risk of changes in the availability of future liquidity. This is where the 
Bank Rate is so crucial because it sets the price of cash (liquidity today). If people 
expect rates to rise than the price of bonds will fall and speculators will choose to 
hold their wealth as cash. If they expect rates to fall they will prefer to hold their 
wealth as bonds. In that way the demand for cash (liquidity) changes according to 
expectations of future rates (Tily, 2010, p. 188). If the normal rate of interest is set 
very low than there is very little reason to hold inactive, speculative money and this 
wealth would instead be held as bonds. Broadly, if you have a bond and are 
worried that, should you need to cash out, rates would have risen and your bond 
will be worth less, you'll choose instead to just hold money rather than take a hit. So 
the ability to fix expectations of future rates very low would mean people not having 
to worry about potential rate raises, which makes them happy to buy and hold 
bonds. It is through the liquidity preference and uncertainty of future rates that the 
monetary authorities can then act through open market operations to shape 
broader macroeconomic outcomes.  
It this way Keynes’s monetary work - articulated in his Treatise on Money 
(1930), the General Theory (1936) and then How to Pay for the War (1940) - 
outlined his critique of the orthodoxy, and it provides firmer ground to debate 
whether a revolution in policymaking took place in his image. Keynes departed from 
Marshall and Pigou in arguing that the economy should be conceived of as a 
system in its own right, rather than another ‘market’ as in the classical cannon 
(Mitchell, 2005). In doing so he brought the insights of the monetary theorists to 
bear on the nascent neoclassical economics. The Keynes of ‘pump priming public 
works’ that critics pounded in the 1970s (for example Buchanan and Wagner, 1977) 
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only really applied to the arguments he put forward in The Means to Prosperity in 
1932, and was specifically about using loan-finance to address depression 
conditions (Giovanna et al., 2004). Once the initial stages of the recovery were in 
place, Keynes stressed the importance of what could be termed more monetary 
forms of governance. In the General Theory he wrote how the central bank could 
try to fix long-term interest rates low, so as to counter the systemic liquidity 
preference that undermined investment, stating that “perhaps a complex offer by 
the central bank to buy and sell at stated prices gilt-edged bonds of all maturities, in 
place of the single bank rate for short-term bills, is the most important practical 
improvement which can be made in the technique of monetary management” 
(Keynes, 1978, p. 206). Indeed, he argued against the idea of the Treasury 
attempting to ‘fund’ the public debt (paying down the ‘floating’ debt) because this 
risked preventing a further fall in long-term interest rates (Moggridge & Howson, 
1974, p. 240).  
I make these points to clarify how important it is to judge Keynes’s work and 
his influence in terms of this monetary thinking. Doing so puts the question of the 
Keynesian revolution on a different footing. Rather than bundle Keynes up with a 
series of normative commitments about the purpose of government action in the 
economy, I argue it is more fruitful to assess the revolution through what tools were 
constructed to try and bring Keynes’s alternative conception of the need for 
‘governance’ of the economy into being: the means of Keynesianism, rather than 
the ends. When assessed this way, our understanding of Keynes moves beyond 
the caricature of public-works spending. As a result, the issue of monetary policy 
and debt management returns to the story of the Keynesian consensus. 
 Few economic historians or political economists address Keynes’s work on 
public credit or the issue of debt management and liquidity more broadly. Though 
there is now a small group of monetary Keynesian authors that have followed from 
Victoria Chick (1983) and Geoff Tily (2010) and blame the triumph of the neo-
classical synthesis and ISLM model for sidelining Keynes’s monetary insights6, I’d 
argue that this also reflects how difficult it has been for people to address the way 
in which public debt has monetary functions that have been instrumentalised to 
empower the state. It is a history that often fades out of view. Though authors 
(Howson, 1974) have noted that the Bank of England’s “obsession” with the 
                                                      
6 See for example Tily (2010, pp. 102–113), and Chick and Tily (2014). 
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enormous debt accumulated through the first world war, they believe the issue 
receded after the conversion of the war debt to a more long-term debt in the 1920s 
(Tomlinson, 1985, p. 42). It is a strange omission. Keynes was important in 
pressing for and designing the conversion between the wars and he was the 
dominant voice on the National Debt Enquiry Commission that was established by 
Attlee and Dalton in 1945 (Moggridge & Howson 1974). When contextualised within 
the time he was writing we see that Keynes made liquidity management a crucial 
part of central governance, building on the work of Bagehot and Hawtrey before 
him. In this public debt served as a tool - something to be instrumentalised - rather 
than an ogre to be avoided. One tool was using debt to finance counter-cyclical 
public investment - this is well known - the other was to use the management of 
public debt securities to increase liquidity which was essential in keeping the 
economy from stalling because Keynes felt people’s uncertainty about the future 
made them reluctant to part with their money and invest in a way necessary to 
ensure growth.  
In the following section I examine the attempt to translate this monetary 
thinking into practice in the postwar period of “cheap money” and how this flooded 
the system with too much liquidity. 
3.2 Monetary management of the debt state 
When the monetary aspects of public debt are acknowledged it becomes clear how 
public debt is used for much more than simply meeting a government’s fiscal 
needs. Rather public debt puts in place a monetary infrastructure that can be 
manipulated by the state to govern the economy. For precisely this reason the 
politics of public debt involve more than simply meeting the imperatives imposed by 
creditors. It was the place of public debt securities in the broader monetary 
infrastructure that allowed Keynes to make his theoretical claims about the 
possibilities of using public debt to govern the broad flows of liquidity in the 
economy.  
In what follows I examine what happened in the attempt to translate 
Keynes’s ideas of debt-based governance into practice. Keynesian governance in 
Britain was about trying to mobilise public debt securities as a way to counter the 
systemic liquidity preference in the economy which Keynes argued undermined 
investment and put a ceiling on economic growth. As such the first attempt to do 
this saw the establishment of ‘cheap money’ during the second world war, and the 
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immediate period that followed. The ‘cheap money’ period is often discussed in 
simple terms as a brief time of abnormally low interest rates which ultimately 
resulted in inflation, one that was quickly resolved when interest rates were 
increased by the Conservative government in 1951 (Allen, 2012a, p. 813). Yet 
closer examination of the mechanism by which public debt securities were used to 
try to lower interest rates, reveals the lasting significance of the ‘cheap money’ 
period. 
Though the ‘war economy’ is much discussed, often the focus is on the 
various innovations in planning and controls, so it is worth restating the dramatic 
impact the second world war had on the scale and mechanism of public finance. 
The second world war witnessed one of the largest ever increases in public 
expenditure, financed through one of the largest ever increases in public debt, 
which was secured on very low rates of interest (Tily, 2006). It was a remarkable 
achievement that owed much to Keynes. During the war Keynes advised the British 
government to secure a significant proportion of borrowing from banks directly, 
through issuing Treasury Bills (and similar short-term public securities), rather than 
relying mostly on external long-term investors on the gilt market (Tily, 2006, p. 666). 
As such the monetary authorities in Britain worked with the macroeconomy’s 
systemic preference for liquidity rather than against it when financing the war. And 
on the basis of this success in wartime financing, Keynes was keen to continue the 
idea after the war to finance the reconstruction effort, proposing to the National 
Debt Enquiry committee that “the technique of tap issues, by which the preferences 
of the public rather than of the Treasury determine the distribution of the debt 
between different terms and maturities, should be continued into peace-time” 
(Keynes, 1980, p. 396). Broadly the thinking was that if people only want to hold 
short-term securities than the authorities should let them. 
To recall, when Clement Attlee took power in 1945 the productive capacity 
of the British economy was battered and the national debt stood at £21.4 million - 
225 per cent of GDP (Nield, 2012). The British state was, in that sense, entirely 
debt dependent, and by that stage the public debt was enough of a concern for 
Attlee to commission a National Debt Enquiry Committee, tasked with examining 
monetary policy and debt management as foremost policy issues facing postwar 
Britain. The policies adopted in response drew heavily from Keynesian thinking on 
the need to counter the systemic preference to hold liquidity which risked dragging 
back the economic recovery.  
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Keynes wrote how a “reduction of the long-term rate of interest to a low level 
is probably the most necessary of all measures if we are to escape from the slump 
and secure a lasting revival of enterprise” and that the best way of keeping rates 
low across all maturities was for “the market” to “be supplied with securities of 
different types and maturities in the proportions in which it prefers them” (Keynes, 
1982, p. 115) which involved keeping the ‘taps’ open for Treasury Bills to be issued 
and redeemed at fixed rates for whenever demand arose from clearing banks and 
discount houses (Tily, 2010, p. 60). His proposals to the National Debt Enquiry 
committee laid out specific instructions for the “Bank Rate to be reduced to 1 per 
cent… Treasury bill rate to reduced to [0.5] per cent and Treasury Deposit Receipts 
to carry [0.62] per cent… 3 per cent Savings Bonds on tap, a new series to be 
started annually, with an option to the Treasury to repay after 10 years and with, 
preferably, no final maturity” (Keynes, 1980, p. 399). As Tily (2010, p. 77) wrote 
“These proposals went on to underpin the cheap-money policy of the post-war 
Labour Government under its successive Chancellors: Hugh Dalton, Sir Stafford 
Cripps and Hugh Gaitskell”. 
What is clear then is the cheap money policy that followed the war was a 
form of monetary governance that pivoted on using the management of public debt 
securities to adjust systemic liquidity flows in the macroeconomy. Yet using 
government borrowing in this way meant, as Ursula Hicks wrote in 1954 (p. 171), 
“expenditure can be made, and additional incomes distributed, without any member 
of the public having to curtail his outlay, as he would have to if the expenditure had 
been covered by taxation” (or indeed financed through gilts paid for out of savings). 
Nonetheless creating ‘wealth’ through government debt financing after the war was 
a delicate operation. The scale of the public debt posed a potential problem where 
there was still the need to attract buyers of long-term gilt finance - who of course 
would only do so at high yields - while at the same time trying to ensure the cost of 
servicing the public debt did not curtail postwar reconstruction. It is why for Keynes 
the answer was straightforward, rather than fund the debt through gilts sold to 
investors, the wartime policy should be continued by financing the debt through 
borrowing directly from the banking system by issuing liquid assets - like Treasury 
Bills - to the banking sector.  
 In the balance between the use of long-term finance raised by the Bank of 
England selling gilts on the London Stock Exchange, versus the use of short-term 
finance raised by the Treasury issuing Treasury Bills and similar instruments to the 
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domestic banking system, the two world wars and cheap money period that 
followed rapidly expanded the use of the latter. The Treasury Bill issue grew from 
around £1.1 billion at the outbreak of the second world war to £4.2 billion in 1945 
and stood at £5.5 billion by 1951 (Wadsworth, 2013, p. 149). In that sense, 
Treasury Bills, which of course were barely used until the first world war (Hicks, 
1954), were becoming an ever more important part of the banking system, 
financing 20.6 per cent of Britain’s total debt holdings by 1951 (Allen, 2012a, p. 36) 
and acting as the main constituent of the clearing banks’ liquid assets (Wadsworth, 
2013). These two different forms of debt financing represent the difference between 
the ‘funded’ debt: that comes from private sector savings, and the ‘unfunded’ or 
‘floating’ debt that comes through short-term issuing assets to payable to the 
banking sector (Wadsworth, 2013, p. 60). As I will discuss the structure of the 
national debt finances was to become an object of political contestation itself, with 
different governments preferring different instruments.  
The use of the ‘floating’ debt to finance Attlee’s postwar government came 
from Keynes’s argument that active monetary governance was needed to ensure 
liquidity was cheap and private sector investment would grow. His concern, which 
was shared by both Labour chancellor Hugh Dalton, and Attlee, came from the 
shadow of the interwar period that loomed large on policymakers after the second 
world war (Allen, 2014, p. 7). During that period Hawtrey’s interest in restraining 
liquidity won over Keynes’s advocacy for the opposite, and the high Bank Rate that 
was set as a result worked only to deepen an enormous recession. Dalton and 
Attlee were wary not to repeat the same mistakes. Cheap money was also 
pragmatic because low interest rates helped keep debt servicing costs down. Over 
the course of the 1920s, for example, the cost of servicing the first world war debt 
had absorbed 40 per cent of the country’s budget (Pollard, 1989, p. 97).  
Politically, ‘cheap money’ was attractive too. The interwar period saw the 
place of Britain’s financial sector politicised on a number of fronts. Industrialists, like 
the famous business tycoon and county cricketer Dudley Docker, led national 
campaigns bemoaning how British merchant banks invested overseas rather than 
at home (Newton and Porter, 1988, p. 54). Meanwhile, Keynes had critiqued both 
the harsh terms of credit and the financial sector’s general indifference to the needs 
of productive industry (Keynes, 1981). The 1925 return to the Gold Standard - 
which necessitated high interest rates - made the Bank Rate an issue of public 
debate, with manufacturing exporters complaining it undermined their prospects. In 
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response Hawtrey outlined how the City was a crucial source of “invisible earnings” 
that could help arrest declining export earnings, arguing that: “The shrinkage of 
[financial] business is a serious evil… The greatest factor in the material prosperity 
of this country is not manufacturing but augmented carrying trade” (in Green, 1991, 
p. 209). The Great Depression and economic stagnation that Keynes felt came 
from an excessively stringent attitude towards liquidity control is what underpinned 
his famous call for a “euthanasia of the rentiers” and the “socialisation of 
investment” that he felt was needed to avoid a liquidity trap (Keynes, 1978, p. 378). 
It was why Labour’s 1945 manifesto proposed that the Bank of England be brought 
under public ownership so that its operation and those of other banks could be 
“harmonised with industrial needs” (Labour party, n.d.). All of which is to say that 
after the second world war, the banking sector was expected to play as much a part 
in the peacetime effort for reconstruction that it had helping to fund the war. This 
was the political foundation behind the cheap money policy.  
To enact the postwar policy of ‘cheap money’ meant restructuring the 
national debt to tilt the balance even further towards ‘floating’ short-term 
instruments and away from the ‘funded’ long-term securities that drew from savings 
(Hicks, 1954). This monetary management of the debt had broader effects on the 
banking system for the reasons I alluded to above. Treasury Bills were accepted as 
a reserve asset in private banks, which meant that the greater the number of 
Treasury Bills in circulation, the greater the stock of loanable funds which the banks 
had available to advance (William Allen, 2015, p. 2). As short-term loans, Treasury 
Bills had lower yields so if government could change the makeup of its debt to be 
funded more by Treasury Bills than by gilts, short-term interest rates could be 
reduced. Moreover, following from Keynes, the monetary authorities were of the 
opinion that long-term (gilt) rates were set by expectations of future rates, so if 
short-term rates were set consistently low, then long-term rates would follow suit. 
Through this Dalton hoped to force short-term rates down from 1 per cent to 0.5 per 
cent with the aim of driving long-term rates down to 2.5 per cent. To do this the 
monetary authorities refused to issue government securities at yields higher than 
2.5 per cent, and was prepared to accept whatever maturity schedule investors 
thrust upon it (Allen, 2014, p. 7). Understandably, many potential investors refused 
to buy gilts at such low yields which meant the Bank of England had to step in as a 
“buyer of last resort” of its own securities (William Allen, 2015, p. 2).  
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That the monetary authorities felt able to pursue this programme shows both 
the significance of Keynes’s influence on them and demonstrates how the state 
used the monetary infrastructure established through public debt to empower itself. 
This is a perfect example of the monetary mechanisms of debt management that 
traditional accounts founded on debt unsustainability find difficult to conceptualise. 
The banking system in England had evolved in such a way that the state could at 
once issue and purchase its own securities, to the extent that during the cheap 
money era, the Bank of England became a net purchaser of gilts from the financial 
system (Allen, 2012a, p. 21). These gilts were bought by the Bank with cash, which 
meant it was injecting cash liquidity into the banking system. In a round-about way 
this arrangement succeeded. Worried that excessive cash liquidity could lead to 
inflation, some investors chose to hold gilts, even at low yields, rather than sit on 
their piles of cash. This allowed some of the cheap money policy to be fulfilled with 
long-term gilt sales, which was a real boon for the authorities. However, the large 
proportion of the cheap money policy was achieved by funding the national debt 
through short-term Treasury Bills instead of gilts. This transformation of the state’s 
debt maturity was the backbone of Dalton’s money management and the result was 
a substantial increase, to the value of £1,026 billion, in the amount of Treasury Bills 
in the financial system between 1945 and 1948 (ibid.). As a result between January 
1946 and January 1947 alone deposits of the 11 clearing banks rose by £900m - 
twice the average wartime growth - purely as a result of the way public debt was 
managed (Hicks, 1954, p. 203).  
This is the crucial context on which to read the important turn in the postwar 
Labour party’s economic strategy. In 1947 Britain suffered a clutch of economic 
crises that centred around the commitment to dollar convertibility. To recall by 1945 
Britain had a cumulative balance of payments deficit of around £10 billion. Export 
earnings were around £350 million a year, while invisible receipts brought in a 
further £450 million. This compared to £2 billion a year spending on overseas 
military and food bought from the US alone (Cairncross, 1991, pp. 26–27). Coming 
out of the war Britain had £610 million of gold and hard currencies (dollars, mostly) 
in reserve underpinning sterling liabilities of £2.45 billion (Allen, 2014, p. 5). In that 
way Britain’s finances were like a bank with insufficient liquid assets (ibid.). At this 
time many of the colonial holders of sterling denominated public bills were 
controlled - blocked from converting their sterling holdings into dollars - so the 
authorities had some cushion (ibid.). But a concern emerged that pumping cheap 
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money liquidity into the domestic financial system through the substantial 
expansion in the floating debt risked inflation.  
As such the opposition to the programme of debt financing was framed not 
in terms of the solvency of this debt, but whether the restructuring of debt into short-
term assets in banks swelled the money supply too broadly. In a sense this was a 
question about whether liquidity was excessive and needed restraining so as to 
avoid inflation - as Hawtrey had outlined in the 1920s - or whether government, by 
cultivating liquidity, could help private investors build the productive capacity of the 
economy. The Economist, for example, complained in 1946, “Mr. Dalton has littered 
the British economy with dry inflationary paper” (12 Oct 1946 cited in Hicks 1954, p. 
203).  
The response by the Labour government was to reduce the government’s 
outlays. This took the form of an austerity budget in 1947 that was repeated by 
Dalton’s successor as chancellor, Stafford Cripps, for the remaining years of the 
Attlee regime (Kerr, 2001, p. 97). When scholars revisit this ‘turn’ in Labour strategy 
they depict it as a case of the City-Bank-Treasury interests reasserting itself and 
forcing a return to balance-budget, Treasury View orthodoxy. In holding onto the 
budgetary ideal of Keynes, writers like Kerr (2001), Peden (1991) and Tomlinson 
(1985), see the 1947 budget as an explicit attempt at Keynesian-style demand 
management, but in pursuit of the ‘orthodox’ ends of sound money. Or, as Bulpitt 
(1986) suggests, though Keynes was influential, the “oral tradition” in the Treasury 
around the myth of Gladstonian ‘sound money’ finance, neutered the ambitions of 
Attlee’s reformist government. As Kerr (2001, p. 92) writes: “Apart from the creation 
of welfare institutions, the Attlee government did little either to create new state 
structures or, indeed, to dismantle old ones. At no point did it take steps towards 
effective central planning, nor did it disrupt the stranglehold that institutions such as 
the Treasury, Bank of England and City of London had traditionally held over 
policy.” As such it is on this basis that many argue the Keynesian revolution never 
quite took form under Attlee.  
Yet ignored in this is how the austerity budget of 1947, or indeed Stafford 
Cripps’ commitment to balanced budgets, could not be simply read off the dollar 
convertibility problem or the reflex for “orthodoxy”, but came from the impacts of the 
monetary expansion that was forged on Keynesian thinking. It was the unique way 
Treasury Bills had been entirely institutionalised within the banking system that 
implied a particular structure for public debt financing, which in turn necessitated an 
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attempt at an austerity budget. None of this is to deny that the American pressure 
for convertibility was insignificant, nor that the City of London had no interest in 
sound money, but the fact Attlee’s government took the turn it did should not be 
explained without reference to its earlier efforts of expansionary Keynesian 
monetary governance.  
The legacy of ‘cheap money’ did not end here, however. It continued to 
present a problem for policymakers through the 1950s. In part this was because 
Keynes had developed his view about the efficacy of liquidity management in a 
context of wartime controls on the economy. He was very aware of the inflationary 
threat excessive liquidity could risk (Tily, 2010, p. 205), but felt that when consumer 
spending was curtailed by rationing, and when clearing bank advances themselves 
were subject to quantitative and qualitative control by the Bank of England, inflation 
risk was not the most important issue (Hicks, 1954, p. 192). Indeed, though 
reluctant to use it - lest expectations get skewered - Keynes argued the Bank Rate 
could be adjusted. In this way the linkages public debt had created between the 
central state and the banking system, and therefore the broader economy (as 
conceptualised as aggregate liquidity figures such as GNP), meant public debt 
could be used for the purpose of economic governance. As I’ve said before, a tool 
to be used, rather than avoided.  
Nonetheless the cheap money policy had an effect that Keynes did not 
anticipate, and it worked to undermine the monetary authorities’ capacity for 
monetary management of liquidity and with that the efficacy of state governance of 
the economy more broadly. The ability of the monetary authorities to influence the 
broad financial system (rather than the price of Treasury Bills specifically) came 
from the way the Bank of England hooked through the discount houses to the 
clearing banks. To recall, the discount houses were obliged to buy Treasury Bills 
whenever the Bank of England felt it necessary, and by forcing the purchase of 
Treasury Bills, the Bank could drain the cash from the system. This meant that to 
replenish their holdings of cash (with which to lend on to clearing banks when 
needed) the discount houses had to borrow from the Bank and because the Bank 
was the ultimate supplier of cash it set the rate on bills - the Bank Rate (Allen, 
2014). This was the system that arose, as much by accident as design, over the 
course of the nineteenth century. Yet the continual issue of Treasury Bills meant 
they had become the dominant liquid asset deposited in clearing banks by the 
1950s, with banks well above the 30 per cent liquidity ratio they were supposed to 
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maintain (Collins, 1988, p. 359). During the war the floating debt had been used to 
finance central government spending, but immediately postwar it was the capital 
requirements of local authorities and the newly national industries that increased 
state debt (William Allen, 2015, p. 9).  
The effects of this were felt when the Conservative party returned to power 
and tried to move away from the cheap money policy. As I describe in the next 
section, they found that the excess of Treasury Bills in the system neutered the 
potential of the Bank Rate to affect domestic liquidity. In so robbing policymakers of 
a key tool of governance. Their response was to rely more on the government 
budget instead, which worked to grant a power to the Treasury that it had never 
had before. 
3.3 The liberal compromise: Consumer Keynesianism 
The common understanding of Keynesian governance as counter-cyclical fiscal 
spending has already been brought into question by the examination of the 
mechanism by which the ‘cheap money’ policy was implemented. Moreover, by 
examining how Keynesian theory was translated into practice I showed how ‘cheap 
money’ demanded a great expansion in Treasury Bill financing, demonstrating one 
of the ways in which the dynamics of public debt encompass more than simply 
financing fiscal spending. In this sense reference to excessive public debt or the 
state’s dependence on private creditors does little to clarify the specific problems 
that policymakers are confronting at any one moment. When analysed in terms of 
how public debt securities are used for the purpose of liquidity governance, the 
politics of debt take on a different shape. In what follows I show how the 
Conservative government’s attempt to restate monetary policy meant the state had 
to take on a much more direct role in managing liquidity. This it did through 
budgetary adjustments which in doing so greatly empowered the Treasury to an 
extent that had never been the case previously. Though writers like Geoff Ingham 
(1984) depict the Treasury as having been the centre of policymaking power in the 
British state since Gladstonian times, I show how it was Keynesian public debt 
management that in fact really transformed the Treasury into the central governor 
of the British economy.  
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The failed return to monetary policy 
The promise of the Attlee government that spent its first two years restlessly 
reforming Britain’s political economy before its ‘turn’ to austerity in 1947 had fizzled 
out by the end of its term. Nonetheless the return of Churchill’s Conservative Party 
in the 1951 election was a significant shock. The Conservative decade that followed 
has come to be cast as a decade of continuity, with bipartisan agreement for 
‘Butskellist’ soft Keynesian governance. Yet Churchill had come to power promising 
to set people free from the state controls on the economy like rationing that had 
followed the war. Drawing from Hayek’s Road to Serfdom which had been 
articulated in the UK most pressingly in Richard Law’s Return from Utopia, he 
fermented a sense of a country in need of a liberalisation drive (Kelly, 2002, p. 96). 
The party was, by Ingham’s (1984, p.206) reckoning, “intent on restoring market 
capitalism”. Though the Conservatives’ 13 years in power were not entirely 
harmonious, and certainly there was an internal battle between more classical 
liberal, Gladstonian forces (represented by Churchill himself) and the more 
corporatist, one-nation vision articulated by Harold Macmillan (Kerr, 2001), I argue 
that there emerged a governance regime forged on budgetary control of liquidity 
flows in the macroeconomy.  
Initially, this wasn’t the plan. The Conservative party, led by their chancellor 
Rab Buttler, had hoped to restore monetary discipline, by abandoning direct 
controls on the banking system, and undertaking what was described as a “return 
to monetary policy” with higher interest rates (Kelly, 2002, p. 221). The problem he 
was trying to fix was not so much the inflationary consequences of growing liquidity, 
but the effects it had on the balance of payments. With Britain needing dollars to 
make international payments, and unable to generate enough through export 
earnings, gold and dollar reserves were being bled to try to restrain speculative 
attacks on the fixed value of sterling. Buttler hoped that by raising the Bank Rate he 
could attack the balance of payments problem on two fronts, first by draining the 
domestic banking system of the liquidity that fed imports, and second by attracting 
foreign savings into Britain. Though this would increase the cost of servicing debt, it 
was a cost he deemed necessary (Allen, 2014). 
He began in November 1951 with a largely symbolic 0.5 per cent rise in the 
Bank Rate to 2.5 per cent, before another more purposeful increase of a further 1.5 
per cent in so that the Bank Rate had jumped to 4 per cent by March 1952 (ibid., 
p.21). This was achieved partially by Bank of England diktat (on the discount 
  
90 
window) but his broader intention was to restructure the maturity of Britain’s debts. 
This meant reversing Dalton’s work by trying to swap short-term Treasury Bills for 
long-term gilts; or switching from a floating to funded debt. In a small way the policy 
was moderately successful. It did help lower domestic liquidity to some extent, as 
banks stocked up on more gilts than they did Treasury Bills, and in doing so 
lowered their reserves of loanable funds (Allen, 2014). Yet it never quite fulfilled 
Buttler’s hopes of reactivating monetary policy. This was because of the sheer 
excess of the stock of Treasury Bills in the financial system. 
The clearing banks had so many Treasury Bills in their reserves that when 
they needed liquid funds to lend on to willing customers they could just wait and let 
these bills mature, pocket the cash and make the advance, and so had no need to 
turn to the discount window where the Bank Rate had been raised (Nevin and 
Davis, 1970, pp. 261–2). This problem was exacerbated by a second issue, which 
was the growth of institutional investors. Banks who had bought gilts and were in 
need of liquid funds could turn to pension and insurance houses, instead of the 
discount market. They would sell gilts and collect cash thereby swapping long-term 
illiquid assets for cash that could be loaned onto customers (Allen, 2012a, p. 23). 
What it meant was the Bank Rate lacked the purchase over the broader economy 
that would allow for effective governance.  
It was the impotence of Buttler’s ‘return to monetary policy’ that led to the 
commissioning of the Radcliffe report to enquire into the workings of the monetary 
system. What it found was that since the government had become a “habitual net 
borrower in peacetime”, and had used the floating debt to finance this, “debt 
management ha[d] become a major problem of policy. To a greater extent than 
between the wars monetary problems and the problem of debt management ha[d] 
become inseparable” (Radcliffe report, 1959, p. 189). Deprived of effective tools of 
monetary governance the government had only fiscal tools in its armoury. This was 
not what Keynes had intended. Interestingly, the Radcliffe report is now mistakenly 
taken as representing a high-point in the influence of Keynesian thinking (Kenway, 
1994; Laidler, 1989a), because of its insistence that monetary policy could only 
ever be a handmaiden of fiscal policy. Yet this overlooks the fact that Keynes did 
not initially place much significance on fiscal interventions, and moreover ignores 
that a key reason why fiscal policy became so important was because monetary 
policy had been rendered mute by the earlier period of ‘cheap money’.  
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Building budgetary Keynesianism  
To manage liquidity in the fine-grained way Keynes’s thinking implied - with 
counter-cyclical adjustments - meant developing a more precise understanding of 
the liquidity dynamics between public debt, the government budget, and the 
impacts this had on the balance of payments. The traditional image of 
Keynesianism as about fiscal injections came in Britain through governments trying 
to find alternative means to manage liquidity when monetary policy failed. This kind 
of budgetary management of the economy placed enormous importance in national 
accounting and macroeconomic indicators that had developed through Keynes’s 
work in the General Theory especially (Suzuki, 2003). It informed a particular kind 
of Keynesian governance that made the government budget and the position of the 
Treasury the central part of political economic life.  
There is a common misconception that the nineteenth century Gladstonian 
commitment to austere public budgets gave the Treasury great power over 
economic life in Britain. This power, when allied to the Bank of England and City of 
London, is what Geoff Ingham (1984) and others argue helped to choke off any 
possibility of a lasting Keynesian revolution in Britain. This idea, however, 
overestimates the scope of the Treasury during Gladstone’s time and underplays 
how the development of budgetary Keynesianism in the 1950s worked to grant the 
Treasury greater power over economic life in Britain than it had ever before. It is 
indeed the case that Gladstone’s commitment to balanced budgets and sound 
money contrasted with the largesse of the fiscal-military state that had 
characterised Britain previously (Campbell, 2004). Yet the organisation of state 
finance at this time barely resembled the Keynesian period. Because while the 
Gladstonian Treasury may have had a tight control over the government’s fiscal 
outlays (ibid.), it can hardly be said to have held much sway of the economy as a 
whole. Indeed, even as late as the 1930s, the Treasury barely had any information 
about the national economy, let alone the capacity to control it. This incapacity was 
transformed by Keynes. In order to establish budgetary Keynesianism, the Treasury 
was grandly empowered by providing it the means to ‘see’ economic activity across 
the country, and equipping it with the capacity to alter that economic activity. 
Crucial in this was the emergence of national accounting, and the macroeconomic 
forecasting models that built on them, both of which took place alongside and 
through Keynes’s articulation about the need for governance. They are therefore 
crucial in understanding the nature of the Keynesian revolution in Britain. 
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 As such in what follows I revisit the development of national accounting, 
and Keynes’s contribution to it, before outlining how this led to a particular kind of 
budgetary governance that was necessary once Buttler’s attempt to return to 
monetary policy had failed.  
National accounts grew out of the idea of a national ‘income’ that had 
developed in the twentieth century through Alfred Marshall’s Principles of 
Economics and Pigou’s Wealth and Welfare. Yet it was only with Keynes that the 
concept of a national income became something articulable in a specific number 
(Tribe, 2015) Though national accounts in various forms had existed for centuries - 
for example Gregory King’s in 1689 - with Keynes came an effort to develop 
national income accounts in relation to other aggregate monetary flows: consumer 
spending, investment, government spending etc (Mitchell, 2005). This was a 
substantial shift that came through the way Keynes’s theoretical innovations 
coincided with the emergence of a sophisticated statistical infrastructure in Britain. 
The general principle of related aggregates (consumer spending, investment, 
government spending etc) were established in the General Theory, but these were 
not workable for policymaking at the time of its publication in 1936. Statistics in 
Britain were still so rudimentary at that point that even conceptualising the economy 
along the lines outlined in the General Theory was impossible. As Tribe (2015, p. 
90), writes: “the General Theory proposed the existence of systematic relationships 
between variables whose precise dimensions remained indefinite, or disputed”.  
The statistical infrastructure that made Keynes’s ideas actionable had to be 
constructed. In this the war was crucial because it brought academic economists 
and mathematicians together in government service. Keynes worked alongside 
these mathematicians who were intent on developing practical statistics. Though at 
this point there existed basic statistics around the concept of the ‘strength of a 
nation’, these were not sophisticated or granulated enough for the purposes of 
Keynesian style national governance (Tribe 2015). Keynes and the statisticians he 
worked with were crucial in developing a conception of a ‘national economy’, with 
national income accounting helping to bring to life Keynes’s idea of a 
macroeconomy with headline aggregates of monetary flows that could be 
manipulated from the centre (Mitchell, 2005). Other countries, like Germany, were 
developing similar national accounting frameworks by the end of the war, but only 
in Britain was there the kind of statistical infrastructure necessary to ‘weaponise’ 
accounting (Tribe, 2015, p. 66). These were features that had begun to form around 
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the interconnected financial system that had developed in the nineteenth century 
and the effort under Gladstone to try and ensure ‘sound money’. Yet even ‘sound 
money’ governance amounted to little more than a ‘nod’ towards the levels of gold 
entering or exiting the country (Tomlinson, 1985, p. 32). A picture of the national 
economy as a whole and its relation to government was highly limited.  
The more it developed the more it gave enormous new power to the central 
state. To recall, the impotency of monetary policy in the 1950s meant that ‘demand 
management’ had become a fiscal matter. This meant trying to control the 
macroeconomy through the once-a-year government budget. This required a 
substantial new apparatus of policymaking. As Alec Cairncross, who was a senior 
economist in the Treasury later put it, until the 1950s there were “virtually no official 
aggregates of the kind we now take for granted: no GNP, no index of industrial 
production, no balance of payments (except in very tentative form), no adequate 
consumer price index, and so on” (Cairncross 1988: 12 cited in Suzuki 2003, p. 
478).  
The first articulation of national accounts in the Keynesian sense came in 
the 1941 publication of UK National Income and Expenditure statement, a year 
after Keynes laid out the framework in How to Pay for the War, but as Cairncross’s 
remarks suggest, it took time for the necessary indictors to develop. As they did, 
they became the pillars upon which were constructed the Treasury’s understanding 
of the economy, the challenges it faced, and the political controversies these 
implied. The development of national accounting and the other macroeconomic 
indicators owed very little to the creditors that were financing the government, or 
the supposed grip of the City-Bank-Treasury nexus, though national accounting did 
provide a new language with which to articulate their concerns.  
This is apparent in the way the balance of payments problem came to be 
tackled in the 1950s. Initially, to recall, Buttler had tried a higher Bank Rate, but 
given its failure, policymakers now depended on a fiscal solution. In the first form of 
the national accounts, outlined in 1944, Keynes had modelled the balance of 
payments through international trade multipliers (Tomlinson, 1985, p. 43). Yet in 
1951 James Meade, who had worked with Keynes to construct national accounts in 
the first place, developed a model that systematically linked consumer spending 
aggregates to the balance of payments. Rather than rely on a muddy, loose notion 
of the impacts of “easy” or “dear” money, how this might relate to consumer 
spending, and how in turn this could affect the balance of payments with higher 
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imports, Meade’s model showed the Treasury precisely how an increase in 
consumer spending would “leak” out of the system into higher imports (ibid.). It also 
systematically outlined how the government budget related to consumer spending, 
and in doing so designated great significance to the way the budget - which was 
developed at the Treasury - could impact the broader fortunes of the British 
economy. 
The means of governance constructed through Keynes’s thinking on liquidity 
meant intervention was less about direct control of industries or particular kinds of 
productive planning - which, when they did exist under Attlee owed more to wartime 
controls than anything else (Kelly, 2002) - and instead was more about managing 
broader economy-wide aggregate monetary flows. That is precisely why the 
Treasury’s grip on the economic fortunes of the country grew through the 
Keynesian revolution rather than worked against it. 
Precisely what control central government had over these broad monetary 
flows therefore became an important issue in the 1950s. The options for fiscally-led 
adjustments were limited, however, by the nature of the national accounts, the 
models that were crafted on them, and the way they were calculated. In the 1944 
White Paper on Full Employment it was government spending that was supposed 
to carry the burden of fiscally-led adjustments to macroeconomic demand. Yet in 
practice, the only lever through which government was deemed capable of affecting 
aggregate demand was consumer spending, and that solely through the means of 
variations in taxation (Price, 1978, p. 77). This was because investment 
expenditure and government expenditure were treated as external, which meant 
consumer spending was the residual that had to be controlled7 (Dow, 1970, p. 181). 
Consumption was the only monetary flow that could be varied rapidly (since 
consumers tended not to plan spending over the long term) and taxation was the 
only instrument through which it could be adjusted. Moreover, consumer spending 
was especially potent because it accounted for two thirds of national product, half of 
final demand, and after Meade’s work, had also been shown to be a crucial 
                                                      
7 Successive governments from Churchill's 1951 regime onwards modelled both 
government and private investment as unchanging and pre-determined in their 
calculations because of their long-term scale (Dow, 1970, p. 182, my emphasis). 
Broadly, forecasts assumed that government investment was long term, planned, 
neutral and would not vary much on a year-to-year basis. Private investment, 
meanwhile, was complicated and required advanced preparation and again, took 
time to carry out which made yearly variations difficult to conceptualise, and in effect 
closed them off to policymaker influence (Dow, 1970, p. 181). 
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determinant of the balance of payments (Dow, 1970, p. 182). Again here it is 
difficult to really account for the influence of creditors in the financial sector on this 
architecture of governance. Certainly the balance of payments was a constraint on 
government policy, but its response was shaped by the way national accounting 
tools had constituted the appearance of the ‘problem’ and the available options to 
tackle it.  
As such what came to be known as Britain’s “stop-go” cycle through the 
1950s was the different trajectories of government spending and tax strategies. 
Generally, despite how the sceptics of the Keynesian revolution deem the period as 
upholding Treasury orthodoxy (for example Peden, 1991; Kerr, 2001) governments 
through the decade were geared to “go” with Churchill and MacMillan running 
deficits through the first half of the 1950s8. 
The development of national accounts and macroeconomic indicators gave 
potential buyers of British public debt a more systematic way to assess their worth. 
Thanks in part to the Keynesian apparatus of calculation, the stability of sterling 
was understood by reference to both the balance of payments, but also to the level 
of growth in the economy. The national debt stopped being expressed in absolute 
terms, instead a more relevant figure that came into use was the proportion of debt 
to GDP (Tribe, 2015). Conceptualised in such terms debt took on a more 
manageable form, and the solution to debt sustainability became not just 
repayment but through the growth of the national income. As such the ‘stop’ part of 
the stop-go cycle was tricky. Because in order to improve the balance of payments 
government felt it necessary to dampen consumer spending which leaked into 
imports. But running a deflationary budget risked undercutting economic growth, 
and slow growth risked calling into question the solvency of Britain’s public debt.  
                                                      
8 This was in part to pay for the institutions of social reproduction like the NHS that had 
been established by Attlee, but mostly deficit finance was in fact used to pay for the 
development of Britain’s arms industry. As Edgerton showed, public spending on 
social services after 1948 was not significantly higher than before the war. Instead it 
was defence spending, which had obviously grown through the war, but less 
obviously continued to remain high well into the 1960s, that absorbed a significant 
chunk of the government’s budget. “In 1953 defence took over 30 per cent of public 
expenditure (net of debt interest), while health and social security took 26 per cent” 
(Edgerton, 2006, p. 66). This double pressure of government spending on both 
social reproduction and defence put pressure on sterling as deficits piled up, and 
bolsters the case that the financial sector was not the only significant lobbying group 
in British policymaking. 
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The emerging politics of national economic decline 
Public debt had taken on a new significance through the establishment of 
budgetary Keynesian governance in the 1950s. As Britain’s economic decline and 
the necessity for ‘growth’ came to dominate political debate so too the position of 
the government as an economic actor came under closer scrutiny (Miller, 1990; 
Tomlinson, 1996). Whether by accident or design one implication of the way 
Keynesian thought translated into practice was that the sustainability of public debt 
became a question about the efficacy of the state as an economic actor, and its 
ability to generate growth.  
The favourable international environment in the 1950s ensured Britain was 
able to grow throughout the decade (Cronin, 1991). It also meant British exporters 
were able to earn enough dollars - predominantly through forced trade with the 
colonies - to keep devaluation fears at bay (Kerr, 2001, p. 104). This, in turn, 
worked to contain the conflict within the Conservative party between the liberal 
elements that wanted deeper public spending cuts, and the one-nation 
Conservatives that didn’t. Within the Labour party there grew a tension between its 
right wing that was happy to maintain the liberal budgetary governance based on 
Keynes’s thinking, and its more socialist elements that wanted more direct planning 
of industry along the lines seen in France and Germany (ibid.).  
Nonetheless the political mood was shifting. The Suez crisis had 
demonstrated to Britain the limits of its imperial future and there was growing 
dissatisfaction with the state of Britain’s economy in comparison to its European 
and American competitors. Though there had long been worry about the relative 
unproductiveness of Britain’s core industries, in the late 1950s and early 1960s an 
idea of a broader “national” economic decline took hold. The publication of C.P 
Snow's Two Cultures, Arthur Koestler's Suicide of a Nation, and Michael Shanks’ 
The Stagnant Society sparked a series of books on the subject of British economic 
decline (Edgerton, 1996). The development of comparative economic statistics 
through the 1950s lent weight to the growing dissatisfaction with Britain’s economic 
fortunes. As one civil servant put it in 1961: “If it were not for the activities on an 
international scale of the economic statisticians, it is doubtful whether the present 
agitation would be anything like as noisy” (Tomlinson, 1996, p. 747). More and 
more ‘growth’ became the panacea to the clutch of problems Britain confronted. 
And as I show in the next section this, when combined with the Treasury’s hold on 
the broad health of the British economy, this meant a politics of productivity took 
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hold that established the criteria on which to politicise the British government as an 
economic actor and its management of public finances. 
At the turn of the decade the political ground was shifting much more 
explicitly onto ‘economic growth’ and the role of government in its cultivation. The 
language of British decline, and the promise of growth to arrest it, became an 
important political narrative, with the Labour opposition in 1961 publishing what 
economic historian Jim Tomlinson described as a key declinist pamphlet called 
‘Signposts for the Sixties’. “It set Britain's economic performance in an explicitly 
comparative context, contrasting unfavourably the country's share of world trade 
and growth of industrial production with that of other west European countries” 
(Tomlinson 1996, p. 752). It also stressed the need for active intervention in the 
economy in order to modernise Britain’s flagging manufacturing companies through 
rationalising industry (Tomlinson, 2000). The 1964 election, as Edward Heath's 
biographer Campbell (1993, p. 163) wrote, was the first where decline and the 
necessity for economic growth was the central issue:  
“The notion of Britain's relative decline - the realisation that in terms of 
economic prosperity, social services, and the 'quality of life' Britain was 
falling behind other industrialised countries - had struck the previously 
complacent public consciousness quite suddenly within the previous five 
years. It was to be the staple assumption of every subsequent election over 
the next three decades.” 
What emerged through the 1960s was a focus on corporatist modernisation of 
industry in the hope that growth could provide an ultimate fix-all solution to the 
problem of raising wages, inflation, balance of payments and employment. The 
1950s period of stop-go budgetary policies had ended in ‘go’, and inflation was 
again running higher than desired, with balance of payments worsening (Kerr, 
2001). That turned into a full-blown crisis after revaluation of the Deutsche Mark in 
March 1961which blew another hole into foreign exchange reserves. The episode 
also sharpened focus on the stability of even ‘established’ countries’ currencies. It 
was in this context of cross-party frustration that a report into “controlling public 
spending”, to be chaired by Lord Plowden, was commissioned by the Treasury.  
The Plowden report, which was published in 1961, noted how much had 
changed over the previous 20 years. Public spending was larger, more complex 
and entailed future commitments in a way never seen previously. “[The] Budget is 
seen,” wrote Plowden (1961, p.6), “not as a simple balancing of tax receipts against 
expenditure, but as a sophisticated process in which the instruments of taxation 
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and expenditure are used to influence the course of the economy.” Yet despite this, 
Plowden noted the form of the budget had barely changed in the two decades since 
1941 and that still “not enough is known about the relationship of public expenditure 
to the issues of growth and solvency of the national economy” (ibid.). 
In the emerging discourse of “growthmanship” (Cronin, 1991) debate over 
what was standing in the way of British economic growth. Was it inflation arising 
from excessive wage demands; or were there deeper institutional problems in the 
British state itself? Plowden (1961) articulated the latter, arguing that despite the 
advances in national accounting and the development of macroeconomic 
indicators, there were still fundamental problems with the efficacy of the British 
state as an economic agent - and particularly within the process of budgetary 
decision making - that was in need of urgent modernisation. 
As part of the focus on growth, in the early 1960s Harold Macmillan began 
moves towards a more corporatist arrangement that used the state in a more direct 
way in the economy than had been the case during the 1950s (Kerr 2001). Looking 
at the French example he saw the possible promises of indicative planning, and this 
became a theme for him and especially Harold Wilson’s first government that 
followed in 1964. There was certain support in the private sector for closer 
cooperation between government and industry in building long-term economic 
plans, but the form of partnership was geared towards using the government to 
broker an incomes-policy that would help contain wage growth (Kerr 2001, p.104). 
As such Macmillan made early moves towards an incomes policy, but Wilson’s 
election promised more substantial reform. As ever, the problem of the balance of 
payments lurked. I have mentioned the 1961 crisis and three years later Wilson 
faced balance of payments problems immediately upon entering office. In August 
1964 $1 billion standby credit was secured from the IMF and a further $500 million 
from various foreign central banks (Green 2013, p.170) and he raised the Bank 
Rate after consultation with the American monetary authorities (ibid.). As Green 
writes it was at this point the Treasury began to take a more active role in trying to 
defend against speculative attacks against sterling, partnering with the Fed in a 
series of swap arrangements between central banks to build up a ‘war chest’ of 
finances. 
Wilson’s solution was to promise to the Labour party conference in 1963 a 
transformation of Britain’s economy “forged in the white heat of the technological 
revolution” that would drive productivity and exports up, while also containing 
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inflation (Francis, 2013). In a nod to the now firm grip the Treasury had over broad 
economic life in the country, he established a new Department for Economic Affairs 
and Ministry of Technology responsible for developing a national plan with a longer-
term horizon than the Treasury, whose more immediate problems with the balance 
of payments tended to dominate. Alongside this came a plethora of other state and 
para-state corporatist institutions like International Computers Ltd, the National 
Research and Development Corporation, the Industrial Reorganisation Corporation 
and others. The stated aim was to take British industry “by the scruff of the neck 
and drag it kicking and screaming into the twentieth century” (Hall, 1986, p. 89). 
The NEDC, Regional Development Corporations and the IRC were all established 
with an eye to solving what was thought to be a long-running problem in Britain 
(first articulated by Keynes to the 1933 Macmillan committee) of the lack of financial 
support provided to small and medium size enterprises (Hall, 1986). The hope was 
that para-state bodies could help channel City money towards domestic industry 
that otherwise was being under served by the financial sector.  
Framed in this way it is perhaps not surprising that the ultimate failure of 
Wilson’s corporatism to deliver a productivity revolution came to be cast as further 
confirmation of the ability of finance capital to triumph over productive forces in 
Britain. Both Geoffrey Ingham (1984) and Peter Hall (1986) argue that 
policymakers’ steadfast commitment to low inflation and an overvalued sterling 
exemplified the hold the City had over a government that remained ultimately 
impotent in comparison; only ever the handmaiden to City interests. Again, 
however, this relies on a projection of what a proper ‘Keynesian’ government would 
have done and a normative commitment to the virtues of productive over financial 
capital.  
Yet the corporatist drive of Macmillan and then Wilson had a curious effect 
on the government budget. Though efforts were made towards indicative and even 
more sophisticated planning, the central part of government action in the economy 
remained its budgetary policies. And though Wilson is now often said to have 
favoured Treasury orthodoxy, under his watch, government spending as a 
proportion of GDP grew and even stated attempts at deflation did not translate into 
deep public spending cuts (Keep, 2016, p.5; Kerr, 2011). Moreover, investment in 
the public industries continued apace. Following the Plowden report, effort was put 
into bringing the government budget and national income accounts closer together, 
and integrating forecasts of ‘public sector expenditure’ and GDP into the procedure 
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of government planning (Jones, 2000; 2003). This was deepened by the income-
expenditure model that went the step further to project forecasts of government 
borrowing, showing systematically for the first time how different aggregate financial 
flows related to differing central government demands for credit (Kenway, 1994, p. 
60).  
The period politicised government as a generator of economic growth. 
Though there were not necessarily doubts about the solvency of public debt it was 
abundantly clear that sterling denominated securities were under threat because 
the government would not be able to maintain such large balance of payments 
deficits (Needham, 2014a). As Green (2013) argued, Wilson was never keen on 
devaluation, and the American monetary authorities did not want Britain to devalue, 
but Wilson felt unable to jump-start his corporatist revolution while exporters were 
being squeezed with such a high exchange rate.  
The way that this situation developed cannot be read off the power of 
creditors and the financial sector restricting government to an orthodoxy unchanged 
from Gladstone. Rather it is precisely in the attempt to turn Keynesian governance 
into action that the Treasury was grandly empowered and that forecasts on how 
government debt related to budgetary interventions and GDP projections became 
such an important part of policymaking 
3.4 Public debt, liquidity governance and monetary control 
The emergence of budgetary Keynesianism in the 1950s was supposed to have 
granted the government the capacity to use its annual budget to manage aggregate 
liquidity flows. Though it was a potent weapon over consumer spending, it proved 
less able to generate the kind of productive investment that was Keynes’s original 
interest in liquidity management. Hence the attempt at more direct, corporatist 
solutions. While the government continued to run deficits through most of this 
period, on the monetary side it had become more austere (Kerr, 2001). Ever since 
Buttler’s attempt to restructure the government finances and fund a greater 
proportion of the national debt through gilts, rather than Treasury Bills, the discount 
window had slowly managed to re-establish its importance in shaping liquidity in the 
banking system (Allen, 2015). Indeed, if the monetary authorities were able to 
choke off liquidity created in the banking system, then its budgetary moves would 
be more potent.  
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For this reason, the high interest rates imposed during MacMillan and 
Wilson’s time in power - something often considered to represent their 
subordination of industrial renewal to the interest of finance (for example Kerr 2001, 
Green 2013) - could perhaps be better understood as an attempt to make the 
government budget the sole engine of economic governance. It is important, then, 
at this point to examine how the authorities attempted to combine expansionary 
fiscal budgets with monetary control of higher interest rates and what this meant for 
the operation of the two key markets for government debt: the short-term Treasury 
Bill market, and the long-term gilt market.  
To recall cheap money had flooded the banking system with such a large 
volume of Treasury Bills that the discount window had been rendered ineffective. 
The Radcliffe committee was established in May 1957 to examine the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy over the previous years. It reported how debt 
was at once a major headache for policymakers, but at least offered scope for 
intervention: 
“There is no doubt that it has, and can, exert this influence through the 
management of the National Debt which, if burdensome to the financial 
authorities in other respects, affords in this respect an instrument of 
singular potency. In our view debt management has become the 
fundamental domestic task of the central bank. It is not open to the 
monetary authorities to be neutral in their handling of this task. They must 
have and must consciously exercise a positive policy about interest rates, 
long as well as short, and about the relationship between them” (Radcliffe 
report 1959, p. 337) 
British debt had stood at 237 per cent of GDP in 1946, and was still 175 per cent in 
1951 (Keep, 2016), but the growth in the economy through the 1950s meant that by 
the end of the decade the public debt ratio seemed a more manageable 112.5 per 
cent (Allen 2014, p.245). In this sense the problem debt presented was not one of 
solvency per se, but the liquidity impacts that financing the debt implied. Over the 
course of the Conservative decade of the 1950s, Wilson, Eden and Macmillan ran 
repeated deficits, breaking with Labour’s ‘turn to austerity’ in the final years of the 
1940s (Allen, 2014). The result of which was an increase in both gilt and Treasury 
Bill financing, mostly to the domestic banking system.  
The effort to at once finance the debt internally, run budget deficits, and try 
to contain potential inflation meant that in the latter half of the 1950s and 1960s, 
interest rates were kept unduly high. The big shift came in 1957 when Macmillan, 
who was chancellor at the time, insisted on a significant rate hike. Wary of the 
  
102 
growing inflation in the previous years and the inability of the existing control 
arrangements to curtail clearing bank advances the governor of the Bank of 
England, Cameron Cobbold suggested a big increase in rates and was supported, 
eventually, by Conservative chancellor Peter Thorneycroft. The result was a jump in 
the Bank Rate from 5 to 7 per cent (Allen 2014, p.130). This succeeded in choking 
off inflationary expectations for the rest of the decade and indeed monetary policy 
was fairly stable for the remainder of the period. It was, as the Radcliffe committee 
reported, fiscal policy that made the running in demand management.  
Alongside the high Bank Rate there were a multitude of other controls on 
banks, which complimented the monetary authorities’ effort to manage the public 
debt. Bank insiders at the time (for example Allen, 2014, p. 181) now describe the 
period as resembling a kind of ‘financial repression’. The clearing banks faced the 
Bretton Woods restrictions on exchange, which together 30 per cent liquidity 
requirements and what was at that time still significant qualitative guidance from the 
Governor who more often than not was calling on them to slow advances. 
Collectively this meant that the clearers had little option but to hold government 
debt (which at least offered some interest compared with cash). As such the 
clearing banks were significant buyers of gilts and Treasury Bills, helping to finance 
government at rates more or less set by the monetary authorities themselves (ibid.).  
These controls served to strengthen the tie that the government budget had 
with monetary control. As Thorneycroft said in the late 1950s, there were two 
sources of money: Government and the banks (in Allen, 2014, p. 128). Short of 
nationalising the clearing banks, which the more radical left on the Labour party 
advocated, the controls on the banking sector described above was all the 
monetary authorities had available to control the liquidity extended to the national 
economy by the banking sector. There were other possible quantitative controls on 
the banking sector that were mooted at the time, for instance ceilings on bank 
advances, but Cobbold considered them unworkable (Tily, 2016). It is why there 
was such attention given to the prospects of trying to control government spending 
and what provoked the commissioning of the Plowden report to inquire precisely 
into the operation of fiscal policy that I described in the previous section.  
The monetary problems that plagued the British governments of the 1960s 
centred around the level of sterling, and culminated in devaluation in 1967. Yet as I 
described, throughout the period the discussion on monetary control was cast in 
fiscal terms, either jump-starting growth with the corporatist revolution - drawing on 
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the public exchequer if needed - or controlling fiscal spending through attempts at 
public sector wage cuts.  
In that sense, it is easy to see how the Keynesian period has come to be 
cast primarily in fiscal terms. The legacy of cheap money combined with the vast 
wartime public debt to make government deficit spending the primary mode of 
economic stimulus and the attendant inflationary and balance of payments 
problems. The apparent failure of fiscal policy and attempts at industrial 
modernisation is taken as a sign of the financial sector’s dominance in much 
literature, yet as I turn to in the following chapter, what I argue is much more 
significant was the way in which the monetary controls that had been established 
by the end of the 1950s, revolving around liquidity ratios, the high Bank Rate on the 
discount window and the clearing bank network, were being steadily eroded by a 
concurrent development of a parallel financial sector. Its impacts were to make 
monetary control a far steeper challenge. 
Conclusion 
Consideration of the monetary aspects of public debt helps to recast the question of 
whether there was ever a Keynesian revolution in Britain. That is a debate that has 
been grounded in fiscal terms: whether or not the authorities in Britain departed 
from a balanced-budget framework of public spending. When, instead, the 
Keynesian revolution is posed in terms of monetary governance, it becomes 
clearer. It involved, initially at least, using public debt to try and increase liquidity 
and stimulate private investment. The specific steps necessary to enact the policy 
had a profound significance on the years that followed. The banking system was 
flooded with liquidity that worked to undermine the position of the Bank of England 
as the monopoly provider of liquidity. The result of which was to make monetary 
governance of the domestic economy incredibly difficult. From here the 
governments of the 1950s attempted budgetary governance of the domestic 
economy, relying on national accounting statistics and adjustments to taxes to 
influence consumer spending, a key result of which was to grandly empower the 
Treasury as a key institution at the heart of Britain’s broad economy. As Britain 
continued to struggle with its external balances and repeated balance of payments 
problems, in the 1960s the idea of ‘economic growth’ pushed through by the state, 
became a very important grammar of politics, which meant the state and its 
finances came to be assessed in terms of its ability to generate growth. 
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In that way the Keynesian period demonstrated both the great potential, but 
also profound difficulty with managing the monetary aspects of public debt. The 
volatile dynamics of debt management were especially pronounced in an 
international framework for monetary governance that bound the state within the 
parameters of fixed exchange rates. As I show in the next chapter, when in the late 
1960s money creation became ever more centred around private sector debt, the 
question of how to control liquidity became even more pronounced. 
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4. The credit revolution: The 
rise of ‘parallel banking’ in 
Britain 
Introduction 
While prime minister Harold Wilson dreamt up his modern industrial revolution, 
‘forged in the white heat of technology’, Britain’s financial sector underwent a real-
life revolution that was to have a far more enduring effect. Between 1955 and 1971 
there emerged what became known as a ‘parallel’ financial sector in Britain that 
existed alongside and intertwined with the main, regulated sector. In the parallel 
sector private banks developed the capacity to issue their own debt as money on a 
scale far greater than before. The dominant position of public debt as the main 
source of liquidity was destroyed forever. And much like with the British state 
centuries before, the private banks’ capacity to monetise their debts meant a rapid 
growth in credit creation. This credit found its way to individuals, households and 
businesses, ramping up levels of private debt in the economy that have only 
continued to climb ever since. The scale of this private-sector liquidity created 
through the ‘credit revolution’ revolved around the parallel money market whose 
emergence and growth undercut the traditional discount market and with it the 
dominant position that public debt securities - Treasury Bills especially - had had in 
the monetary system. It was a sharp decline: Treasury Bills made up 67 per cent of 
all sterling instruments in 1957, but by 1979 accounted for just 6 per cent (Collins, 
1988, p. 361). In this radically altered environment the monetary authorities lost the 
direct control of liquidity in the financial system that had previously been 
established through their monopoly on Treasury Bills and cash. In this way a crucial 
avenue through which the state had used monetised public debt to govern the 
economy was undermined.  
The monetary authorities lacked the capacity (and many have argued, the 
will) to stop the rapid credit that was created through the parallel sector. It is 
perhaps why the credit revolution, and the parallel sector in which it emerged, are 
often depicted as free-market success stories; cases where financial market 
innovation - for better of worse - trumped the regulatory apparatus (for example 
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Goodhart, 1986; Cobham, 2003; Congdon, 2004). As I have argued throughout this 
is symptomatic of the way debt is seen as growing to excess only in an institutional 
and governance vacuum. Even the use of the terms ‘parallel’ and ‘secondary’ 
banking implies that the financial institutions which made up the sector developed 
in abstraction from what was already in place. It is well established that the period 
between the late 1960s and mid 1970s saw the financial sector undergo significant 
change. Yet what the credit revolution meant for monetary governance is less clear. 
Often the period is depicted as hastening the demise of the state as a monetary 
governor and helping to establish a new regime of market governance in its place. 
The heterodox literature like Anastasia Nesvetailova (2007), for example, ties the 
monetary expansion witnessed in the period to the notion of a market-provision and 
market-governance of credit. In these accounts (see also Chick and Dow, 2013) the 
credit revolution unfolds as a story of ‘politically managed’ money giving way to an 
era of ‘market managed’ money. 
 In this chapter I argue that the notion of ‘market-led governance’ does not 
adequately specify how the emergence of the parallel financial sector transformed 
the possibilities and problems of monetary governance in Britain. The sidelining of 
Treasury Bills as the dominant form of banking sector liquidity did of course 
undermine a key basis of state governance, but the nascent parallel money market 
did not simply dissolve the centuries-old institutional infrastructure that revolved 
around the Bank of England. The Bank of England’s hold over the most deeply 
institutionalised debt, the public debt, meant it still carried great weight in monetary 
affairs. Without a central bank, the private sector banks would have found it far 
harder to monetise their debts (Mehrling, 2010). For this reason, it is unhelpful to 
depict the credit revolution as the development of ‘market governance’ in the 
financial sector. Rather, to grasp how private sector financial houses acquired the 
capacity to monetise their debts and dramatically expand credit, it is necessary to 
place the innovations in their institutional context. Doing so reveals how the 
secondary financial sector, in which the credit revolution was born, did not operate 
in parallel to the primary sector. Rather, they were deeply intertwined. What 
separated the two was not regulation as much as it was the entrance of American 
banks harnessing the technique of ‘liability management’: the use of money 
markets to buy the ‘deposits’ that allowed lending to grow (Cassis and Battilossi, 
2002). Liability management came out of a highly-restricted American financial 
environment (Konings, 2011), and was brought to the British financial system 
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through London’s hosting of the Euromarkets (Burn, 2006). The growing 
significance of liability management helped to expand the interbank borrowing 
market, undermining the traditional discount market in the process (Goodhart, 
1982). Meanwhile, the development of the Euromarkets and the parallel money 
markets coincided with, and supported the broader development of, non-traditional 
banking in Britain. This came through the rise of hire purchase houses, Trustee 
Savings Banks, and Building Societies, which all worked to erode the dominance of 
the Big Five clearing banks in British retail finance (Collins, 1988). Taken together, 
British private finance was by the middle of the 1970s, becoming more highly 
leveraged, and capable of extending levels of credit that well exceeded what 
reserves would imply (Alessandri and Haldane, 2009)9. It is precisely because of 
the way bank debt could act as money that debt was able to grow so rapidly. As I 
have argued throughout, to take seriously this monetary aspect means tracking 
how private debt acquired monetary features, and how the monetary infrastructure 
this established shaped the broader financial system and the possibilities it offered 
for state governance.   
In the first section of this chapter, I build on this argument to show how the 
credit revolution cannot be depicted as a market revolution. The critical story that is 
often told, of postwar ‘regulation’ giving away to post 1970s ‘deregulation’ does 
nothing to capture concretely what changes were necessary in order for private 
bank debt to acquire moneyness. I argue that liability management was central, and 
its arrival into Britain through American financial houses facilitated the rapid growth 
of Britain’s financial sector, and the attendant expansion of private sector debt. On 
this basis I suggest the key to grasping the dynamics of the credit revolution and its 
effects on governance is by examining how liability management operated in 
Britain. In the second section I show how Britain’s financial sector was undergoing 
significant change in the period from 1950-1970, with the emergence of a broad 
parallel sector. This involved new retail financial houses - the hire purchase houses 
specifically - that undercut the clearing banks, and most importantly a new money 
                                                      
9 Alessandri and Haldane (2009) show how return on equity for UK banks jumped from 
around 5 to 25 percent between 1966 and 1972, the period I refer to broadly as the 
credit revolution, with banks rapidly reducing their ratio of liquid assets to total 
assets. Moreover, having declined since the end of the second world war, UK 
banking assets as a percentage of GDP began to grow rapidly in the late 1960s, 
crossing over 100 per cent of GDP by 1975.  
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market - the Euromarkets - which hosted international banks who established 
sophisticated techniques of liability management. The result of which was to 
establish a new practice of interbank borrowing as the crucial source of liquidity 
provision (Collins, 1988, p. 379). In the third section I examine how liability 
management operated and its consequences for monetary governance. The 
demotion of Treasury Bills as the primary source of liquidity meant that the Bank 
Rate was no longer a driver of short-term borrowing rates in the banking system 
(Needham, 2014a, p. 15). This was a major challenge for the monetary authorities 
and resulted in a series of ill-judged ‘monetarist’ reforms during the following 
decades. 
4.1 The credit revolution: Market-led governance?  
The growing excess of debt 
One key problem that arises when the monetary aspects of debt are occluded is 
that it becomes very difficult to explain how debts can continue to grow to such vast 
levels. For this reason when critical commentators, particularly heterodox voices 
like Ann Pettifor (2014) or Steve Keene (2011), come to write about the growth of 
debt they do so in terms of its inevitable unsustainability. They depict the explosion 
of private debt that took place through the credit revolution as a distortion from 
correct and acceptable practice. For this reason, there is a deep association in the 
literature between growing excess of debt and the idea of ‘market’ governance. If 
only there were an institutional infrastructure in place to ‘ground’ private finance, 
such growth would be impossible. It is why prominent post-Keynesian writers like 
Victoria Chick present an account of the credit revolution emerging alongside, and 
through, the state abdicating its role in monetary governance, stepping aside to let 
the market take over. Chick and Sheila Dow (2013), for example, describe how in 
the ‘golden era’ of a state regulated money, the financial landscape was 
characterised by “institutional specialisation, cartelisation, and a network of 
subsidies, privileges and responsibilities that knit[ed] the private financial 
institutions, the Bank of England and the Treasury into a mutually dependent 
system” (Chick and Dow, 2013, p. 2). This system began to unravel because of 
legislative changes in the 1970s that had the effect of leaving to the market what 
had previously been controlled by the state. Deregulation instilled an 
unprecedented situation where the Treasury and Bank of England “relinquished 
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responsibility for the control of credit and the money supply”, creating, “an entirely 
new position for the state vis-a-vis the nation’s money” (ibid.).  
This had important implications for public finance because under the 
postwar system of ‘managed’ money the Bank of England had legislative power to 
demand the clearing banks retain eight per cent cash and 20 per cent of other liquid 
assets in easily-accessible deposit accounts (ibid.). The ‘cash’ deposits were held 
at the Bank of England, while the liquidity deposits were held as Treasury bills in 
the discount houses. In exchange for these restrictions, the Bank of England 
provided liquidity to the clearers through the discount houses, lending at the Bank 
Rate through the discount window. The arrangement empowered the state in three 
ways. Firstly, holding cash and Treasury Bills in deposit with the Bank of England 
provided the state with short-term finance. Second, clearing banks and discount 
houses that held gilts provided the state with long-term finance. Third, as the 
monopoly provider of state money on the discount market, backed by gold (via the 
dollar), the state could adjust the level of money creation in the broad economy as it 
saw fit.  
By Chick and Dow’s (2013) account, these three sources of power were 
gradually relinquished as direct controls were swapped for market management in 
the 1970s. Reserve requirements fell, the link to gold was severed, and the clearing 
bank cartel dissolved. The compulsion to compete in the newly liberalised banking 
market meant the specialised and cartelised financial institutions that had 
characterised British banking gave way to a new arrangement where banks began 
to resemble each other more and more. Clearing banks soon began to offer interest 
on deposits and started competing for assets by offering lower interest rates on 
loans. This meant spreads were squeezed which, Chick and Dow (2013) argue, 
resulted in banks systematically lowering their reserves of liquid assets as much as 
they could in order to restore profit margins. This took place in a broader context of 
financial expansion through digital-technology-enabled globalised exchanges, the 
formal end to the dollar-gold link, and deregulation on the ‘demand-side’ of bank 
borrowing. Collectively there is a sense that the rapidly growing financial markets 
overwhelmed the infrastructure through which financial governance had taken 
place, supplanting it with a straightforward system of market governance.  
This branch of heterodox literature is very keen to stress how in 
contemporary times banks have the capacity to create money as debt (for example 
Pettifor 2014). In explaining why there has been such a marked increase in debt 
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since the 1970s Montgomerie (2015) points at the fact that money creation comes 
now from the private sector. Yet there is an assumption in Montgomerie (2015), 
Pettifor (2014) and Chick & Dow (2013) that banks have gained this capacity solely 
by virtue of deregulation, as if money and debt grows only outside of an institutional 
infrastructure. The idea being that that once ‘allowed’ to by the removal of state 
regulations, banks have the capacity to rapidly extend credit. For this reason, it 
becomes very difficult to understand specifically how the state’s ability to use public 
debt securities to govern the economy was affected by the credit revolution. That 
this argument is often made by heterodox economists is especially surprising 
because it downplays one of the key lessons of Hyman Minsky’s foundational 
heterodox work. He demonstrated what institutional innovations were necessary for 
private debt to function as a form of money, and in that sense how deeply 
institutionalised credit relations were in the broader economy. In tracing out the 
institutional shifts I argue that it is liability management, rather than deregulation, 
that better captures the shift on which the credit revolution was forged. 
Private money, market governance? 
The credit revolution transformed the position of public debt securities in the 
banking system. Public debt, especially Treasury Bills, had become established 
after the first world war as the key source of liquidity in the financial system. This 
provided the state, through its monopoly provision of this liquidity, a monetary 
infrastructure through which to govern the economy through the postwar Keynesian 
period (Allen, 2012b). The impact of the credit revolution was that it saw private 
debt securities, in particular a new instrument called Certificates of Deposit, 
supplant Treasury Bills as the most important source of liquidity (Revell, 1973, p. 
280). Given this broader role for private debt and private financial markets in the 
money market, it is easy to assume that monetary governance too was 
‘marketised’. Yet to grasp more specifically how the credit revolution implicated 
monetary governance we need to see what it entailed and how it operated. This, I 
argue, comes by casting the credit revolution as a development in the technique of 
banking with the emergence of ‘liability management’ in Britain.  
Through liability management the financial system acquired the capacity to 
extend credit to levels well beyond what any notion of reserves or deposits would 
imply (Earley and Evans, 1982). It began in the middle of the 1950s and took off at 
the beginning of the 1970s (Cassis and Battilossi, 2002, p. 108), and it transformed 
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the logic of banking practice. Rather than first raise deposits and then make loans, 
liability management involved banks first originating loans and then looking for 
corresponding ‘deposits’ to buy from the money markets markets. In that sense the 
new banking practice meant first growing the asset base, and then managing 
liabilities through money market operations. To do this banks needed a ready 
source of liabilities that could quickly be raised to facilitate their asset growth. For 
most of the twentieth century the main liquid liabilities in the British banking system 
were Treasury Bills and Bank of England cash. Though, as the 1959 Radcliffe 
committee report recognised, there were a number of other money-like financial 
securities (commercial bills of exchange, for example), it was public debt securities 
that dominated. The great shift that took place through the credit revolution was that 
private bank debt securities replaced public ones to become the dominant money-
like security in the banking system, and as such the dominant source of liquidity 
(Revell, 1973). Driving this development in the monetisation of private debt was not 
1970s deregulation, which followed later, but the development of the interbank 
money market through the practice of liability management. Without active 
interbank borrowing, bank securities could not be the dominant money-like financial 
security, and it would not be possible for banks to operate by a logic of ‘creating 
money out of nothing’ in the way heterodox commentators like Keene (2011) 
present bank practice today. Interestingly, though often overlooked in contemporary 
heterodox literature, Minsky (1986, p. 86) himself stresses how important the 
development of the interbank money market was in creating a financial sector 
capable of rapidly increasing debt. 
Without the development of an interbank money market it would have been 
very difficult for bank debt to acquire the monetary functions it did through the credit 
revolution. This is because of the way banks operate, and the primary problem they 
face. As I will next explain, banks can be thought of as operating under a constant 
liquidity constraint. In order to lend out money on demand to customers they must 
always have ready access to liquidity, and there are three primary channels 
available10: First, a bank can borrow from the central bank’s open market 
operations. However, if the central bank is trying to restrict reserve growth - as the 
Bank of England was in the late 1950s and 1960s - this would not be possible. A 
                                                      
10 This reformulates Minsky’s description of money and banking as laid out in Minsky 
(1986) and (Dymski and Pollin, 1992). 
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second option is to borrow from the central bank’s discount window, but again this 
comes at a cost when the Bank Rate was being increased to precisely to limit credit 
creation. The third option is to raise cash directly from the open money market 
through issuing debt securities. It was this third option that became so significant 
and underpinned the credit revolution. Banks are special today precisely because 
the debts they issue are so liquid that they are accepted as means of payment - 
money - by other banks (Minsky 1986), in that sense granting them the capacity to 
issue their debt as money in a similar way the state managed through the Financial 
Revolution.  
It is precisely through conceptualising bank debt in terms of its monetary 
functions that an understanding can form of the way in which banks sustainably 
work with liabilities that vastly outstretch their assets, and in that sense function 
despite being technically insolvent at any one time. Much like the state, banks have 
amassed debts well in excess of the level where there is any realistic prospect of 
repayment. Yet the continued ability of their debt to function as money meant that 
this solvency problem was not as important as managing liquidity. It is for that 
reason that the interbank money market was crucial, because it provided the 
constant stream of liquidity necessary for bank debt to work as money.  
This is why the idea of deregulation is misleading. Bank debt did not acquire 
monetary functions by dissolving the monetary infrastructure that was already 
established. Rather it built on this infrastructure. It is why Minsky placed such 
importance in the development of the federal funds market whose emergence he 
witnessed as a participant observer at a major Wall Street brokerage house in the 
late 1950s (Minsky, 1957; Mehrling, 2015). He describes the period as a crucial 
turning point in the transition to conditions of ‘financial instability’ (characterised by 
rampant credit creation) in the American economy. As came to be the case in 
Britain, it was the nascent techniques of liability management that drove the 
transformation. In the postwar era, American Treasury Bills (issued by the state) 
were the primary instrument through which banks met their liquidity requirements 
but towards the end of the 1950s banks started to issue their own Certificates of 
Deposits (CDs), which together with repos, sparked a credit revolution. “Introduced 
in the banking system in the early 1960s,” Minsky later wrote (1986, p. 85), “[CDs] 
soon became a favourite vehicle for the investing of large-scale holdings of short-
term funds. The growth of CDs in the early 1960s enabled bank credit to expand 
substantially faster than the reserve base.”  
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Minsky’s point here is important. The argument implies that before the 
emergence of liability management through CDs, banks were still dependent on 
customer deposits or central bank reserves. Under these conditions they were less 
able to expand their own credit money so rapidly. Instead (whatever the origins of 
money11) banks had to behave much more like the neoclassical model where they 
intermediate customer saving and investing, and chase deposits to increase their 
possibility of lending. In these conditions monetary growth therefore comes from 
within the productive economy (or from central bank diktat) rather than being 
injected into the economy by bank creation. This actually describes the conditions 
of nineteenth century England quite well. At that time the clearing banks that 
dominated grew their deposit base and lent from these reserves (Knafo, 2013, p. 
155). Even when the joint-stock banks developed, slowed their use of gold or Bank 
of England created cash to settle deposits between themselves, and issued 
cheques drawn against deposits (Chick, 1993), there was still a base to which they 
were tied12. This is precisely why banks felt so compelled to court deposits and 
expand branch networks, and why the banks with the biggest branches (the Big 
Five clearing banks) dominated English banking (Nevin and Davis, 1970).  
Though by the twentieth century there were multiple forms of money in the 
British banking system13, bank lending was still based on the physical collateral of 
deposits and state-issued debt established an institutional limit on monetary growth 
that could not be breached14: Though the London discount market was highly 
                                                      
11 It is notable, for instance, that in the nineteenth century the dominant view of money 
creation was that money originated from banks as credit. Henry McLeod is thought 
to have originated the credit money approach but was speaking to a specifically 
Scottish context where banks would issue loans as credit secured on land to farmers 
who would then repay from the spoils of newly created produce. In that sense credit 
preceded productive output, which was central to the way MacLeod developed his 
thinking on banking (Skaggs, 2003). 
12 Cheques helped the ‘money supply’ to grow well in excess of the notes in circulation 
and the stock of gold but lending was still thought to come out of a fraction of these 
reserves, with ‘deposits’ in the banking system as a whole increasing by a factor of 
1/reserve requirement (Stiglitz 1997: 736 in Werner, 2015, p. 7). 
13 These included customer deposits, the notes issued by the Bank of England, 
Treasury Bills issued by the government, and commercial bills of exchange, created 
by banks themselves (Allen, 2014). Indeed, the money market in Britain was so well 
developed that the Radcliffe committee (1959, p. 133) could describe there being 
“many highly liquid assets which are close substitutes for money” which made the 
control of broad monetary growth difficult. 
14 The monetary authorities could, however, increase the issue of Treasury Bills or 
Bank of England notes, which would increase the money supply. As I laid out in the 
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developed, it was not used to issue ‘money as debt’ for the purpose of retail lending 
beyond what the (fractional) reserve base would imply (Chick, 1993).  
The difference between then and what followed was not deregulation but the 
fact that bank money became more significant through the development of 
techniques of liability management. Given its importance, the heterodox literature 
says surprisingly little about the new developments that took place on the money 
market in the 1950s and 1960s. To be able to call on the money markets to meet 
cash commitments the ‘asset’ side of a bank’s business need to be fine tuned 
carefully enough to ensure a constant flow of cash in, but the ‘liability’ side requires 
careful management (Dymski and Pollin, 1992). A bank raising funds from the 
wholesale money markets is dealing with sophisticated investors who often demand 
higher interest rates than everyday retail depositors. There also needs to be a 
money market of sufficient size and depth to be able to handle a bank’s varied 
business. It is hardly a surprise, therefore, that money market “liability 
management” was not a mainstream strategy for banks for a long time (Nevin and 
Davis, 1970). Without sophisticated techniques of ‘liability management’, the credit 
revolution would not have been possible, and the key question to consider then is 
how these techniques emerged. While it would be easy to depict liability 
management as an aspect of ‘market governance’, where the state stepped back, 
this would reveal very little about the specific ways in which liability management 
affected the monetary infrastructure in Britain and the impacts it had on the state’s 
capacity to govern as a result.  
In the following section I examine the context in which liability management 
emerged in Britain. It came at a time when Britain’s financial sector was undergoing 
a significant change through the emergence of a parallel sector that was not directly 
tied to the governance mechanisms of the Bank of England.  
4.2 The institutional origins of the credit revolution 
The development of liability management had a transformative impact comparable 
with the emergence of discounting by the London Goldsmiths centuries before. 
Precisely because it helped private debt to serve more widely as money, it 
                                                                                                                                                            
previous chapter this was of course something they often did. But the clearing banks 
could not of their own accord increase the money supply. 
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transformed banking and underpinned an exposition in liquidity and private 
indebtedness that has come to characterise the contemporary economy. Yet the 
expansion in debt did not take place in an institutional vacuum; rather liability 
management was born in a highly-regulated American financial context and 
imported to Britain (Konings, 2011). This came as part of a broader shift in the 
British financial landscape that saw greater competition and a growing financial 
market in Britain that was to require a new settlement for financial governance, one 
that accepted the changed role for government debt securities in the control of 
system-wide liquidity.  
The credit revolution took place through the development of a secondary 
financial system in Britain that emerged parallel to, and intertwined with, the primary 
sector that had been established over the previous century. The impacts of this 
were felt on a number of fronts, mostly immediately by the Big Five clearing banks. 
The dominance of these banks, whose credit creation was regulated by the Bank of 
England through discount houses, ebbed away as the secondary market, which 
operated outside of the Bank of England’s sphere of influence, developed (Revell, 
1968). The rise of the secondary markets and the arrival of liability management 
coincided and deepened the decline of the joint-stock banks that had dominated 
since the 1850s, and helped to establish, for the first time since the Bank of 
England’s imposed monopoly on note issue, the extension of credit to levels well 
beyond what even fractional reserves would imply. These dynamics altered the 
terrain of monetary governance, rendering the existing British apparatus incapable 
of directly controlling credit creation. The deep interconnections between public 
debt securities and the private banking and payments system caused changes to 
the way that retail banking worked in Britain. In turn, this had implications for the 
operation of debt management.  
Challenging the clearing banks 
The postwar period of Keynesian experiments in monetary governance originated 
at a time when the Big Five clearing banks dominated British finance, yet by the 
end of the 1950s, this was beginning to change. Since the demise of the country 
banks in the middle of the nineteenth century, the Big Five had dominated the 
financial sector, with personal and commercial deposits in clearing banks 
accounting for 80 per cent of the total deposits in Britain in 1951. By 1967, 
however, their influence had dissolved and the figure had almost halved, dropping 
  
116 
to 46 per cent (Nevin and Davis, 1970, p. 214)15. 
In their place, a number of new and alternative financial houses began to 
ascend in the 1950s: building societies, Trustee Savings Banks, hire purchase 
houses, and international banks (Channon, 1977). These were financial houses 
that operated either in the mainstream, Bank of England governed primary markets, 
or, increasingly in the growing secondary market that existed in ‘parallel’ to the 
traditional system (Einzig, 1971). The growth of Britain’s parallel financial sector 
can easily seem like an example of financial innovation developing to escape the 
institutions of monetary governance but such an account would miscast what 
developed in Britain and the intricate ways in which the primary and secondary 
markets were integrated.  
Initially, the Big Five clearing banks tried to avoid really competing with the 
new houses. They had an established practice of cartel-like collusion where they 
offered customers zero interest on current account deposits, and a fixed rate of 
interest on savings account deposits that was uniform to the sector (Channon, 
1977, p. 40). In that sense they did not ‘compete’ for deposits (liabilities). Neither 
did they compete on the lending (asset) side of their business. This was because 
they felt that if any one bank offered more loans than their competitors, it would 
eventually result in comparatively more claims being made upon their reserves, 
meaning that cash reserves will transfer to those other banks, the reserve ratio will 
fall, and the liquidity position become untenable. As a result, the Big Five clearers 
felt institutionally bound to move together, instead of really competing on credit 
advances (Macmillan committee, 1931, p. 34) The authorities were happy with this 
cartel behaviour because it ensured interest rates offered to customers were 
predictable allowing the Bank Rate to remain fairly stable as it did not have to 
adjust continually to manage short-term retail rates (Nevin and Davis, 1970, p. 
216). This, in turn, meant that longer term yields on gilts would not have to fluctuate 
(Needham, 2014a). Through the 1950s and 1960s, the Bank of England felt this 
stability was an important factor in its ability to continually sell gilt-edged securities 
                                                      
15 Amalgamations between the retail-facing arms of banks since 1967 has meant the 
sector is once again highly concentrated today, with the four big UK banking groups: 
RBS, Barclays, HSBC and Lloyds Banking Group, along with Nationwide and 
Santander accounting for 80 per cent of the stock of UK customer lending and 
deposits (Davies et al., 2010, p. 323). 
  
117 
to fund the national debt, which had become a permanent feature of the British 
economy after the war.  
Yet this situation was being made increasingly untenable by the growth of 
the parallel sector. An important aspect of this on the retail side, directly in 
competition with the clearing banks, was the growth in personal finance. The 
postwar boom had brought increasing wages and the development of a consumer 
spending culture in Britain (which of course was fermented by successive 
Conservative governments looking to consumers to drive growth). There was a 
rush in demand for consumer durables bought on credit in the 1950s and this new 
debt-fuelled consumption opened an avenue for new financial houses to expand 
(Channon, 1977, p. 49). It was specialist hire purchase houses, rather than the 
established banks that really drove this market. The traditional merchant banks, 
who were struggling with the declining use of sterling in comparison to the dollar, 
did enter some of these areas but at this stage were more focussed on trying to 
build overseas interests (Jones, 1995), while the big five joint-stock clearing banks 
seemed to ignore the hire-purchase market altogether (Channon, 1977). They 
didn’t really see the opportunities in consumer credit - the most obvious entry point 
for them - preferring to stick with their established practice of providing overdraft 
facilities to corporate clients (Channon, 1977, p. 44). By the end of 1958 hire 
purchase lending exceeded £600m, most of which was concentrated in a fairly 
narrow line of consumer goods: motor vehicles, but also furniture, radio and TV 
sets, gas cookers and refrigerators (Radcliffe report, 1959). The hire purchase 
houses managed to suck deposits from the mainstream retail banking sector, 
raising the majority of their funds from industrial and commercial deposits. Yet 
perhaps more important was their activities on the liability side of their business. 
They used the money markets to raise a small amount by issuing terminable 
debentures of three, five and seven years (Radcliffe report 1959, p. 75). 
Recognising the potential this had to rapidly expand their assets, they they 
established the Finance Houses Association to lobby the authorities for the right to 
expand their use of unsecured notes (Radcliffe report 1959, p.76). And it is to this, 
the developments on the parallel money markets, to which I now turn.  
Challenging the discount market 
The parallel money market was a money market that existed outside the realm of 
formal Bank of England oversight (Einzig, 1971). Its first flourishing came not 
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through private sector innovation but rather stemmed from changes in the public 
sector that owed to concern among Conservative politicians over the scale of the 
national debt. As I showed in chapter three, the Conservative governments of the 
1950s were keen on restructuring the national debt and wanted to loosen the strain 
government investment placed on the national budget (in large part to allow for 
consumer-friendly tax cuts which they felt would stimulate growth). For this reason, 
in 1955 they changed the way local authorities accessed investment funds, 
increasing the rate at which local authorities borrowed from central government (via 
the Public Works Loan Board) (Collins, 1988, p. 371). The new rules required local 
authorities to either borrow from the loan board at market rates or access finance 
from the private money markets. Local authorities did the latter by issuing securities 
on the wholesale money markets. Since local authorities were prevented from 
issuing long-term stock, they instead experimented with trying to raise short-term 
deposit-like securities at first (Einzig, 1969, p. 106). These were wholesale 
deposits, issued in sterling, with maturities of between a day and week. In addition, 
they began to issue large-denomination bills. These securities were mostly bought 
by clearing banks and other new financial intermediaries, along with some large 
corporations and even other local authorities (Collins, 1988, p. 371). This had the 
effect of creating a market in short-term highly liquid securities, which, because 
they had the implicit backing of the British state, were considered similar to 
Treasury bonds, but existed outside of the traditional discount market.  
In the early 1960s short-term borrowing rates were significantly lower than 
long-term rates, which meant local authorities found it cheaper to finance 
themselves through short-term borrowing, and as such the market developed 
quickly. Indeed, such was the scale of the market for local authority financing, it 
ended up influencing broad international movements of funds to and from London 
(Einzig, p. 1971, p. 106). For example, in 1961 Dawney Urban District Council 
borrowed £232,000 from the Moscow Nardony Bank to finance their housing 
programme (Burn, 2006, p. 192). In effect central government had been 
disintermediated and the liquidity that was developing on the money markets was 
creating an opportunity for local public institutions to access finance. At a time when 
the national debt was still high, the new local authority borrowing established 
another aspect to politics of the state’s debt. The increase in this ‘unfunded’ floating 
debt, driven by the growth in short-term local authority financing, worried the 
monetary authorities to such an extent that in 1964 the Treasury decreed short-
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term borrowing had to be capped at 20 per cent of total debt (Einzig, 1971, p. 108). 
The public sector was, therefore an important driver in the development of the 
secondary markets, even a decade before the ‘deregulation’ of domestic and 
international finance that much heterodox literature takes as a starting point. This 
demonstrates how the growth of financial markets came not from dissolving the 
monetary infrastructure that was in place and mobilising ‘market governance’ 
instead, but precisely by using this infrastructure as a base for further development.  
By the early 1960s the British secondary money market was largely 
domestic, made up of local authority finance, and consumer finance through the 
hire-purchase companies. While this was important in the early reshaping of 
Britain’s financial architecture, it did not as yet pose a threat to the broad system of 
governance based on Treasury Bills (Revell, 1973). Indeed, the problem of 
excessive liquidity was still deemed to originate from the overabundance of 
Treasury bills in the banking system which, as I argued in chapter three, was 
articulated in terms of the pressure it placed on Britain’s external deficits. This is 
why when Labour prime minister Harold Wilson first came to power in 1964 he was 
obsessed with trying to improve Britain’s exports by remedying the sluggish 
productivity of Britain’s manufacturing sector (Hall, 1986). Yet in the financial 
sector, at the same time as home-grown outsiders were first making headway into 
British finance and establishing a secondary sector, American banks were arriving 
onto the new secondary money markets. It was these American banks, operating in 
the emerging Euromarkets, that were best placed to capitalise by importing their 
sophisticated techniques of liability management into Britain (Channon, 1977). The 
basis of the state’s power to govern the economy through its control of government 
debt securities on Britain’s discount markets was undermined by the way American 
banks used the Euromarkets.  
The Euromarkets are now described as one of the most pivotal financial 
innovations of the twentieth century (Reid, 1988) and the most significant monetary 
device since the banknote (van Dormael, 1997). That such important innovation 
took place during the high time of ‘embedded’ finance is not because regulators lost 
faith in the efficacy of state regulation and turned to ‘market ideology’ instead, but is 
precisely because of the impact liability management had in revolutionising the 
money markets. Its development came from the way the dollar shortage that had 
characterised the world economy just after the second world war (and which was 
overcome by Marshall Aid and the Korean War (Wyn-Jones, 2016)) soon became a 
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dollar glut as the American economy boomed. The Euromarkets were encouraged 
by the banking and regulatory communities of London, New York and Washington 
to became a London-based site for international banks to offer dollar credits on the 
basis of their non-resident dollar holdings (Burn, 2006; Green, 2016). This was a 
profitable business that, given the excess of dollars in the international financial 
system, was easily expanded (Konings, 2007, p. 47).  
Initially the Euromarkets were a useful place for American corporations to 
escape the domestic restriction on interest rates they could earn on their deposits. 
As such, rather than earn low returns on their savings, they opted to bypass the 
domestic American financial system altogether and hold their savings on the 
Euromarkets instead. This disintermediation by American corporations of the 
American financial system prompted American banks to move into the 
Euromarkets. With American regulators trying to overcome their own balance of 
payments problems by restricting the outflow of dollars, the Euromarkets provided 
American corporations a perfect escape (Konings, 2010). For this reason, the 
Euromarkets had a powerful effect undermining the Bretton Woods system, long 
before Nixon formalised its collapse by closing the dollar-gold window in 1971. It 
was through their operation on the Euromarkets that American banks introduced 
liability management to Britain and the development of an active money market 
outside the discount market. American banks had long had better expertise than 
their British counterparts in techniques of money market liquidity management, 
because historically American banks operated under heavy restrictions that made it 
difficult for them to raise deposits (Konings, 2007). Their restricted deposit portfolios 
meant that during the postwar period they were often unable to meet customer 
demand. As such, willing borrowers were forced away from banks and had to find 
alternative sources of liquidity. In early postwar America, corporations relied much 
more on issuing their own securities directly to institutional investors, bypassing 
American banks altogether. This ‘disintermediation’ threatened the position of the 
American banks and forced them to experiment with techniques of money market 
deposit raising that characterised the emergence of ‘liability management’. 
Crucial to this, as Minsky later observed, was the development of 
Certificates of Deposits (‘CDs’) which allowed American banks to buy deposit-like 
liabilities on the money markets and thereby meet their liquidity requirements. It 
worked by helping to establish a significant market for interbank, short-term 
securities, which became the basis for liability management. CDs were first created 
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by Citibank in America in 1961 as a money market instrument that allowed banks to 
lend to one another (Degen, 1987, p. 131). Specifically, it was a promise that “a 
certain amount of capital will be deposited with an issuing bank at a specific rate of 
interest, and that this deposit will subsequently mature and be paid back with 
interest at a future date no less than three months away” (Channon 1977, p. 11). In 
a sense they were like a normal deposit but in the context of the heavily regulated 
US financial markets they were especially useful because they could be tailored 
individually (Nevin & Davies 1970, p. 230). Though they were not exempt from the 
interest rate ceiling that existed in postwar America, because they were issued for 
set minimum periods - and could not be withdrawn at an instant - banks were 
therefore permitted to offer higher rates than more regular demand deposits. 
Moreover, as the market grew, banks actively created a secondary market in CDs 
which allowed holders of the instrument to sell off easily at time of their choosing 
(Konings 2007, p. 46). This transformed them from time-deposit like instruments 
into something that resembled demand deposits. That way they were highly liquid 
(like demand deposits) but were able to offer a higher interest rate and could 
compete on the money markets with Treasury Bills and commercial paper. The 
great significance of CDs was they provided banks with a response to 
disintermediation. Banks could issue CDs on the money markets and sell them to 
commercial banks. Though not a direct form of corporate deposits into bank 
accounts it was a money-market form, which rested on the marketability of CDs 
(Konings, 2006, p. 480).  
They changed the way the money market worked. It was not that a money 
market did not exist before, but with Citibank’s innovation, it became less a place 
where banks bought financial assets, and instead more a site where banks sold 
obligations (debt) in exchange for liquidity (Konings, 2006). In doing so it 
established the possibility for banks to facilitate asset growth in accordance with 
customer demand, allowing for bank debt to serve as money ‘created’ 
endogenously. This gradually shifted the driver of bank practice. Previously, “the art 
of banking consisted mainly of acquiring the composition of assets that would earn 
satisfactory profits while preserving the liquidity and solvency of the bank” (Degen, 
1987, p. 130). The new approach was the reverse. As Chernow (1990, p. 54) 
writes, “instead of managing their assets on the basis of a given liability structure, 
the burden of securing the bank’s liquidity and profitability shifted towards the 
management of the bank’s liabilities”. 
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The integration of primary and secondary finance in Britain 
In this new context where liability management had granted bank debt with more 
monetary-like functions and underpinned an expansion in lending, the clearers had 
initially suffered the most. Their initial refusal to participate in new lending practices 
had undermined their standing, but their passivity did not last. It was their adoption 
of American-style liability management techniques that helped mainstream the 
practice (Channon 1977), and meant there was no prospect for the old framework 
of monetary governance to cope in a dramatically altered environment.  
Having ignored personal credit and hire purchase finance at first, the 
clearers ‘bought’ their way into the secondary markets at the end of the 1950s. This 
process began in 1958 when the monetary authorities allowed Barclays to make a 
25 per cent investment in the shareholdings of secondary bank United Dominions 
Trust and a flurry or merger activity followed. Spurred on by a general bull market in 
the London Stock Exchange, by July 1958 four major clearing banks had bought 
stakes in hire purchase companies (Channon, 1977, p.49). Interestingly, and 
reflecting how removed the joint-stock banks still were from these emerging 
practices, they were reluctant to get involved in management of the secondary 
houses they had just acquired, deeming hire purchase lending, and personal 
finance more generally, a touch too crude for their more traditional sensibilities 
(ibid.). Whatever their misgivings, however, the acquisitions proceeded at a pace. “I 
was on holiday in Wales at the time,” a prominent clearer recalled, “and came back 
to find the whole bloody lot in hire purchase. They went into it like the herd of 
Gaderene swine.” (in Kynaston, 2002, p. 103). This initial takeover period in finance 
was vertical in nature, with clearers buying companies involved in leasing, factoring, 
credit cards, and unit trusts using these lines of higher-interest lending to shore any 
potential liquidity problems that arose in their main line of business (Nevin & Davis, 
1970).  
By acquiring stakes in secondary houses, the clearing banks soon 
developed skills in the liability management that the secondary banks had acquired 
(Channon, 1977). Nonetheless the British banks were at a disadvantage to their 
international competitors, because in comparison with American banks especially, 
but also German and Japan financial houses, British banks were significantly 
smaller and less capitalised (Goodhart, 1982). Liability management was much 
more viable when a firm was more deeply capitalised, given the tight-rope it was 
constantly facing with the need to have liquidity on hand or accessible at any one 
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time. This concern about comparative size drove a significant horizontal merger 
rush among clearers and 1968 saw the biggest banking merger in British history 
between when National Provincial and Westminster - four and five of the ‘big five’ 
(Channon, 1977, p. 42) merged. Nonetheless, it took a while for British banks to 
really warm to the innovation, partly because of the gentlemanly embarrassment 
with competing for deposits, something which the clearing bank cartel had never 
really done (Einzig, 1971).  
It was not until 1968 that British clearing banks began to issue sterling 
denominated CDs and by July of that the year $800 million of CDs had been issued 
(Nevin & Davis, 1970, p.230). CDs were important because they allowed banks to 
retain part of corporate liquidity that would otherwise be channelled towards 
competing institutions in the money market. It meant banks could strengthen the 
liability side of their balance sheet by compensating for shrinking deposits with 
funds borrowed from the market (Battilossi, 2002, p. 108). They had a 
transformative impact in the way British finance moved away from sectoral 
specialisation, which had characterised the City for generations, towards more 
universal, investment bank-like activity (Davies et al., 2010). For example, clearers 
began diversifying their products, offering export finance, foreign exchange 
facilities, trustee facilities; all practices learned from American banks. 
The importance of private sector debt securities in the money market was 
not new, before the rise to prominence of Treasury Bills after the first world war, 
commercial securities, in particular bills of exchange, were the main form of 
discount market liquidity (Revell, 1968). Yet bills of exchange were at least self-
liquidating. What started with Treasury Bills and now extended to the private sector 
with commercial debentures, local authority bonds and most crucially CDs was 
liquidity being secured on debt-based IOUs, as such stretching the distance 
between financial sector securities and any underlying ‘real’ economic activity 
(Mehrling, 2010). As I examine in the following section, this was to have important 
implications for the changing way government debt securities fitted within the 
infrastructure of credit relations.  
4.3 The public governance of private money 
The expansion in credit that accompanied the credit revolution increased the size 
and significance of the financial sector in Britain (Alessandri and Haldane, 2009, 
see footnote 9). This growth did not take place through the dissolution of an 
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institutional infrastructure, or in abstraction from it, but rather was forged onto the 
monetary system that had been established over the previous centuries. In outlining 
how liability management came to Britain, I demonstrated specifically the 
importance of liability management in establishing monetary features to bank debt. 
It allowed banks to greatly expand their role in the monetary system. The credit 
revolution showed again how when the monetary aspects of debt are taken into 
consideration, debt is no longer necessarily a problem to be avoided, something 
that drags on productive life, and which, unless paid back swiftly, courts financial 
(and ethical) ruin. Rather it showed how the ability to create debt (as money) could 
be incredibly productive. Because the credit revolution was a private-sector 
development, it was harder to account for its effects on public debt and public 
governance. As I have mentioned, it is often assumed that public governance was 
overwhelmed and the state stepped aside to allow for market-rule instead, which 
deepened the power of creditors over all other social actors (for example 
Nesvetailova, 2010; Chick and Dow, 2013). Yet examination of the specific 
changes to the money market reveals a different story. It is fair to say public 
governance was transformed, but the capacity of the state to govern was not 
diminished. 
The transformation was clear. The state’s ability to govern the economy 
through shifts in liquidity stemmed from its status as near monopoly provider of the 
two dominant sources of banking sector liquidity: banknotes and, more significantly, 
Treasury Bills. Yet the growth of CDs and interbank lending through liability 
management rapidly changed this. Treasury bills had made up 67 per cent of total 
short-term sterling instruments in 1957, but by 1979 accounted for just 6 per 
percent (Collins, 1988, p. 361). This decline began in the 1950s and 1960s as 
alternative sources of liquidity, originating form outside the monetary authorities’ 
influence, developed in the Euromarkets and the secondary banks and local 
authorities. As such, much as the excess of Treasury bills had curtailed hopes of 
traditional monetary policy in the mid 1950s, the result of liability management was 
that the monetary authorities faced the reverse problem, with Treasury bills too 
insignificant a part of the money market to be useful in the direct control of liquidity. 
This had implications beyond even broad monetary governance and actually 
affected the working of the clearing bank cartel itself. The secondary houses often 
offered better terms on deposits and this lead to a reduction in the Big Five clearing 
banks’ share of total deposits (Channon, 1977). Unless the cartel ended, and banks 
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were forced to compete for deposits by offering higher rates to savers, the 
‘disintermediation’ of the traditional financial system would continue. In turn this 
worsened the dynamic of broad monetary governance because fewer deposits and 
loans were being made out of the system where Treasury bills were significant. 
The result of which was that the state faced two key problems: First was 
how to stem disintermediation of the clearing bank sector; second was how to make 
monetary policy effective in a context when public debt securities were no longer 
the main form of liquidity in the banking sector (Revell, 1973). More broadly, by the 
late 1960s the monetary authorities were beginning to operate in an environment 
where there appeared to be no possible restriction on credit creation. This was 
because of the growing prominence of securities like CDs that were neither 
rationed by the state nor self-liquidating and corresponding directly to contracts in 
the ‘real’ economy (Degen, 1987). In order to solve the two problems I identified, 
and govern liquidity, the state needed to be able to act on a banking system that 
organised its own operations in terms of the necessities of liability management. 
The issue of what monetary governance looked like in conditions of unlimited credit 
was to become a pressing problem which initially, as I examine in the next chapter, 
led to all kinds of misguided attempts with ‘monetarist’ control of the money supply. 
These regulatory reforms that were to take place in 1970s came through an attempt 
by the public authorities to control, guide and govern these new monetary 
dynamics, rather than simply ‘enable’ them because of an of ideological faith in 
market governance or because newly-empowered creditors imposed their will over 
policymakers. The changes that had taken place transformed the way banking 
operated. Broadly whereas previously banks operated by expanding their deposit 
base before expanding their lending, now the reverse was true. Banks could secure 
funds to meet their asset growth by issuing financial securities that had very low or 
no reserve requirements. Governance in this context was very different because 
the Treasury Bills mattered less and reserve requirements were insignificant. As 
Early & Evans put it (1982, p. 55) liability management broke “the three-way link 
that once connected the volume of bank reserves (monetary base); the volume of 
demand or checkable bank deposits (money) and the level of bank lending.”  
It was a rapid transformation as well. The first sterling CDs were issued in 
1968, a year later total holdings stood at £442m and by 1971 it had grown to 
£2242m (Revell, 1973, p.280). Their growth was due to the way banking based on 
liability management worked. Banks extended advances not through the traditional 
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overdraft manner that had long characterised British banking - and was still the 
norm for clearing banks at the start of the 1970s - but through fixed-term loans. 
Such advances were less suited than overdrafts in the provision of working capital, 
but chimed well with needs for longer-term investment projects, in particular 
property-development and construction where the use of new investment appraisal 
techniques like Discounted Cash Flow were more common (Miller, 1991). In this 
way liability management-based banking, which characterised these secondary 
banks had large fixed-termed accounts on both sides of the balance sheet, all 
repayable at knowable but varying points (Revell, 1973).  
The key to managing a successful banking operation in that context was not 
controlling for liquidity in the traditional sense (guarding against a sudden mass 
withdraw of deposits), but about trying to ‘match’ the maturities, interest rates and 
exchange rate terms of a bank’s assets and liabilities (Revell, 1968)16. In this type 
of ‘matching’ model of banking based on liability management, interest rate 
changes (and expectations of them) are even more significant than in the traditional 
model (ibid.). An expected rate rise means bankers will have their assets short as 
possible and liabilities long as possible - they can switch into higher yielding assets 
when the interest rate change comes, but continue to pay lower rates on a high 
proportion of liabilities, and vice versa. Given that secondary banks dealt with large 
accounts, usually £50,000 on either side of balance sheet, and given that such 
opportunities are rare but always taken, to maintain a ‘match’ they cannot rely on 
the customer base to readily draw on deposits (Revell, 1973, p. 247). The result is 
that they have to turn to each other on the interbank deposit market for fulfilling 
their matches, or else by issuing CDs. This is precisely why the market for CDs 
grow so rapidly. Key to his growth was the way in which a large secondary market 
in CDs was established, because this ultimately allowed CDs to resemble the 
liquidity of demand deposits. Interestingly, the secondary market for CDs was 
actually forged around the backbone of the mainstream money market, the 
traditional discount houses. Demonstrating how interconnected the traditional and 
parallel markets really were, the discount houses were the dominant market-
makers of CDs. By 1971 they held between 89 per cent and 93 per cent of all 
sterling CDs (Revell, 1973 p. 277) in their role as dealers on the secondary market. 
Because they act as principles, their profits stem from dealing, and as such they 
                                                      
16 Revell (1968) was on of the first statements on the process of matching in the UK. 
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held a larger book when interest rates were expected to fall and reduced their 
holdings when rates were expected to rise. The discount houses’ significant 
participation in the secondary CD market posed an interesting governance problem: 
CDs were not eligible collateral for loans from the Bank of England, which meant 
the discount houses were compelled to borrow from the interbank sterling market 
when running short of the cash needed to fulfil their traditional role of extending 
liquidity to the clearing banks. 
What is striking is that the parallel market worked in a manner seemingly 
entirely opposite to the traditional discount market. All loans were unsecured 
interbank loans, there was no direct intervention by the authorities and no 
established principle for a lender of last resort (Revell, 1973, p. 270). To compound 
the risk of unsecured lending was the fact that that the network of interbank 
deposits meant that lending banks had no control over the ultimate destination of 
the loans they advanced (Revell, 1973, p. 286). If this implied a general riskiness to 
the sector what posed further problems for the monetary authorities was that 
interest rates on the interbank money markets were - for the reasons I mentioned - 
much more volatile than on the traditional discount market. Given the absence of a 
Bank of England decreed ceiling on terms of liquidity, overnight rates could vary 
from 1 to 100 per cent. Moreover, the growing size of the interbank borrowing 
market meant that these volatile rates were more significant than the controlled and 
stable Bank Rate. As Revell wrote in 1973 (p. 273): “Up to a few years ago it was 
usual to talk of Bank Rate or the treasury bill rate as determining other rates, but for 
the past three or four years it has been the inter-bank sterling rate for an 
appropriate maturity which has come to represent the 'cost of money' in London.” 
At the start of the 1970s, then, the monetary authorities faced problems on a 
number of fronts, all of which stemmed from the fact that the primary discount 
market was being bypassed as a result of the credit revolution. There was the basic 
problem of excessive credit creation that was heaping further pressure on sterling 
(Schenk, 2010). There was the emerging and seemingly unknowable systemic risk 
through a network of interlinked, unsecured interbank loans. There was significant 
interest rate volatility on the parallel money market, and a significant divergence 
between its interest rates and the Bank Rate which applied to the traditional 
discount market (Revell, 1973). Given the way that short-term rates affect long-term 
rates, this meant interest rate volatility on the gilt markets; something the Bank of 
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England had always tried to control for by ‘leaning into the wind’ of the market 
(Needham, 2014a). 
These multiple and specific issues are only made visible by departing from 
the framework of thought that sees the credit revolution in terms of the 
establishment of market-led governance. Moreover, when the credit revolution is 
conceptualised in terms of the institutional infrastructure required to facilitate 
expanding credit, it becomes possible to see what new avenues for governance 
were opening up for the state. If the rates offered on ‘parallel’ markets could be 
connected to the traditional discount market, then the state would be in possession 
of an even more powerful transmission mechanism to guide systemic liquidity.  
Moreover, in a highly leveraged money market, where banks drew upon an 
interbank market whose unsecured deposits were only as liquid as market 
sentiment decreed, the importance of government securities as a guarantee of 
high-quality liquidity only grew. Government debt would become less called upon 
as a source of liquidity in normal times, but presented a very solid collateral on 
which to secure further money market liquidity. This was something Minsky (1986) 
had recognised in the emerging federal funds market when he described state debt 
as standing at the apex of the credit pyramid, but was not yet something 
policymakers in Britain had conceptualised. Instead, as the monetary authorities 
strived for a new settlement of governance to fix the problem of discount market 
disintermediation, they undertook and a series of ill-judged experiments to control 
the credit revolution through ideas associated with monetary control.  
Conclusion  
The period surrounding the early 1970s has come to be cast as crucial in explaining 
the development of Britain’s highly-leveraged, debt dominated political economy. 
Many see the growth in private sector credit creation as the start of a move to 
private, market-led forms of monetary governance. The fact that private banks had 
the capacity to use their debts as a form of money is now often taken for granted. 
Yet in providing a historical overview of the key developments in Britain’s postwar 
financial sector, I tried to show how it was that private debt acquired monetary 
features. Liability management was central to this and its arrival in Britain was a 
part of a number of changes to the British financial landscape. 
In historicising the credit revolution like this I show how there was no 
straightforward ‘marketisation’ of British finance which developed in place of the 
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Bank of England dominated institutional landscape. Rather, the parallel sector and 
techniques of liability management were grafted onto what was already there, 
creating problems for both the well-established clearing banks and the monetary 
authorities. Specifically, I showed how the practice of liability management 
transformed the logic of banking, where previously banks lent to customers before 
raising the assets to match on the open money markets. This helped generate an 
explosion of liquidity that had profound effects on the ability of the monetary 
authorities to curtail credit creation.  
In outlining this private sector history, this chapter provides a context 
through which to examine how the debt politics of the 1970s and 1980s played out. 
In the chapter that follows I explore how the attempt to achieve ‘monetarism’ was 
thwarted by the rise of liability management, while at the same time the ambition to 
squeeze the money supply ended up making the ‘gilt market’ a coherent force in a 
way that had not been the case previously. 
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5. Monetary targets: 
Depoliticising governance? 
Introduction 
Monetarism was a technical theory about economics that became charged with 
political symbolism. Formally, it was the argument that inflation was caused by an 
excess creation of money. Yet the ideological implications were stark. Because 
underpinning the monetarist theory was the idea that “excessive” democracy was 
the heart of the inflation problem. As the arch monetarist Samuel Brittan (1975, p. 
130) argued in his famous polemic The Economic Contradictions of Democracy, 
unless government found a way to check the “excessive expectations” generated 
by what he described as the “democratic aspects” of the political system, 
uncontrollable inflation would follow. In the mid 1970s when the credit revolution 
had combined with the oil price crisis to hike up inflation across the developed 
world, Brittan argued that the future of the United Kingdom as a functioning liberal 
democracy was in doubt.  
The monetarist case of writers like Brittan, and his Cambridge professor 
Milton Friedman, was forged on a recognition that public debt came with monetary 
implications. If a government’s debt could be printed as money, it followed that the 
Keynesian inference was right and there was, indeed, no fiscal perimeter to the 
amount of debt a state could issue. There was, as such, no limit on what a 
government could spend. For monetarists this meant that when politicians were 
pushed by democratic forces to placate their subjects with greater spending, they 
would turn inevitably to the printing press. On this basis monetarists argued that 
liberal democratic governments like Britain faced a trade off between monetary 
stability and economic democracy, and if the latter was not contained, crippling 
inflation was inevitable.  
This monetarist framework became an incredibly powerful lens through 
which to read developments in monetary governance in Britain over the 1970s and 
1980s. The emergence of monetary targets was seen by monetarists as the 
solution to the problem they laid out, because it bound the scope of government 
policies within parameters that would ensure against excessive money creation. 
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Following this framework many critics (for example Burnham, 2007) now depict 
monetarist reforms as a ‘depoliticisation’ of monetary governance in Britain. Indeed 
a mirror image of the monetarist trade-off between debt and democracy is present 
in Wolfgang Streeck’s (2014a; 2014b; 2015) argument about the politics of the ‘debt 
state’. For Streeck, governments dependent on credit must always takes steps 
necessary to establish credibility in the eyes of international investors. These steps 
might be at odds with the wishes of the general populace, and as such it could be 
necessary to protect economic policy from democratic influence; to ‘depoliticise’ 
monetary governance. 
I argue that the notion of depoliticisation misconstrues the significance of the 
changes made at the time and the character of contemporary governance today. It 
is a notion anchored in a monetarist framework of the politics of public debt, which 
makes even critical writers depict monetary targeting as a strategy of market 
credibility that succeeds by using ‘rules’ and targets to limit the state’s room for 
manoeuvre (Flinders and Wood, 2016). From this perspective, depoliticisation 
involves devolving governance from the state to the private sector, and establishing 
a technocratic form of rule sealed off from the formal channels of democratic 
influence (Gane, 2015). The idea being that ‘targets’ and ‘rules’ bound economic 
policy within an explicit framework, and thereby act as a check on the democratic 
impulses that the likes of Brittan had warned against.  
In tracking the emergence of monetary targets in Britain I show how, 
whatever the rhetoric, monetarism and the idea of market-regulated credit only ever 
figured as an aspiration. Indeed, the targets themselves were routinely missed. 
Though the depoliticisation literature, like the monetarists they critique, placed great 
significance in the targets, what mattered more was what was constructed in the 
effort to make the financial sector behave like the monetarist ideal. As I will show, 
the attempt to govern through ‘targets’ resulted in complete overhaul of the way the 
two key instruments of government debt, Treasury Bills and gilts, were managed. 
Yet the state did not simply dismantle and box away its tools of liquidity 
management to pursue ‘depoliticised’ governance. Rather the monetary authorities’ 
experiment with targets was an attempt to find a way to respond to the credit 
revolution and regain control of liquidity. Through the chapter I outline how the 
period is best understood as an attempt to build the capacity for interest rate control 
of the broader economy. The unexpected result of which was to end up placing 
enormous pressure on the gilt market. As such, the effect of the monetarist 
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revolution was not to depoliticise governance and eradicate the state’s capacity for 
discretionary intervention, but to transform it in important ways that was to later 
enhance the ability of the state to govern through debt.  
The chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section I examine in 
more detail how depoliticisation became a dominant frame for thinking about 
monetary governance since the onset of monetarist thinking, and how the notion is 
too broad to capture what was really at stake in post 1970s governance. The 
second outlines the workings of the gilt market in postwar Britain before tracking 
how the debate on monetary targeting first came to Britain from the IMF in 1967. As 
a condition for the financial support they provided after the devaluation of sterling, 
the IMF stressed the need to control what it called Domestic Credit Expansion 
(‘DCE’), an imperfect measure of credit creation. This first experiment in targeting 
proved crucial in establishing an intellectual platform for what followed in the 1970s. 
The third section then examines the second attempt at monetary control, which 
came through the 1971 Competition and Credit Control (‘CCC’) policy. The policy 
aimed to tackle the problems the credit revolution had created for monetary 
governance by deregulating the ‘primary’ sector and attempting to govern the 
banking system as a whole. This meant swapping ‘direct’ controls on individual 
banks for a more broad-based interest-rate based management that would keep 
growth of the broad money supply, £M3, in check. As I show, the policy was a 
spectacular failure on its own terms, but did remake the gilt market by removing the 
Bank of England’s support. Finally, the fourth section examines the third attempt at 
monetary control, with Margaret Thatcher’s Medium Term Financial Strategy 
(‘MTFS’). I show how the framework was internally incoherent - the targets were set 
arbitrarily and routinely missed - and how the attempt to govern through it brought a 
significant recession and was soon abandoned. Nonetheless, it heaped more 
pressure on the operation of the gilt market which by the early 1980s was in need 
of major reform. 
5.1 Who will guard the printing press? The politics of depoliticisation 
The difficult relationship between the state and public debt is often thought to have 
reached a tipping point in the 1970s (for example Streeck, 2014a; Buchanan and 
Wagner, 1977). There is an idea that state debt had grown to such excess that, 
when allied to the global economic downturn of the time, a correction was 
inevitable. This is why the period is widely thought of as marking an important shift 
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in economic governance. The postwar era, where government officials saw 
themselves as the breadwinners of the economy, was creaking and in its place a 
new order took form. Central to the way this new order is conceptualised is the idea 
that it was becoming ‘depoliticised’ in some sense: handed over to ‘technocrats’ 
who have stepped away from normative questions of distribution and shielded 
themselves from democratic oversight (Davies, 2014). The ‘depoliticisation’ 
framework has become an incredibly powerful lens through which to conceptualise 
contemporary governance and deeply implicates discussions of neoliberalism 
today17. Yet as I argue in this section, depoliticisation is a very loose idea that is 
built on normative assumptions about the unsustainability of debt and the problems 
it presents democracy. Depoliticisation risks an overly functional explanation of the 
governance changes that have taken place since the 1970s, presenting ‘rules’ and 
‘targets’ as bulwarks against the kind of politicised governance that would risk 
violating creditor interests. In that way the notion of depoliticisation relies on the 
idea that excessive public debt allowed creditor interests to squeeze out 
democracy, leaving the instrument of the state at their behest. Ultimately, 
depoliticisation is an account of governance being devolved to financial markets at 
the expense of the state.  
As I have asserted throughout, there is more to debt politics than the 
imperatives of creditors. This is especially true of the way that monetarist ‘targets’ 
became part of the governing apparatus of the British economy. When viewed 
through the lens of depoliticisation, monetarism becomes a general, pro-finance 
ideological move. Yet this has both substantive and conceptual problems. Firstly, it 
places undue importance in the targets themselves, which were in fact set 
arbitrarily and also never really met (Cobham, 2003, p. 48). Secondly, it reifies 
creditor power by depicting the creditor imperative as the overriding principle of 
debt relations. This inhibits examination of what was constructed through the 
attempt to establish monetarist-style governance, and how it was not solely 
creditors having their way, but also affected the capacity of the state to use public 
debt securities to manage liquidity in the economic system.  
Peter Burnham’s work on postwar monetary policy (2007; 1990; 2011; 2014) 
is a good example of how the notion of depoliticisation is forged on the problematic 
                                                      
17 William Davies (2014) for example has described neoliberalism as the displacement 
of the political by the economic.  
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idea of debt unsustainability. His work on the financial reforms of 1970s Britain 
established depoliticisation as a lens through which to read governance changes, 
with the establishment of a framework of rules and targets that “diminish politicians’ 
discretion” (Burnham, 2011, p. 464). In his account, and in accounts by those who 
have since adopted his framework, depoliticisation is depicted as a “narrowing of 
the boundaries of democratic concern”, closely linked to “the emergence of 
technocratic and post-democratic forms of governance”, which “deny political 
contingency”, “transfer functions away from elected politicians” and insulate 
decision making processes from democratic oversight (Flinders and Wood, 2014, p. 
135). Within this general framework Buller and Flinders (2006) identify three 
mechanisms of depoliticisation. First, governors can seek institutional 
depoliticisation by establishing third-party bodies that enjoy day-to-day managerial 
control of policymaking. Second, rules-based depoliticisation is achieved when 
governors adopt explicit rules that constrain the scope and need for political 
discretion. And finally, preference shaping depoliticisation, which occurs when 
governors mobilise ideological or rhetorical claims to lift a certain policy out of the 
scope of democratic deliberation.  
The 1970s monetarist push contained elements of all three. Though the 
Bank of England was a nationalised body, informal control for setting the Bank Rate 
had long belonged to unelected Bank officials. More importantly in the 1970s fixed 
rules were established for monetary growth aggregates. Finally, to some extent the 
‘crisis of inflation’ was talked up as a master narrative to frame the pursuit and 
necessity of policies pursuing monetary targeting. Such depoliticisation was 
supposedly present in Ted Heath’s 1971 experiment with the ‘Competition and 
Credit Control’ policy and the ‘Minimum Lending Rate’ reworking of the market for 
Treasury Bills that followed. Burnham (2007) argues that these were attempts to 
establish ‘fixed rules’ for governance, over and above the ‘discretion’ of politicians 
accountable to the electorate, a move he argues that has a lineage back to the 
Gold Standard and also the Treasury View18. Given this long history, Burnham 
actually warns against the simple periodising apparent in some critical literature (for 
                                                      
18 A contemporary example of this would include the 2015 UK Conservative 
government’s attempted ‘fiscal charter’ that compelled government to achieve a 
surplus on their budget by 2019/20, and then keep the budget in surplus each year 
thereafter. 
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example Chick and Dow, 2013; Nesvetailova, 2010) that sees monetary 
governance moving from a politicised postwar environment to a depoliticised 
neoliberal age. Instead, he suggests depoliticisation/politicisation is better 
conceived of as two poles of statecraft that policymakers constantly oscillate 
between. Despite the assertion, however, it is not clear Burnham himself avoids this 
pitfall. Different periods, he says, see more or less politicisation, and he argues - in 
the keeping with conventional critical literature - that 1970s monetary control was a 
key moment in changing the emphasis to depoliticisation (Burnham, 2011, p. 464). 
Burnham draws from Greta Krippner’s (2007) call to examine how state officials use 
markets for the purpose of governance, and both depict the monetarist turn in 
economic governance as an attempt by state authorities to withdraw from 
exercising ‘discretion’, and sidestep normative and distributional consequences of 
state action, “effectively depoliticising economic policy by redefining economic 
events as the product of “market forces” rather than the activities of state officials” 
(ibid., p. 479). Moreover, this seeming ‘distance’ from democracy is emphasised in 
the way policymakers discuss monetary matters. As Krippner writes (ibid., p. 483) 
monetary governance is articulated in a vernacular of technical expertise that 
shrouds policies in highly inaccessible jargon.  
Given the devolution of monetary governance to technocratic institutions, 
the language of ‘experts’, the appeal to rigorous ‘rules’, and the strength of the 
counter-inflationary narrative, it is understandable that critical literature sees 
‘depoliticisation’ in changes made to British monetary management in the 1970s. 
Moreover, given Britain’s long history of debt-based governance - and the enduring 
association of Britain with ‘liberal governance’ (Knafo, 2013) - depoliticisation 
seems a particularly fruitful concept for examining British political economy. 
Nevertheless, to speak about depoliticisation is to speak about a particular 
kind of state governance - a particular kind of state power - and what this is is never 
really explained in the depoliticisation literature. Instead I argue that, depoliticisation 
works as a very general idea, and is presented as a strategy of governance where 
the state devolves its power to markets, in a manner that resembles Streeck’s 
(2014b) notion of ‘market justice’ triumphing over ‘social justice’. This is because 
the authors like Peter Burnham that focus on rules and targets as aspects of 
‘depoliticisation’ end up conflating two related issues. The first is their argument that 
depoliticisation is a strategy to absolve policymakers from the consequences of 
their decisions. The second is their argument that depoliticisation is a strategy for 
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market credibility. In their accounts, it is the latter that works as the true driver for 
depoliticisation. Burnham, and others that draw from his framework, argue that 
depoliticisation is a strategy that “seeks to change market expectations regarding 
the effectiveness and credibility of policymaking” (Burnham, 2001, p. 127). The idea 
being that if you establish rules you can convince ‘markets’ that there will be less 
space for “political choice or discretion on the part of politicians” on the basis that 
“the less the need for discretion, the less the danger of policy mistakes being made” 
(Buller, 2003, p. 7). This is again founded on the assumption that the instability of 
the state’s debt renders it forever vulnerable to creditors and makes certain policies 
untenable. It is this form of ‘depoliticisation for the markets’ that drives the others. 
The more politicians can seal themselves off from the consequences of their 
policies, the less they can be blamed for what (it is assumed) will be the necessary 
deflationary procedures that ‘markets’ dictate. This in turn bolsters the supposed 
credibility of a government’s commitment to undertake creditor-desired 
programmes.  
The depoliticisation literature does not specify what policies creditors desire 
or why their interests would suddenly take precedence in the 1970s, or how the 
‘rules’ for monetary governance that took hold in the 1970s translate into creditor 
dominance. In this way it overplays the coherence of these rules and, indeed, 
policymakers’ commitment to them. The inconsistency, and indeed outright 
incoherence, of monetary targeting as an ‘expert’ framework for policymaking in 
Britain, for example, was keenly felt in the fact that experts could never agree on 
what counted as ‘money’ and what policies worked to control its supply (Cobham, 
2003). Moreover, even when targets were agreed they were set inconsistently and 
routinely missed.  
This should call into question the efficacy of seeing these rules, and the 
technocrats that developed them, as significant in and of themselves. What is more 
important is what gets constructed through them, what institutions are developed, 
what linkages made; but these are issues that are flattened under the term 
‘depoliticisation’. The importance of these aspects are occluded because of the 
idea that, ultimately, depoliticisation is something that emerges as a necessary step 
of achieving credibility in the eyes of financial markets. If the entire purpose of 
monetary governance is to secure credibility, then the state as a debtor is 
necessarily subjugated to the domination of the market (of creditors). This perhaps 
speaks to Burnham’s broader research agenda that is dedicated to examining the 
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efficacy of the state under capitalism (for example Bieler et al., 2006). Undercutting 
his account is the view that the crisis of capitalist overproduction in the 1970s was 
forcing the state to pursue deflationary strategies (Burnham, 1999, p. 45). In that 
sense, whatever the minutia of policymaker actions, there is a deeper driver always 
lurking in the form of capitalist imperatives. As such depoliticisation can be seen as 
symptomatic of the state’s relinquishing of control and ultimate impotence in the 
face of the demands of the capitalist market. 
On the contrary, in what follows I show how regulatory reform came from an 
effort on the part of state officials to respond to the credit revolution. Monetarism as 
an intellectual movement first found prominence in this context. Similarly, when the 
state undertook programmes of monetary targeting it did so in an attempt to 
mobilise some particular market actors - notably the clearing banks - in the hope of 
disciplining others - the secondary houses in particular. In the effort to make 
monetary targeting successful, the role of government and private debt securities in 
governance changed. Crucial in this was, I argue, the gilt market, which came to 
bear a particularly large burden, and made the question of interest rates and 
interest rate expectations a more important lever of liquidity governance than ever 
before. When the assumption of debt unsustainability is dropped, depoliticisation no 
longer captures the significance of the 1970s governance reforms. Instead, as I 
demonstrate over the remainder of the chapter, it is developments in the gilt market 
that matter more.  
5.2 The first target: Domestic Credit Expansion 
The problem with depoliticisation as a framework through which to understand 
monetary governance is that it is overly general and overly functional and cannot 
account for the specific issues state authorities were confronting. Instead, in 
keeping with the broader way in which debt politics is often conceptualised, 
depoliticisation is presented as a strategy to improve credibility in the eyes of 
creditors, whose imperatives seem to trump all others. I argue it is more fruitful to 
contextualise debt politics within the monetary infrastructure that issuing public debt 
as money had established through the previous centuries. This casts the 
emergence of monetarism in different terms. It can be viewed less as an ideological 
project that tried to mask regressive or creditor-friendly policies in a veil of objective 
targets, and more as a renewed attempt by the state to improve its capacity to use 
the monetary infrastructure to govern liquidity, which in the process radically 
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reformed the operation of the market for its own debts.  
This is because in the late 1960s British policymakers faced a series of 
interlinked problems, all of which implicated how public debt securities were used to 
govern the economy, but which cannot be understood solely in terms of the 
abstract imperatives of creditors. The first problem was the familiar issue of balance 
of payments. Britain’s struggling industrial sector was unable to deliver sufficient 
exports to keep the balance of payments in check, which meant the Bank of 
England was constantly fighting to maintain sterling’s (overvalued) status 
(Cairncross, 1995). Second was the credit revolution that broke the transmission 
belt of monetary policy by disintermediating the traditional discount market. It meant 
the Bank Rate was no longer setting the ‘price’ of liquidity, meaning the monetary 
authorities had little oversight of a substantial amount of lending, plenty of which 
was ‘leaking’ into imports, worsening the balance of payments again. Third was the 
scale of the national debt. Britain had long since carried a large national debt and 
by 1968 it totalled £34.19 billion, substantially more than the £10.7 billion sterling 
deposits in the clearing banks (Goodhart, 2014a, p. 124). Such was its volume it 
was termed ‘The Flood’ by Brian Tew, one of Britain’s leading monetary economists 
in the pages of The Banker in 1969 (ibid.). In isolation any of these issues may 
have been manageable but their combination meant policy fixes were contradictory. 
This push for monetary targeting came from an incapacity of the state’s governing 
apparatus and as such in revisiting the emergence of monetary targeting and the 
regulatory changes that it led to, I suggest their aim was not to abdicate control and 
hand it over to financial markets, but instead the very opposite, to improve the 
capacity of the state to better control the financial sector.  
The three issues first came together in the 1967 sterling devaluation and 
culminated in the CCC policy four years later, and in the process radically changed 
the mechanism of economic governance by drawing monetary targeting into the 
equation. It is notable that monetary targeting was first tasked with tackling balance 
of payments problems, rather than inflation with which it later came to be 
associated (Kenway, 1994). In keeping with the postwar arrangements, the initial 
push for monetary targeting was directed specifically at containing consumer 
imports, and, unlike the use of narrow monetary targets in other countries like 
America, began with targets on a very broad calculation of DCE (Needham, 2014a).  
The arrangement monetary targeting was seeking to replace was a 
monetary governance regime aimed at managing general liquidity quite loosely. To 
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move from an arrangement like this to one that focused on specific targets for 
monetary growth, in the belief that this could govern the entire economy, required 
the construction of a significantly different intellectual and institutional policymaking 
apparatus. In the examination of how monetary targeting was established I argue 
that what was constructed is not captured by the idea of depoliticised governance, 
but rather a changed role for public and private debt in monetary governance, and 
an emerging contradiction between the attempt to secure price stability on the gilt 
market while at the same time dampen liquidity in the banking system. This 
becomes clear by examining how the gilt market operated and how it was affected 
by monetary targeting. 
The gilt market in postwar Britain 
To recall, the gilt market is the market for long-term government debt in Britain. It 
forms the main proportion of government debt financing (Abbas et al., 2014, p. 11)19 
and could be crudely distinguished from Treasury Bills by being thought of as a 
state’s ‘mortgage’ debt, compared to the ‘overdraft’ debt of Treasury Bills. Though 
other instruments existed (such as national savings), gilts were the Bank of 
England’s primary mode of meeting its key remit: the stability of government 
financing. This stability, it felt, stemmed from gilts remaining highly marketable 
(Needham, 2014a). This is because the long-term investors who bought gilts, like 
the pension and insurance funds that had grown substantially since the 1950s, 
bought them primarily as a safe store of long-term value (Goodhart, 2014a). Yet 
long-term investing did not actually mean holding gilts until maturity, but rather 
constantly updating an investment portfolio by selling gilts on before the cash 
dividend became available and ‘switching’ to a new gilt (Thomas, 1986). The 
problem for the monetary authorities was that they could never be sure that a 
market for switching in this way would exist. The Bank was particularly doubtful 
because they were convinced gilts were inherently unstable and “driven by 
‘extrapolative expectations’ where ‘higher interest rates would create the 
expectation of yet higher rates”, and vice versa (Needham 2014, p.17), and 
undermine the stability of the gilt switching market as a result. To compensate, the 
                                                      
19 In Britain and across OECD countries long-term public debt, like gilts, made up the 
majority of public debt financing until the second world war. After the war, short-run 
securities grew in use, but from the 1970s the trend was reversed and long-term 
debt is now considered to be most desirable (Abbas et al., 2014). 
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Bank acted to continually influence and stabilise gilt prices, precisely because it 
saw volatility as being hard-wired into the market and a threat to stable government 
financing.  
The Bank of England achieved this by acting as a ‘dealer of last resort’ in its 
own securities (William Allen, 2015, p. 2). Gilts were sold at tender but underwritten 
by the Issue Department at the Bank of England, which as a result was the main 
buyer at tender. This provided the Bank flexibility, because it would then sell the 
majority of the gilts to external customers on the secondary market on ‘tap’ at a set 
price. These secondary market transactions took place exclusively through the 
London Stock Exchange at the behest of the Bank and through the Government 
Broker, Mullens, who had held the role for over a century. The Bank was prevented 
from dealing directly on the Stock Exchange because that was a privilege only open 
to members of which it was not. The Bank of England was not the only dealer in 
gilts, some discount houses also operated in the secondary market on the London 
Stock Exchange, but they were very small in comparison (William Allen, 2015). The 
Bank of England’s dominant role in this regard was not by design. Rather, the 
private sector simply lacked the capacity to underwrite and deal the entire gilt 
market because of just how big the market had become after the war had expanded 
government debt (ibid.). 
Nonetheless by virtue of the arrangement where the Issue Department was 
the main initial buyer of gilts, the Bank was able to intervene by buying back gilts 
from external investors on the secondary market to facilitate ‘switching’ (Thomas, 
1986). Despite the long-term nature of both gilts and, in general, gilt investors, 
liquidity was still therefore an important criterion. Though the Bank was the primary 
dealer it was still imperative for government financing that secondary market 
jobbers had the capacity to buy and sell large quantities easily, which is why the 
Bank acted as a buyer of last resort. This key line of support allowed jobbers to 
meet investors' constant demands (for switching maturities, interest rates and so 
on) and was something the Bank felt broadened the market and made gilts more 
attractive to investors (ibid.). The Bank’s interventions to facilitate ‘switching’ also 
gave it a capacity to influence prices. If the Bank felt investor confidence was weak, 
it would buy up a load of gilts and edge prices up. In turn, when the market was 
strong, it would try to sell more gilts to edge prices down. Any gilts issued, but not 
required by investors, were taken back by the Bank’s Issue Department for later 
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sale (ibid.). As Tony Coleby, head of the Gilt-Edged division at the Bank, later 
summarised (quoted in LRS, 2006, p.6): 
“The Bank stood ready each day to buy a limited quantity of stock at set 
margins significantly below that day’s opening level. The jobbers could 
trade in the knowledge that they had some degree of stock loss fallback, 
but it was limited in amount and expensive to use if they had bought stock 
close to the opening prices so they would only buy stock close to the 
market and, in that way, support a wider market if their commercial 
judgment was that there would be two-way trade at that level.” 
It was a system that worked smoothly as long as new issues were infrequent and 
price levels reasonably stable, and it was the handle through which the state had 
the capacity to manage its own debt without resorting to what the Bank described 
as a less preferable option of more “arbitrary and capricious intervention” that could 
“alienate the larger investor from the market” (in Thomas, 1986, p.61).  
Nonetheless, this was arrangement that had developed before any notion of 
monetary targeting existed in British policymaking circles. And the Bank’s indirect 
intervention in the manner described above actually had contradictory implications 
for the objectives of monetary control. This was because at the very moments when 
aggregate demand was strong and the authorities might want to check liquidity 
growth through selling gilts to the private sector, gilt prices would be falling (due to 
inflationary expectations) and sales difficult to achieve. In its capacity as a primary 
dealer in gilts, the Bank of England often rectified this problem by supporting the 
market itself, which meant buying back gilts - an illiquid asset - with cash 
(Needham, 2014a). As I show this meant that the Bank of England was often 
injecting liquidity into the banking system at the very time when the monetary 
authorities were trying to restrict liquidity growth. This contradictory dynamic 
becomes apparent by examining how monetary targets were forged onto the 
governing apparatus that was already in place.  
Integrating ‘money’ into Keynesian governance 
The notion that growing state debt eventually courts a crisis of sovereignty is 
present in the way monetary targets are deemed a form of ‘depoliticised’ 
governance. And indeed targets were first introduced at the behest of the IMF when 
Harold Wilson’s Labour government was forced to borrow from them in 1967. Yet I 
argue here that their significance lay not in the way that targets narrowed the 
state’s room for manoeuvre but rather in the way they ended up, eventually, 
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increasing the importance of the Bank Rate whose significance had been dented by 
the credit revolution. This becomes clear by contextualising how monetary targets 
fitted in the broader institutional infrastructure of the British monetary system, 
transforming the operation of the gilt market that I described above.  
Wilson had come to power in 1964 and sought to manage the banking 
sector more directly than his Tory predecessors (Hall, 1986). At that time, the 
monetary authorities did not see monetary targeting as a viable policy option. This 
was because for money to be controlled, first it had to be counted, and the 
monetary authorities felt this was impossible. The 1959 Radcliffe report, that was 
commissioned after the failure of 1950s monetary policy, reasoned that there were 
too many money-like assets in Britain’s financial system to have any clarity over 
what could be deemed ‘money’ (Collins, 1988, p. 473). As such, if the monetary 
authorities tried to curtail supply of money in any one area, banks would simply 
substitute for a similar, money-like product in another. Moreover, the variety of 
credit instruments undermined not only the possibility of direct control of the money 
supply, but also the efficacy of interest rate management too. The rate on Treasury 
Bills could be directly set, and the price of new note issues also set by decree, but 
because of the rise of the parallel money market these were an ever diminishing 
proportion of the total monetary assets in the system (Revell, 1973). All of which 
made the authorities feel that calculating the money supply was impossible, and 
controlling it was even harder. The issue was one of capacity, rather than ideology. 
The idea of monetary targeting was not unheard-of and was not deemed 
unimportant, but it was rejected as a basis for policy because the authorities felt 
they lacked the means to make it workable. Instead the authorities used direct 
controls on clearing bank advances and limits on hire purchase lending, which were 
all part of Wilson’s ambitions for a corporatist, productivist order that would enable 
the upgrading of Britain’s manufacturing base (Kerr, 2001).  
By 1967, however, with Wilson’s corporatist ambitions failing to drive exports 
high enough to tackle Britain balance of payment problems, Wilson tried to jump-
start export competitiveness by cheapening sterling. But devaluation came with a 
series of consequences that had a profound effect in shaping the institutional 
evolution of the postwar apparatus of economic governance (Cairncross, 1995). 
First of all, devaluation was accompanied by a significant rise in the Bank Rate from 
6.5 to 8 per cent to appease the gilt investors who the Bank of England worried 
could ‘lose faith’ in the value of sterling, and there was an immediate freeze in 
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aggregate bank lending to all but the exporting industries and ship builders 
(Needham, 2014a, p. 23). Defence spending and spending on national industries 
was cut and corporation tax raised, all in an attempt to turn the current account 
around. Despite that, with foreign currency reserves already strained and 
confidence in sterling shook, Wilson needed to ask for a £1.4 billion IMF loan to 
support sterling (Needham, 2014). 
IMF support came only with the condition that Britain would try to limit DCE. 
This was a fairly rudimentary metric of credit creation developed first by the IMF’s 
director of research Jacques Polak in 1955 and was intended as a statistic to help 
discipline inflation in the developing countries in which the IMF normally intervened 
(Needham, 2014a, p. 7). In Britain’s case DCE stood as a measure of the broad 
money supply, adjusted for balance of payments, and included in it a stable 
demand-for-money function based on a development of Milton Friedman’s notion of 
permanent income, which had previously been seen by the monetary authorities as 
impossible to calculate and a further reason why monetary control was not viable 
(Laidler, 1989b). The IMF’s point was that the balance of payments was worsened 
by an excess of credit which ended up being advanced to consumers who spent it 
on imports. As such the IMF’s solution to the balance of payments problem was 
simple: reduce the expansion of credit. By 1969 the improvements in economic 
forecasting allowed the Treasury to include estimated projections of DCE. The IMF 
wanted a fixed target for DCE of £500 million a year but, as Wilson and his team 
pointed out, this was not possible in Britain’s highly liquid financial system 
(Needham, 2014). In Britain, borrowers generally preferred overdrafts to more long-
term and predictable bank credit (ibid.), and, secondly, could always access finance 
from the emerging parallel financial sector anyway (Einzig, 1971). Wilson’s 
government fought off direct IMF conditions, but this desire to actively control credit 
expansion soon spread. There was still debate over whether a demand-for-money 
function could be calculated, but the fact it was codified institutionally by the IMF 
was significant.  
Already here it becomes clear that the early monetary targeting did not 
come by sweeping away the governing apparatus that had developed. Contrary to 
what is implied by the notion of ‘depoliticisation’, the early targets were forged on an 
apparatus that aimed to control of balance of payments, not inflation, and focussed 
primarily at inhibiting consumer spending on imports (Oliver, 2014). In that sense 
they added to, rather than departed from, the pre-existing ‘Keynesian’ apparatus I 
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laid out in the third chapter. The intellectual attacks by monetarists - which were 
more sweeping - continued apace in the pages of the Financial Times with Samuel 
Brittan writing about the importance of the money supply, and the Banker 
magazine, which published many of Friedman’s articles pushing the same cause 
(Middleton, 2013). Too often, however, our understanding of the importance of 
monetary targeting is drawn from a focus on the ideological writing of Brittan, 
Friedman and gang. While these were certainly significant in shaping the narrative 
of political debate, as I demonstrate their baring on the actual institutional 
development associated with monetary targeting is less pronounced.  
In December 1968 the Bank of England first published data and 
commentary on the broad money supply, £M3, based on what it called the 
‘counterparts’ approach. £M3 was a measure of the “currency in public circulation 
and deposits (foreign and sterling) in UK banks” and derived from a simple 
equation: “PSBR, less gilt-sales to the non-bank private-sector, plus bank lending, 
plus foreign inflows” (Davies, 2012, p. 7). It was a measure that derived from the 
‘flow-of-funds’ theory of the monetary order, which was ultimately founded on the 
idea that investment was solely driven by savings and in that sense there was no 
scope for government debt or private debt, over the long term, to sustainably affect 
aggregate demand. The £M3 figure was not yet used in policy but it already had 
two major implications. First, it offered a measure of the money supply, which had 
been deemed unfeasible in the Radcliffe framework (Needham, 2014a). Second, 
and crucially, it tied the calculation of the money supply to a function of the PSBR 
meaning that there were two clear routes to controlling the money supply: issuing 
more gilts and fewer Treasury Bills, and reducing public spending. This became 
vital in the way debt was governed in the years that followed.  
Whatever their lofty aims, however, the monetary authorities did not yet 
have the capacity to govern broad liquidity through monetary targeting. This was 
because of the way that the gilt market operated. The contradiction between trying 
to squeeze credit creation on the one hand, and trying to support stability in the 
market for long-term government debt (the gilt market) on the other, meant that 
monetary control was impossible to implement. The Treasury was not opposed to 
the idea of limiting DCE, indeed they used ceilings on bank lending and hire 
purchase controls for this very purpose (Goodhart, 1989). But the Bank of England 
had, since the end of the first world war, acted as the principle dealer in its own 
securities, and felt it needed to ‘manage’ the gilt market in order to keep prices 
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steady. To do this the Bank would routinely buy up a load of gilts from domestic 
financial institutions and in doing so release the liquidity needed for banks to extend 
lending, at just the time when the Treasury (and IMF) were trying to limit credit 
expansion (Needham, 2014a). Both the Treasury and IMF were unhappy but the 
Bank was adamant that maintaining gilt liquidity was its primary responsibility.  
At the same time the Bank was keen to respond to the problem presented 
by the credit revolution that had seen the discount markets be disintermediated by 
the rise of the parallel money markets. This undermined the importance of Treasury 
Bills and the significance of the Bank Rate in setting the price of liquidity in the 
financial system. Moreover, the more the Treasury used direct controls and ceilings 
on clearing banks, the stronger the hand of the parallel banks which did not face 
such restrictions (Goodhart, 2014a). These factors throw into a different light the 
significance of the emerging interest in monetary targets. Their importance was not 
initially about restricting the state’s policymaking options, shielding democratic 
participation or absolving policymakers, rather they belonged in a context where the 
state was trying to enhance and deepen its capacity to direct liquidity flows and 
govern the economy.  
The authorities’ three problems - balance of payments, parallel banks and 
the national debt - left it in a bind. The other, longstanding impediment to 
implementing monetary control had been that the authorities did not yet believe it 
was possible to calculate the economy wide demand for money function. The 
uncertainty of this particular relationship - between changes in interest rates and 
changes in the demand for money - had been the subject of much debate since the 
end of the 1950s. Christopher Dow’s work in 1959 and Milton Friedman’s notion of 
permanent income grew in popularity through the 1960s, and both argued that a 
stable demand for money function could be identified. This vein of thought was then 
formalised further by the IMF through its DCE targets (Laidler, 1989b, p. 33). This is 
important, because if a stable relationship could be established between interest 
rates and people’s demand for money, then it was possible to ‘set’ the amount of 
money created (to meet demand) by manipulating interest rates. The Bank felt it 
had enough of a handle on broad money supply to publish M1, M2 and M3 figures, 
but it was an improvement in data-gathering techniques that meant in March 26 
1970 the newly formed Monetary Policy Group argued a workable demand-for-
money function had been discovered (ibid.). As such it promised that credit and 
money could be controlled by interest rates, and in doing so reasoned that direct 
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controls on the traditional, primary banking sector could be removed. This of course 
would allow for the end to the disintermediation of the ‘primary’ banking system20 
offering the hope of dampening the effects of the credit revolution (Goodhart, 
2014a). 
The fix to both the balance of payments problem and the inability of clearing 
banks to compete with secondary banks lay with using interest rates to control 
credit. The only problem was the Bank’s attitude to the gilt market. For decades the 
Bank had treated the gilt market as inherently volatile and in need of intervention 
(Hotson, 2010). With the national debt so large ‘leaning into the wind’ was needed 
to keep prices stable and appease creditors who bought gilts as a store of value 
(Goodhart, 2014), but, as I have mentioned, intervention would routinely flood the 
system with liquidity and push credit expansion up. It was a straightforward 
dilemma for the Bank. Dump intervention, but risk gilt market volatility and the 
chance of a national debt crisis; Or keep the gilt market in check but let parallel 
banks trample ever more over the regulated British financial system. Proper 
monetary targeting - using interest rates to manage credit demand - needed the 
Bank to let go of its belief that gilt market intervention was a necessity.  
In the summer of 1970 their wish was granted. Michael Hamburger was on a 
secondment at the Bank from the New York Reserve and published a piece of 
research showing that gilt market volatility was better explained by external factors - 
Euromarkets, expected inflation, dollar-sterling relations - than the support, of lack 
thereof, from the Bank (Needham, 2014a, p. 34). As such in the June 1970 edition 
of the Quarterly Bulletin, the Bank of England’s demand for money equation was 
published and with that the Bank was in place, as it put it, to unleash “the interest 
rate weapon that the Radcliffe Report specifically warned against” (ibid.).  
To recount, in the time since Radcliffe was published in 1959, monetary 
thought and the apparatus of monetary policy had evolved. Through DCE and the 
broad, counterparts £M3 calculation, policymakers now felt they had a sense of 
money supply and its potential to influence balance of payments. In identifying a 
                                                      
20 Implied in this is an assumption that banks do indeed create credit in line with 
customer demand - something that occurred through the credit revolution - but that 
customer demand could be controlled through interest rates. As it turned out, 
customer demand for liquidity was highly inelastic to interest rates, and credit 
continued to climb (Goodhart, 2014a). But it was to take another twenty years for 
policymakers to accept this. 
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stable demand-for-money function, policymakers now felt they had an alternative 
means of controlling credit creation, through interest rates. The chasm that had 
grown between the cost of short-term borrowing on the traditional discount market, 
and costs on the emerging parallel money market, could also be solved in this way. 
The monetary authorities hoped that releasing direct controls on the traditional 
market would allow the two sectors to resemble each other, and thereby reassert 
the primacy of the discount market and the Bank Rate as the liquidity ‘rate setter’ 
across the financial system. 
The goal of the emerging era of monetary control was to use interest rates 
to carefully vary the quantity of money that, it was thought, was the ultimate 
determinant of aggregate demand. This marked a shift from the immediate postwar 
arrangement where Labour chancellor Hugh Dalton tried to force interest rates 
down to the extent that they were an irrelevance to economic activity. Keynes, as 
part of his broader agenda of supporting producers over rentiers, wanted low 
interest rates across the board so that anyone needing to access credit to invest or 
consume, would be able to do so. This revival of interest rate management through 
the monetarist frame was to try to bring interest rates to the centre of policymaking, 
to make them the handle through which fine adjustments to final demand could be 
made. In that sense interest rate control was more not less politicised than before.  
Having overcome the idea that the gilt market needed constant intervention, 
policymakers now felt able to use interest rates to contain credit expansion and 
solve the balance of payments problem that had hampered British policymakers for 
decades. This new dawn found form after Wilson lost the 1970 election. In the lead 
up to the election Conservative leader Edward Heath had, in traditional Tory 
fashion, promised a bonfire of the controls that limited the banking sector, and had 
proposed to replace the direct lending limits with competitive control via interest 
rates instead (Burnham, 2011). Shortly after he took office he launched the 1971 
Competition and Credit Control policy. This was called the ‘new approach’ and 
translated all the developments in monetary thinking and institutional capacity 
discussed above, into a single policy and in doing so became the biggest shift in 
the management of government debt since Keynes’s revolution forty years before. 
5.3 The second target: Competition and (no) Credit Control 
In examining how ‘targets’ became the central plank of monetary governance in 
Britain, and how this relates to the way government debt securities were used for 
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the purpose of economic governance, it is becoming clear that depoliticisation does 
not capture the significance of what was being constructed. The arrival of the first 
targets with the IMF in 1967 and their evolution into interest-rate based control of 
£M3 that was to take place through the CCC reforms, was about the state trying to 
establish a new settlement for the control of liquidity after the credit revolution. 
Interest rates, which had previously been adjusted to the rhythms of Britain’s 
external deficits, became a central part of the domestic economy, transforming the 
way the gilt market especially functioned and the capacity of the monetary 
authorities to govern economic life in the process.  
This, however, becomes more visible through an up-close examination of 
the evolution of the monetary infrastructure that public debt had established, rather 
than appeals to more windy notions about the ideology of monetarism. Certainly, 
the monetary authorities had little idea of the capacity they were creating for 
themselves at the time. Rather, the CCC reforms were a one-punch policy that 
aimed to solve a clutch of immediate problems confronting British policymakers. At 
once Heath hoped it could help free Britain’s clearing banks, allowing them, driven 
by competition, to grow in size and capitalisation (Goodhart, 2014a). This, it was 
hoped, would check the progress being made by parallel banks, who were raising 
liabilities from wholesale money markets from which to rapidly expand their asset 
base; and thereby restore the primacy of the discount market and Bank Rate. What 
this meant was removing the limits that the state had put in place since the war on 
the expansion of clearing bank assets, ie letting the clearing banks lend as much as 
they wanted, and trying to control their lending solely through the Bank Rate 
instead (Davies, 2012). This was the great deregulation of banking that, as I 
discussed in the last chapter, is seen as a key moment in the credit revolution (for 
example Chick and Dow, 2013). But as I demonstrate here, it was a move designed 
for the opposite reason, to control the impacts already unleashed by the credit 
revolution.  
Part of the reason the reforms get misconstrued as ‘deregulatory’ is the way 
the plan was articulated in the general terms of Heath’s desire to “disengage the 
state” (MacDougall 1987, p. 184 in Burnham 2011, p.145). In typically monetarist 
terms the hope was that modern money could be made to behave like the ideal of 
commodity money. In that sense the desire was to establish a ‘market regulation’ of 
credit through CCC and that this market discipline would succeed where direct 
controls had failed in curtailing credit creation. Yet there was a tension between the 
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rhetoric of free markets and the fact that the monetary authorities were actually 
seeking tighter control. This latter part - a new mechanism for controlling credit 
creation - was voiced in terms of a monetary target, £M3. 
Implementing CCC 
The CCC reforms were launched on September 1971. Over its two-year life it was, 
on its own terms, a staggering failure. By the time it was abandoned in 1973, £M3 
had increased by 72 per cent, credit spiralled, asset-bubbles blew and the economy 
crashed (Needham, 2014b, p. 155). But the legacy was even more profound. First, 
monetary targets became a fixture of economic thought. Second, because CCC 
brought into being the belief that interest rates could halt money creation, and that 
monetary creation was a function of the PSBR, monetary targets came to be seen 
as a benchmark of future interest rates. Third, as a result of the previous two points, 
high interest rates, low public sector borrowing, and a bigger gilt market came to be 
seen as the ultimate weapon to tackle Britain’s multifold economic problems.  
Moreover, it demonstrated how misleading it is to take Heath’s rhetoric of 
‘disengaging the state’ at face value, and as proof of a trend towards deregulation 
or depoliticisation. Rather the integration of targets onto the British monetary 
infrastructure is better conceptualised as part of a qualitative change in the mode of 
state intervention. As part of the new settlement required after the credit revolution, 
the authorities needed an alternative to the combination of direct controls and the 
discount window, which were no longer impactful. CCC was an attempt to really try 
and make interest rates a powerful and flexible lever. This, however, was to come 
at the cost of stability in the gilt market, which was put under enormous pressure as 
a result of the attempt to make interest rates the main lever of control (Hall, 1992). 
The misfortunes of the CCC reforms reflected how intertwined banking and finance 
had become in the broader national economy. The monetary apparatus was so 
politicised it could never be the purely technical fix that CCC’s proponents wanted.  
To depart from the overly functional depoliticisation framework and examine 
more specifically what the reforms meant for the relationship between the state and 
public debt it is necessary to examine the context in which the CCC policy was 
implemented. Heath came to power in 1970 at a time of rising unemployment, 
union unrest and rising inflation (Kerr, 2001), as well as the growing governance 
problems being presented by the credit revolution. For Heath, a budgetary 
Keynesian in background, salvation lay in growth (Campbell, 1993). He thought 
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economy-wide growth would avoid a fight with the unions, and would also avoid a 
more radical remaking of the financial sector. As such after a brief experiment with 
tightening the budget he, together with chancellor Barber, set the dials of the 
macroeconomy to ‘growth’ with an infamously inflationary budget (Tomlinson, 
1985). They went all out by announcing a GDP growth target of 4-4.5 per cent 
growth (Needham, 2014a, p. 50). Given that growth was less than half that when he 
came to power, it was an audacious claim. Heath imagined that growth would come 
from low interest rates, so his pursuit for growth collided fatally with the need for 
high interest rates to make the CCC policy work as the theory promised. As such 
when CCC was implemented in September 1971, the Bank Rate stood at 5 per 
cent (Bank of England, 2015, p. 1), a level that, as it turned out, was not enough to 
stem demand for credit.  
Heath thought growth would come from increasing industrial productivity, 
something that those around him said could only be fostered by low interest rates. 
William Armstrong, a Treasury advisor to Heath, argued that Britain needed to build 
up industry on a Japanese and German scale (Needham, 2014a, p. 50). But this 
would need investment and public spending. Jim Slater, who at this time was at the 
height of his fame as a conglomerate magnate, was continually invited by Heath for 
advice on reviving British industry. Slater also argued that low interest rates would 
allow the private sector to invest and build up industry without the state getting 
involved and amassing more of its own debts (Kynaston, 2002, p. 473). Heath was 
left with a choice. He had been elected on a free-market ticket, and the ideals of the 
CCC policy fitted in with that. But to succeed CCC demanded interest rates so high 
that the parallel banks especially could face real difficulties. As such following the 
crisis of 1972 which started with the miners’ strike in January, was followed by the 
state of emergency in February and then the imposition of the three-day week, 
Heath infamously changed course with the 1972 Barber budget.  
It was a dash for growth with a bonanza of tax give-aways, but came for the 
first time in postwar history without direct limits on clearing bank lending. Perhaps 
even more crucially the budget allowed interest repayments to be deducted from 
income for tax purposes, despite Treasury advice that such a move risked a 
marked increase in lending and consumer spending. The changes were substantial: 
for a basic taxpayer the cost of debt servicing fell by 30 per cent, and for a highest 
rate taxpayer a staggering 90 per cent (Needham, 2014a, p. 52). The Economist 
urged readers to “go to your bank manager and demand a loan with which to flutter 
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in the City” (Reid, 2003, p. 59). And people did. Given that CCC was founded on 
limiting £M3 through interest rates, making borrowing instantly cheaper through the 
new tax regime meant the interest rate that would be required to even attempt to 
control £M3 was significantly higher. Moreover, instead of lending going to 
investment, asset prices spiked and money was funnelled into commercial property 
(Needham 2014: 52). There was no way interest rates could be raised high enough 
to curtail £M3 without damaging the economy further, and Heath was reluctant 
anyway because he bought the Slater logic that lower interest rates would induce 
industrial modernisation. The rush of demand for borrowing also fed the emerging 
logic of the credit revolution, which was to originate loans first, and buy ‘deposits’ 
afterwards. As as one senior clearing banker told Margaret Reid (2003, p. 59) a 
decade later: “Almost for the first time in banking history you found your lending 
business then scurried round for deposits.”  
Immediately, familiar problems resurfaced and these all coalesced around 
the operation of the market for public debt. The ‘Barber boom’, as it came to be 
known, created a forecasted PSBR of £3.35 billion, 5 per cent of GDP, for 1972/73. 
The Bank of England, fearing how the gilt market would react, felt it necessary to try 
and force up long-term rates by increasing the Bank Rate by a further 1.5 per cent, 
taking it to over 10 per cent (Needham, 2014a, p. 52). Nonetheless, the hope of 
relying on gilt sales to fund the PSBR was not met in its entirety, especially 
because in the new regime the Bank offered less support to the gilt market. The 
main alternative to gilts was to finance the PSBR through Treasury Bill sales to 
banks. The Bank of England calculated that £700m of Treasury Bills would need to 
be sold, which was easy enough in itself, but given that Treasury Bills were a highly 
liquid asset that could be used to meet banks liquidity positions (in the manner I 
described in the previous chapter), issuing Treasury Bills fuelled the dynamics of 
credit creation, and pushed up £M3 even more (Needham, 2014a).  
By July 1972, less than a year since it begun, CCC was suffering. Not only 
was Heath refusing to increase the Bank Rate to a level that the Bank of England 
felt was appropriate for the £M3 target, but economists at the Bank of England were 
reporting ‘considerable problems with its equations used to predict the demand for 
money’ (Needham, 2014a, p. 58). Whether this was because of an unexpected 
inelasticity of demand to interest rates, or more likely that the Bank Rate was still 
not the setting short-term rates across the parallel markets, the entire edifice of 
interest-rate controlled monetary targeting was collapsing (Davies, 2012). The 
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effects of this were felt on the operation of the clearing banks too. To recall, before 
CCC lifted caps on their asset growth, they operated as a cartel with a fixed spread 
between their lending and deposit rates. With the CCC changes, a ‘merry go round’ 
developed because banks used to bid for deposits by offering attractive rates on 
deposits and generous rates on overdrafts (Goodhart, 2014a, p. 12). Because 
traditional retail bank sector lending was mostly on an overdraft system, private 
companies had the choice of making payments by drawing down on their deposits 
or by using overdraft facilities - and this choice obviously depended on the spread 
between the interest they received on deposits and the interest they paid for 
overdrafts. When the spread was narrow or even negative - as was the case 
between 1971 and 1973 after the CCC reforms - companies borrowed solely to 
swell their interest-bearing deposit account. This borrow-to-deposit strategy came 
to be known as ‘round tripping’ and drove a huge increase in bank lending (ibid.). It 
exposed the fundamental flaws in the reasoning driving CCC. To recall the 
authorities were trying to bring credit creation under control on the belief that it 
drove balance of payment and inflation problems. Credit creation could be limited 
by direct controls on advances and overdrafts, which would choke off supply, or by 
higher interest rates, which would choke off demand. Yet this would not work 
because of the banks’ ability to raise deposits from parallel wholesale money 
markets.  
The problem was still the need to bring the Bank Rate on the discount 
market into line with broader short-term liquidity rates (Revell, 1973). That, 
ultimately, was to require reform of the way the Bank Rate operated, something 
tackled in a sweep of changes to the financial sector made by Margaret Thatcher’s 
government, which I examine in the next chapter. In what follows initially, however, 
I assess how the CCC reforms affected the workings of the gilt market 
The ‘New Approach’ in the gilt market 
By sacrificing interest rate stability, gilt yields became more volatile and demand for 
government debt less reliable (Thomas, 1986). To recall, in order to make flexible 
interest rates the workman of systemic liquidity control, the monetary authorities 
had to stop the policy of ‘leaning into the wind’ by intervening directly in the market 
for gilts to keep prices stable, because swapping cash for gilts released liquidity into 
the banking system. The way this support was removed also meant providing less 
support to the jobbers who had dealt in the gilt market. Previously in the Bank’s 
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capacity as a dealer of last resort, it would facilitate switching through buying gilts 
back on the secondary market at market rates. After the CCC reforms the Bank no 
longer guaranteed to buy stock outright (except those gilts with a maturity of under 
a year) and instead would only buy stock at prices of its choosing (ibid.). The 
authorities’ commitment to maintaining stable market prices had, in that way, given 
in to their commitment to (try to) control liquidity. The effect was to emphasise 
short-term fluctuations in gilt prices, something that the existing operation was not 
really well placed to manage. As Tony Coleby, head of the Gilt-Edged division at 
the Bank of England, later summarised:  
“When, in 1971, the Bank resolved to change its earlier practice of routinely 
supporting the market by buying stock in at close to prevailing market 
prices, it recognised that that could create a problem for the ability of the 
gilt-edged jobbers to maintain their market-making function” (in LSR, 2006, 
p. 5). 
Though the Bank had been convinced that factors outside its control drove gilt 
volatility, the effects of CCC made it reluctant to abandon the gilt market entirely. 
And in that sense it is again misleading to judge the significance of monetary 
targeting in terms of the rhetoric that surrounds it, because despite ideological 
insistence about the importance and efficacy of ‘market governance’ and market 
management, policymakers always felt compelled to intervene and manage the 
supposedly liberalised regime. The primary responsibility of the Bank, after all, was 
to ensure stability of government financing. As such the monetary authorities tried 
to find other ways to support the market. This was becoming increasingly important 
because it was around this time – the mid 1970s – that growing inflation made gilts 
less attractive (Thomas 1986, p. 64), and low growth made the government's 
borrowing requirements really expand. The Bank experimented with new gilt 
products in the hope they’d be more attractive to investors. These included issuing 
gilts on a partly paid basis; issuing convertible stock (in 1973); and issuing variable-
rate stock (in 1977) (Thomas, 1986). To overcome the uncertainty created around 
expected future rates of inflation, the Bank introduced index-linked stocks in 1981, 
insuring investors against inflationary shocks. Though the Bank created all kinds of 
new products and intervention strategies to stabilise the gilt market, they were 
piecemeal and insufficient in an environment where interest rates were being varied 
to try to control credit creation. Nigel Althaus, the head of the government broker, 
Mullens, later summarised the nature of the predicament perfectly: “The monetary 
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control period put huge pressure on gilt-edged sales, such that they became the 
most important workman of economic control, which the old market was not 
designed to be or to do” (in LSR, 2006, p.3).  
Clearly the pressure on the gilt market was growing. This pressure came not 
from the national debt suddenly becoming unsustainable, but rather from the way 
the monetary infrastructure had evolved to make the gilt markets central in the 
control of liquidity. Mobilising monetary targets was never going to dissolve this 
infrastructure or the onus on the authorities to use public debt for the purpose of 
governance. In that sense it in unhelpful to conceptualise targets in terms of 
depoliticisation. 
5.4 The third target: “Sadomonetarism” and the public debt 
By the mid 1970s Britain had twice experimented with monetary targets. First with 
the IMF’s attempted imposition of limits on DCE, and then again with Heath’s plan 
to control £M3 through the CCC policy. The result of which had been to heap 
pressure on the workings of the gilt market that was not yet able to cope with the 
new era of interest-rate volatility. More pressingly still, the British economy was still 
suffering, inflation was high and the country’s external deficits a significant issue. 
The OPEC shocks and global recession that had formed part of the economic 
chaos of the early 1970s, and led to sterling following the dollar away from a fixed 
exchange rate, meant that the newly elected Labour government in 1974 faced 
significant economic problems. Its broad strategy “was to attempt to ‘tunnel through’ 
to economic recovery using borrowing (not just from the IMF, but from OPEC 
governments, and where possible Eurocurrency markets)” (Clift and Tomlinson, 
2008, p. 560). As such it laid the foundations for what became the infamous 1976 
IMF loan with its accompanying ‘monetarist’ targets on £M3 growth. Though Britain 
had repeatedly drawn on the IMF for the previous two decades this £3.5 billion loan 
package became highly symbolic (Kerr 2011, p. 161). Under Labour’s watch Britain 
had turned ‘cap in hand’ to the international community, and when the loan was 
followed soon after by the manufactured ‘winter of discontent’ (Hay, 1996), Labour’s 
economic reputation was buried for a generation. Moreover, the targets that the 
IMF imposed, or at least attempted to impose, amounted to the third attempt at 
governance through targets. These targets were notionally established first under 
Denis Healey’s watch as Labour chancellor, a ‘disbelieving monetarist’ as he 
described himself (Healey, 1989). Though articulated around monetary growth 
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(£M3) most attention fell on the PSBR (Kenway, 1994). The deflation that 
accompanied them, along with Jim Callaghan’s famous declaration to the Labour 
party conference that it is “no longer possible for a government to spend its way out 
of a recession”, has come to be seen as the final nail in the coffin of Keynesian 
governance and confirmation of the neoliberal ascendancy (Skidelsky, 2009). Yet 
behind the rhetoric, the story remains more nuanced. As Burk & Cairncross (1992, 
p. 228) summarised: “Apart from the continued issue of monetary targets, which 
were rarely hit, economic policy in the last years of the Labour government differed 
little from what it had been before the arrival of the IMF.” Nonetheless, monetary 
targets and their links to government borrowing, formed a crucial plank of 
Thatcher’s rise to power and the targets took their most memorable form in her 
early, brutal economic experiment, the MTFS. 
The MTFS is something that continues to resonate in popular memories of 
‘Thatcherism’, but was simply a framework for economic strategy that outlined fixed 
financial objectives for monetary and fiscal policy. It was supposed to signal a final 
move away from the ‘discretion’ of policymakers to fixed, publicly announced 
principles. As Nigel Lawson wrote in an article for The Times in 1978, the MTFS 
was about showing that “Rules rule: OK” (in Ridley, 2014, p. 68). These rules were 
long term, laying out policy commitments for the following five years (Keegan, 
1984). All of this was built on the monetarist thinking and monetarist assumptions 
and was constructed on the existing architecture of monetarist policymaking in 
Britain developed through the DCE and CCC calculations. And the implications of 
the MTFS was clear: government had set out a framework for containing monetary 
growth, there would be no dabbling in expansionary programmes, this was pure 
deflation with no political ‘interference’ (Kerr, 2001). On the face of it, this was the 
deflationary depoliticisation for the credit markets that Burnham and others 
describe.  
Yet, the status of the targets themselves, and the way investors reacted to 
them, was much more ambiguous than the depoliticisation literature would imply. 
Put simply, the rules and targets were entirely ignored (Cobham, 2003). At first 
there was internal debate among Thatcher’s advisors, and between the Treasury 
and the Bank of England, over which monetary aggregate was to be chosen 
(Kenway, 1994). Then, when they eventually committed to £M3 (for the reason that 
it was the sole variable government had notional influence over because of its 
relation to the PSBR), the targets were, again, entirely incoherent. The figures 
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appeared to be chosen entirely arbitrarily. They did not even correspond to the 
official forecasts for money GDP, or the previous level of money GDP, or the 
previous growth of £M3 (Cobham, 2002). Moreover, they were entirely unexplained, 
with the government not once accounting for why or how the numbers were set the 
way they were (ibid.). Even on their own rather narrow terms, the monetary targets 
did not correspond to any kind of strict economic theory or economic logic (ibid.).  
There was quite a contrast between the fanfare of the targets published in 
the MTFS, their ultimate importance, and the rest of the Thatcher administration’s 
economic policies. Certainly between 1979-1982 some of the choices on fiscal 
policy did not align with the MTFS aims on PSBR and inflation targets (Prasad, 
2006). The cut in top-rate income tax, for example, was (part) financed by doubling 
VAT to 15 per cent, which immediately meant inflation increased greatly (ibid.). 
Moreover, a promise (which Thatcher alone deemed essential for securing the 
election) not to cut public sector pay left her administration scrambling for places to 
cut the government spend. Revenue was pulled in from higher NHS prescription 
charges and an increase in council rents, but these weren’t sufficient to deal with 
the income tax cut and the rise in social security spend that accompanied higher 
unemployment with the autumn 1981 recession (ibid.). This policy incoherence 
made achieving the MTFS targets hard to meet. The other major problem was that 
the credit revolution had of course made monetary targeting particularly difficult. 
Banks could not only raise money from wholesale markets to lend, but were now 
beginning to securitise their own assets and sell them to fund further lending (Smith 
1987). The effect of financial innovation – especially the development of liability 
management - was to increase demand for debt and liquidity. Moreover, the rise in 
the proportion of financial intermediaries’ deposits that were interest-bearing would 
have reduced the interest-elasticity of the demand for money, broad money in 
particular (Cobham, 2003, p. 39).  
Unsurprisingly, all the targets were routinely missed. The targets on £M3, on 
PSBR, the expectation of GDP growth, all were overshot. In that sense, the MTFS 
was a failure. Certainly, with the economy in the doldrums by 1982 there were 
widespread accusations that Thatcher’s high-interest rate ‘sadomonetarism’ had 
sunk the economy (Keegan, 1984). Many at the Bank of England, who were 
sceptical of monetarist assumptions after the CCC fiasco, and worried about the 
effect the high interest rates were having on British industry (especially because it 
kept sterling very high), were fed up (ibid.). Moreover, there was a broader distrust 
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of the scientism of monetarism that sat uncomfortably with the British tradition for 
pragmatic administration. As Goodhart (2014b, p. 94) wrote dismissively:  
“[Monetarist] econometricism encourages lay people to believe that 
scientific discovery in economics, by white-collar people working with 
statistics, equations, and computers, can in practice provide the solution, or 
solutions, to obstinate economic problems. It is only when one observes the 
often remarkable correlation between the output of models and the political 
attitude of their operators that one begins to see through the mists of 
algebra the familiar landscape of economists disagreeing with one another 
and of laymen using abstract economics to support their own prejudices.” 
Three years after the MFTS had been announced, and interest rates had touched 
15 per cent, unemployment had increased and growth was still low (Keegan, 1984). 
Industry had been successfully destroyed and the collapse in employment fixed the 
‘wage-push’ aspect of inflation. It is now a common refrain among critical writers 
(for example Seymour, 2003), and indeed some of Thatcher’s closest advisors21, 
that the whole MTFS affair was a “front” for killing off industry and the unions that 
were based around them. This may well be a fair assessment but it does not 
change the impact the MTFS had on the gilt market and the changes that followed 
as result. This came again from the way that £M3 was calculated. To recall, gilt 
sales to the private sector helped to bring down £M3, and as a result, the targets 
laid out in the MTFS meant trying to broaden the market for government debt.  
The Wilson report, published two years after Thatcher and Lawson had 
established the MTFS as their defining economic framework, laid out the dilemmas 
facing the monetary authorities: “The size of the PSBR,” it wrote (1980, p. 178) “and 
the techniques of debt management are inseparable from monetary control”. In an 
environment where, thanks in large part to the government’s insistence on its 
importance, monetary growth was deemed a crucial indicator of potential inflation 
and thereby of the risk of holding government debt securities. For that reason, gilt 
sales were increasingly being watched by the merchant banks and fund managers 
representing institutional investors as a sign of the government’s commitment and 
ability to meet its monetary targets. This meant, as the Wilson report noted, 
fluctuations in government borrowing and debt sales often gave rise to expectations 
                                                      
21 In a BBC documentary Alan Budd, special advisor to the Treasury in Margaret 
Thatcher’s government, told Adam Curtis (1992) that he suspected high interest 
rates might have been about trying to create high unemployment to break the power 
of the labour unions.  
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of action by the authorities (through the Bank Rate) which caused further volatility 
to the government’s financing. As it concluded (1980, p.181): “The traditional 
method of selling gilts was not designed for present circumstances.”  
The appeal of monetary targeting first found prominence as a response to 
the problems presented by the rise of parallel banking and the disintermediation of 
the traditional discount market. This, as part of a wider revolution in credit, meant 
that there was an overabundance of liquidity that the authorities felt adversely 
affected Britain’s balance of payments. Their solution was to try and control liquidity 
by varying interest rates in line with fixed targets on monetary growth. This has 
since been cast as a depoliticisation of monetary governance, an attempt by state 
officials to seal themselves off from democratic scrutiny and establish a system of 
governance that proved to financial markets the ‘credibility’ of the government of 
the day. What is missed by the depoliticisation account, however, is the specific 
way in which the mode of governance changed and the affect this had on markets 
for government debt. In particular, the operation of the gilt market was dramatically 
changed through the monetary control period.  
The gilt market was made a crucial engine of economic governance at the 
same time as an important mode of Bank of England support in the market was 
withdrawn. Not only was the gilt market more volatile in this regard, but as Aled 
Davies (2012) describes, the targets also reshaped the way investors acted on the 
gilt market. First, it worked to harness cohesiveness of gilt investors, making them 
move together in buy and sell positions. Second, it worked to make interest rate 
expectations a more central part of the way the financial sector operated.  
Before the reforms, the Bank was able to manage gilts according to the 
‘cashiers’ approach - acting as a dealer in its own securities to keep interest rates 
steady and liquidity high in the way I mentioned previously. Under this 
arrangement, steady interest rates meant few risks to holding gilts. The new era of 
using variable interest rates to target monetary growth shifted the imperatives of the 
gilt market. No longer were gilts simply a safe haven, controlled for volatility. 
Instead the Bank managed the gilt market through what Peter Hall (1992) describes 
as an ‘economists’ approach, where gilts were marketed not on their stability but on 
their potential to offer large capital gains. As such one of the key things constructed 
through the attempts at monetary targeting was to transform gilts from an object of 
security to an object of speculation. This latter, ‘economists’ approach to managing 
the gilt market worked like this: the authorities would force up interest rates to a 
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point where it seemed they could go no higher, and then, believing interest rates 
would then fall, investors would buy gilts because as rates fell, bond prices would 
rise and they would be holding a rapidly appreciating commodity (ibid.). The 
reverse held true too. It was, then, a means for the monetary authorities to try and 
stabilise financing its debts and ward off any potential national debt crisis. The more 
the monetary authorities acted in this way, however, the more it increased 
cohesiveness of the market because gilt buyers were together trying to eye the 
‘peak’ in rates. In order to function this cohesiveness was necessary.  
The consequence of this was to force gilt investors to pay much more 
attention to predicting changes in interest rates, which in turn, was something that 
could, in theory at least, be worked out from the monetary targets. In the early 
years of the CCC, many brokerage houses went bankrupt, unable to cope in the 
new era where gilts were no longer guaranteed stability. As time went on, however, 
the new mechanism became more deeply institutionalised with brokers hiring 
specialist economists to monitor government policy more precisely and try to 
calculate possible movements in interest rate (bid). They paid much more attention 
and offered verdicts in circulars like Philips and Drew's Economic Forecasts, 
Greenwell's Monetary Bulletin, Capel's Discussion Papers, Messel's Monthly 
Monitor, Rowe and Pitman's Market Report, and Vickers da Costa's The British 
Economy, all of which offered (usually gloomy) verdicts on government policy cast 
in terms of the likelihood that government policy would meet the targets established 
(ibid). As was written in a 1979 Rowe and Pitman circular:  
"If . . . the financial markets consider that the consequences of the fiscal 
policies announced in the Budget will be a Borrowing Requirement in 
excess of £8.5 billion, confidence will be impaired and interest rates will 
have to move upwards again in order to keep monetary growth under 
control." (Market report March 1979: 3 in Hall 1992, p. 112). 
It was clear then that the national debt had played as significant a role in shaping 
Britain’s monetarist experience as it had its Keynesian period. Indeed, it was the 
continuity that helped lead the evolution from the Keynesian era after the war to the 
monetarist era of the 1970s and early 1980s. Throughout the broad issues with 
Britain’s economy: low growth, balance of payments problems and high debt had 
remained stubbornly in place. From the perspective of the monetary authorities the 
monetary politics of the time centred around interest rate management. In this 
regard the effort to establish targets had politicised monetary governance more 
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than ever. Precisely because the existing governance infrastructure was not swept 
away and replaced by ‘market governance’, introducing targets meant updating and 
reshaping the mechanisms through which governance already took place. As a 
result, in order for the state to both finance its spending securely and try to manage 
liquidity more effectively, there still needed to be better mechanisms to influence 
interest rates. The monetary authorities still confronted two problems. First was the 
need to check the ceaseless liquidity that the revolution in the money markets 
made ‘the new normal’, and specifically how to make the Bank Rate effective. And 
secondly how to separate monetary policy from debt management by changing the 
way the gilt market operated. 
Conclusion  
Monetarism was a long time coming in Britain. Far from beginning with Thatcher, 
the first targets came from the IMF in the late 1960s. Though the gradual imposition 
of targets did work to transform monetary governance in Britain, they did not result 
in a depoliticisation. Indeed, to invoke the term is to simply overlook the politics of 
monetary targets. By negating the way in which public debt came to function as 
money in Britain, and thereby dissolve the limits on the levels of debt that the 
country could raise, the depoliticisation literature relies on the idea that indebted 
states design their techniques of monetary governance to simply achieve credibility 
in the eyes of financial markets. As such developments in monetary governance 
are seen as originating in the demands of creditors.  
Yet through revisiting the emergence of monetarist thinking and the various 
attempts at monetary control I showed that monetary targeting came from an 
attempt by policymakers to regain control of credit creation after the credit 
revolution. I then showed how the attempt to use interest rates to manage the 
growth of the money supply failed monumentally, but created a new position for the 
gilt market where the price of long-term government debt was less supported by the 
monetary authorities. This placed enormous pressure on the gilt market and meant 
that by the early 1980s reform was needed for gilt financing to remain secure. At 
the same time the hope of overcoming the disintermediation of the discount market, 
and re-establishing the primacy of the Bank Rate in setting the price of liquidity had 
also not been achieved. That would require reform of the market for Treasury Bills.  
By tracking how the attempt to impose monetary targets affected the 
broader workings of the financial sector in Britain it is clear how politicised the 
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process was. That the targets were so often missed demonstrated how they were 
no limit on the state’s scope of economic action. As such, rather than the 
unspecified terrain of depoliticisation, I have used this chapter to establish an 
institutional grounding from which to examine the financial reforms of the 1980s. In 
the next chapter I explore two key changes, the move away from the ‘discount rate’ 
in 1980 and the ‘Big Bang’ deregulation in 1986. I show how these changes are 
best understood as an attempt by the state to enhance its capacity for governing 
liquidity across the economy through its use of public debt securities. 
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6. Deregulation in the debt state 
Introduction 
There is an enduring myth that the Thatcher regime, which ruled Britain through the 
1980s, was committed to ‘monetary discipline’ (for example Kerr, 2001; Green, 
2013; Burnham, 1997). Whatever Thatcher may have preached about the 
importance of thrift and the virtues of the household budget, the fact remains that 
over the course of her time in power the state ran repeated deficits, the public debt 
increased, and private debt exploded (Rogers, 2013). The fact that critical 
commentators still use the notion of monetary discipline with regards to Thatcher is 
testament to the strength of the monetarist framework that pitted monetary stability 
against economic democracy. Because when authors like Kerr (2001) discuss the 
political significance of Thatcher they do so in terms of the sacrifices the country 
was forced to make to bring down inflation. This reading implicates a broader 
understanding of the transition to neoliberalism in Britain. Thatcher is presented as 
a final ‘break’, bringing to a close the supposed consensus on Keynesian 
governance that had ruled since the second world war, one where the state had for 
too long used growing public debt to compensate for the country’s continued 
economic decline. In opposing Thatcher’s new monetary discipline with the period 
that preceded her, it becomes very difficult to account for how and why the national 
debt only expanded under Thatcher. Even when commentators acknowledged what 
happened to public spending during her time in office, they do not use this to 
question the substance of the transformation she represents. Instead, authors like 
Chris Rogers (2014) take it as proof that the language of ‘discipline’ was cover for a 
more targeted, ‘ideological attack’ on a particular tranche of society (organised 
labour in particular).  
Yet the politics of the Thatcherite monetary reform look different when 
considered in light of the history of public debt in Britain. As I have established, the 
ability to raise and service ever growing public debt was forged on the way public 
debt was steadily monetised since the seventeenth century Financial Revolution in 
Britain. The gradual institutionalisation of public debt into the workings of the broad 
economic system in Britain meant that throughout its history monetary stability was 
less a trade off with economic democracy than it was about governing liquidity. 
  
163 
When posed this way, Thatcher’s reforms were less about dismantling the 
governing infrastructure that had gone before, and making a sharp break from the 
past, and more about tackling distinct problems that had arisen in the governance 
of liquidity, so as to smoothen the operation of monetary policy and debt 
management in Britain.  
As such in this final chapter I focus on two key reforms to the way debt was 
managed - reforms that are often understood in terms of monetary discipline and 
creditor power – and demonstrate instead how they helped the state better manage 
its large and growing public debts. The context was key, because by the early 
1980s it had become clear that, in regard to the management of public debt, two 
problems needed to be solved. First was finding a way for the Bank Rate to affect 
short-term liquidity in an environment where Treasury Bills were no longer the 
dominant short-term security. Second was finding a way to greatly expand the gilt 
market which was now relied upon to provide a bigger proportion of government 
debt financing. When the period is examined in these terms, the regulatory changes 
made to the financial sector are put in a different light. What looked like monetary 
discipline appears more fruitfully as developments in techniques of debt 
governance. Perhaps more importantly, when considered this way, there is a basis 
for rethinking the broader neoliberal period and the ever more sophisticated way 
the state has used monetary management to govern the economy. As such in this 
chapter I examine two key episodes of financial reform. The first is the Monetary 
Control Act of 1980 and the second the 1986 Financial Services Act, better known 
as the ‘Big Bang’. They involved reforming the operation of the market for Treasury 
Bills and gilts, respectively, and helped broaden the market for public debt and fine-
tune the ability of the state to govern through debt. What was produced as a result 
of the reforms was not a state with direct controls on banks and money, and how 
much was lent to who and on what terms, but a looser leverage over the system as 
a whole.  
The chapter is divided into three sections. I begin by examining how the idea 
of ‘monetary discipline’ has become a defining feature for the understanding of 
monetary governance under Thatcher. I show how it is often depicted as a 
creditors’ triumph, making it very difficult to conceptualise the power of the state in 
contemporary debt politics. The second outlines how the Bank of England reformed 
the way it sets the Bank Rate. Whereas previously rates were set through the 
discount window, after the Monetary Control Act of 1980 rates were set by the 
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Bank’s direct interventions into the bill market. This provided greater flexibility for 
the Bank Rate and helped it adjust more swiftly in line with developments on the 
broader money markets, something that had become crucial since the traditional 
discount market had been disintermediated by the credit revolution. The third 
section examines how the reforms made to the London Stock Exchange through 
the Big Bang in 1986 tackled problems that had developed in the gilt market since 
the start of the monetary targeting two decades previously. The reforms ended up 
greatly expanding the size and liquidity of the gilt market, and separated the issue 
of debt management from that of setting monetary policy for domestic control. 
6.1 The debt state: Monetary discipline? 
A key idea that undergirds examination of the politics of public debt is the notion of 
‘monetary discipline’. What this involves precisely is rarely clear but in Britain there 
is a sense that discipline was achieved in the 1980s (for example Green 2016; Kerr 
2001; Ingham 1983). It is a process that had supposedly begun with a move away 
from Keynesian governance in the early 1970s, continued through the imposition of 
market-managed credit and the depoliticisation of economic policymaking, before 
finally reaching fruition with Thatcherism in the 1980s. Having struggled for it since 
public debt exploded in the second world war, Thatcher managed to restore 
monetary discipline to Britain (Green, 2016). Associated with it was a sense of a 
competitive, market-based order to social relations, a dominant financial sector, an 
austere public exchequer, and rampant deregulation (Blyth, 2013). In that sense 
monetary discipline seems an aspect of neoliberalism.  
Yet what exactly does it mean to impose monetary discipline? How can it be 
assessed? And, most important for my purposes, what did monetary discipline 
imply for the way public debt was used in economic governance? The British case 
is particularly intriguing in this regard because it is widely acknowledged that 
inflation came down under Thatcher, and that, during the brief years of the MTFS, 
interest-rates reached eye-watering highs (Gamble, 1994). Moreover, swingeing 
cuts were made to parts of the public sector (Prasad, 2006). On the face of it, this 
seems like the moment where Britain, having mounted debts for decades, finally 
had to pay up. Yet at the same time it is well known that private debt expanded 
rapidly (Montgomerie, 2015), Thatcher ran repeated budget deficits - pushing up 
the national debt - and financial speculation was opened to masses of the 
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population (Moore, 2014). All of which muddies the clarity of the concept of 
monetary discipline.  
To square this apparent contradiction, the literature (for example Green 
2016; Kerr 2001) relies on the notion that the principle of monetary discipline is one 
that favours creditors and the financial industry more broadly. As such when state 
authorities established and imposed monetary discipline, they also sealed the 
dominance of the creditor class. As I have argued throughout the thesis, this stems 
from a very one-sided reading of debt politics that fails to examine how the 
moneyness of public debt constructs a monetary infrastructure that embeds public 
debt very deeply into the workings of the broader economy. In that sense while it is 
obvious that a creditor would prefer ‘monetary discipline’ to guard against their 
investments being ‘inflated away’, it is much less clear how this discipline would be 
achieved and who would be targeted to secure it. Moreover, equating monetary 
discipline to creditor dominance forces a very narrow reading of the state’s 
involvement. Restoring discipline requires a strong state to construct it, and in that 
sense the state is more than the ‘nightwatchman’ upholder of the laissez-faire 
fantasy of liberal economics. Yet the notion of ‘monetary discipline’ necessitates a 
very stunted kind of state agency. It is rendered in instrumental terms where the 
state acts to service the creditor class. This stems from a deeper shortcoming in the 
conceptualisation of debt politics that I have discussed throughout the thesis. 
Simply, by occluding its monetary aspects, a growing debt becomes necessarily 
unsustainable and monetary discipline, demanded by creditors, the only solution. 
The result is a reification of creditor power that makes it very difficult to understand 
how state action in finance can develop from other pressures and serve other ends 
than those demanded by creditors. Moreover, it occludes how the pursuit of 
monetary discipline will always be refracted through a deeply entrenched monetary 
infrastructure.  
These shortcomings are especially apparent in the literature on financial 
regulatory reform. It is often assumed that the many regulatory changes that took 
place under Thatcher were compelled by the financial sector and served financial 
interests (for example Gamble, 2009; Kirkland, 2015; Hudson, 2013; Peck and 
Tickell, 2007). Moreover, there is a sense that this was both an expression, and a 
further cause, of the state’s subordination to creditor interests. Streeck (2014b), for 
example, argues that monetary discipline and financial deregulation are all part of 
the same process. While literature specialising on the British case sees in 
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Thatcherism the final victory for the City-Bank-Treasury nexus (aided by US 
financiers) that had long dominated British capitalism but was briefly threatened by 
productivist forces after the war second world war (Kerr, 2001; Green, 2013). This 
sense of a financial sector dictating regulatory reform makes it especially difficult to 
understand the reforms to the market for debt management that took place in the 
1980s. The Monetary Control Act of 1980, and Big Bang reforms in 1986, 
transformed the way public debt was sold. They had important implications for the 
way monetary discipline was pursued and, in the case of the Big Bang especially, 
show how the state can act to increase the size and liquidity of the market for its 
debts.  
Both episodes are much studied, often celebrated, and sometimes 
lamented, yet rarely is there any mention of the lasting significance the reforms had 
on the operation of public debt management. Instead critical literature focusses on 
how they helped to establish monetary discipline, impose ‘market rule’, and 
empower Britain’s financial sector. The only thing that separates critical literature 
from the mainstream in this regard is the fact that the former spells out how 
necessary the state was in the construction of this order. It is why critical literature 
on the Big Bang, for example, emphasises how regulation became “far more 
complex” (Cerny, 1991, p. 177) as a result of the reforms and that “freer markets” 
needed “more rules” (Vogel, 1996). What the critical literature does not disturb is 
the mainstream idea about what was constructed through the reforms. Whatever 
the details of the state’s involvement, the outcome remains the same: monetary 
discipline, creditor rule.  
One thing particularly notable in this regard is the way Thatcher’s pursuit of 
monetary discipline and financial regulatory reform is cast - whether for good or bad 
- as a project to re-establish the dominant position of the creditor class and financial 
sector, and London’s role in international finance. In the context of financial 
globalisation, Thatcher responded to the supposed threat of Britain becoming a 
financial backwater. This notion deeply implicates how changes to regulation are 
read. Philip Augar (2000), for example, argues that the Big Bang was driven by the 
worry that British financial houses would be incapable of competing with 
international investment banks in the market for corporate equities. Given that in a 
globalised financial market investors could take their business to wherever 
commission fees were lowest, reform was deemed necessary. Nestled in this 
explanation is the idea that creditors can use markets to exercise their will. By the 
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1980s the character of financial markets had changed to flip the balance of power 
to investors (Laurence, 1996). Where once the sellers of securities could dictate 
terms, the rise of institutional investors now gave market power to the buyers. Their 
capacity to ‘exit’ the market - ie stop buying securities through the exchange - 
overwhelmed the previous small establishment who had relied on their ‘voice’ being 
heard by their close association with regulators (Poser, 1988). As such Thatcher’s 
desire to uphold the wishes of the financial sector, and secure its future, meant 
forcing through regulatory reform.  
Yet in reality the City was never in danger of slipping into irrelevance. It was 
booming in the second half of the 1970s leading up to Thatcher’s appointment 
(Plender, 1986) and the presence of the Euromarkets in London meant the City 
hosted international financial houses in an incredibly modern market. Though the 
Euromarkets were not within the Exchange itself, they were in the City and by 1983 
had deposits in the region of $1,050 billion (Burn, 2006, p. 17). By the 1980s, they 
were also developing into a potent source of corporate finance (Eurobond issues 
reached $150 billion in 1985 (Plender, 1986, p. 43)) and were populated by banks 
from across the developed world (Cassis and Battilossi, 2002, p. 108). Even 
popular commentators at the time recognised that the development of the 
Euromarkets was a ‘Bigger Bang’, than any of the changes made in the 1980s. 
While the Exchange may have shrunk, there was never a question of the City more 
broadly becoming a financial backwater (Plender, 1986). As one prominent 
commentator Tim Congdon (1986) put it: “Today [the City] is the hub of a new and 
vast capital market without rival anywhere. It is surely preposterous to describe the 
City as ‘uncompetitive’.” 
For that reason, it is misleading to think that financial reform was driven by 
the desire of creditors to restore the dominance of Britain’s financial sector. 
Moreover, as always, regulatory reform also targeted particular parts of the financial 
sector, hindering their development and privileging others. The effort to impose 
monetary discipline and the change to the way the Bank Rate was set, was I argue, 
spurred by the desire to find a way to rein in the parallel banking sector. Similarly, 
the Big Bang reform to the Stock Exchange - and the gilts that were sold on it - 
actually spelled the end for many traditional financial houses in Britain who, as I will 
discuss, were overwhelmed by American competitors.  
In that way there is a problem with the notion of monetary discipline, 
because its framing of state action as functioning creditors and financial markets is 
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misleading. After all, what is ultimately at stake in this thesis is conceptualising how 
public debt can be a basis for state power. I would argue that the two reforms 
demand a reassessment of the politics of the debt state and the association of 
Thatcherism with monetary discipline. It is my contention that the effect of the 
Monetary Control Act was to enhance the state’s capacity to react to developments 
on the parallel money markets, while the Big Bang is similarly better conceptualised 
as an example of the state acting to widen the market for its own debts. In making 
this argument I call into question the efficacy of ‘monetary discipline’ as a 
framework for conceptualising the politics of public debt. 
6.2 Monetary Control: Open market operations 
By the start of the 1980s, one of the biggest debt problems that had developed over 
the previous twenty years was not the size of the public debt, per se, but the 
declining role liquid public debt - central bank cash and Treasury Bills specifically – 
played in the provision of liquidity to the broader economy. Since the credit 
revolution and the arrival of new private liquid securities like CDs and Repurchase 
Agreements, banks relied much less on public debt to meet their liquidity positions. 
This was a problem. Not because it threatened a government financing crisis, but 
because it meant the mechanism for setting the Bank Rate - via the discount 
window on the traditional discount market - was by the mid 1970s no longer the 
most relevant rate for short-term liquidity. As the Treasury itself laid out, “liability 
management… can produce large swings in the short-term interest rates [and] 
reduces the ability of the authorities to “fine tune” the money supply” (HMT, 1980, p. 
6), the result of which being the Bank Rate had very little baring on bank lending 
(ibid.). The Bank of England’s monopoly provision of public debt securities through 
the discount window had been one of the most important ways in which public debt 
had been a basis for state power to govern the economy. It was a clear example of 
the way that public debt was used for far more than simply meeting the state’s fiscal 
spending requirements. 
In 1980 there was a major shift in how the Bank Rate was handled. Public 
debt securities were still the basis of setting rates but there was a recognition that 
central bank liquidity did not matter so much anymore. Instead the Bank Rate would 
be set by the Bank of England dealing directly on the bill markets, and no longer 
through the discount window. The rhetoric was about letting ‘markets’ set the price, 
with the Bank adjusting quantities in accordance; but the goal was explicit: better 
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monetary control (Cuthbertson, 1984). This was a process that had been a decade 
in the making, beginning with the botched CCC policy and then taking an important 
turn with the panicked establishment of the MLR policy soon after.  
It can be difficult to capture the broader significance of such technical 
adjustments, particularly when they came shrouded in a language of grand 
ideological claims. Heath had talked of the ‘disengaging of the state’, while 
Thatcher presented all her reforms in the grandiose terms of a historical struggle for 
free markets. Understandably literature examining financial reform in the 1980s is 
fixated with this elevated level of grand abstraction. For that reason, technical 
adjustments seem only part of a broader mission to ‘free markets’ and assert the 
dominance of creditors. My contention is that when examined as part of the 
infrastructure of governance, however, these financial reforms are better 
understood in terms of the power they granted state authorities. The eventual shift 
made with the Monetary Control Act of 1980 did not grant the state power of decree 
in the provision of banking sector liquidity, but as I show in what follows, it did help 
establish some leverage over a financial system that had changed markedly as a 
consequence of the credit revolution.  
Most of the discussion about the Monetary Control Act has focussed on the 
debate it sparked about the choice of monetary aggregate that the authorities 
hoped to control (for example Needham, 2014; Collins, 1988). Was it growth of the 
narrow, central bank monetary base (M1) or the broader money supply, that 
counted all bank liabilities as part of the monetary stock (£M3). Ultimately, despite 
the preference of the monetarist ideologues, £M3 was chosen. There were many 
competing claims over its efficacy, but £M3 had a potency other measures lacked: 
It was controllable. As David Cobham, one of Britain’s leading monetarists wrote 
“the authorities had to believe that they had a technique for controlling the money 
supply as defined in this way (by acting on the various credit counterparts)” 
(Cobham, 2003, p. 28). Though control of the monetary base was considered, and 
stimulated the most discussion in responses to the Monetary Control Green Paper, 
both the monetary authorities and the wider financial sector, accepted that in an 
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environment where wholesale money was more dominant, controlling the monetary 
base was not especially relevant.22 
Perhaps more significantly, the most influential macroeconomic model - that 
developed by Alan Budd and Terrance Burns at the London Business School - had 
a working ‘proof’ of a stable link between £M3 and the PSBR (Kenway, 1994). As 
such £M3 could be controlled by manipulating the PSBR with the model showing 
the precise adjustments needed to public spending and the sale of gilts (which 
acted to reduce £M3) needed to hit the desired targets on monetary control. That 
made it the obvious aggregate to pursue, despite the fact that many of the ‘pure’, 
economic monetarists - including the vocal theorists closest to Thatcher’s 
administration like Milton Friedman, Alan Walters, Patrick Minford and David 
Cobham, and indeed the Treasury itself - all preferred monetary base control 
(Needham, 2014a). Interestingly the Bank of England, which was sceptical about 
monetary targeting in general after the CCC fiasco, much preferred £M3 because it 
would entrench the position of interest rates as the main driver of policymaking 
(Goodhart, 2014b). And this was something that the Bank retained influence over. 
As an aside it is worth recalling how fiscal policy made the Treasury the most 
important public authority in the pursuit of economic governance. The 
transformation towards interest rate control greatly empowered the position of the 
Bank of England, something that has continued up to today. Nonetheless, the 
debate over the chosen aggregate to be controlled is important insofar as it 
demonstrates again the dangers of assessing the significance of Thatcherism, 
monetarism and deregulation in terms of the rhetoric and ideologies of the time. 
There is always a disjuncture between these grand terms and the more prosaic 
matter of making a policy enactable. Which is why my interest in the Monetary 
Control Act lays in the links it forged between the Bank Rate and the wholesale 
money rate.  
The Act did not come from nowhere. I would argue that it is better thought of 
as the culmination of a series of changes stemming from the state’s effort to 
establish interest-rate control of broad liquidity in the economy. Most important in 
this regard is the MLR policy that emerged a year after the chaos unleashed by 
CCC. This was the first move away from using the discount window to set the Bank 
                                                      
22 In Treasury consultations released through a Freedom of Information Act it was 
made clear that monetary base control was thought to be “a redundant step” (in 
Bridgeman, 1980, p. 14). 
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Rate (Burnham, 2011). Instead rates were set in reference to the prices established 
in the weekly Treasury Bill tenders. To recall the discount window set a ceiling on 
the price of liquidity but not a floor. In order to ‘make the Bank Rate effective’ (on 
the discount window) the Bank of England had always had to try and manufacture a 
liquidity shortage in the clearing banks. This it did by issuing Treasury Bills to 
discount houses, who were compelled to buy them, draining the discount houses of 
available cash, which in turn fed back to the clearing banks. The result of which 
was that liquidity could only be borrowed from the Bank of England via the discount 
houses on the discount window, at a decreed interest rate: the Bank Rate (Allen, 
2014). In that sense there was nothing new about the Bank of England’s 
interventionist dealings in Treasury Bills. What did change with the MLR was where 
rates were set. In its Treasury Bill dealings, if the Bank chose only to buy back 
Treasury Bills at low prices, it was able to force short-term interest rates up, 
independently of the ‘discounting’ price for liquidity set by the Bank Rate (ibid.).  
When in October 1972 the MLR policy was announced it involved using this 
capacity more actively. The Bank Rate was going to be tied much closer to the 
rates that prevailed in the previous week’s Treasury Bill tender, though adding 0.5 
per cent and rounding up to the nearest 25 basis points (Needham, 2014a, p. 59). 
The hope was that this would allow for more frequent changes and dampen the 
‘announcement effect’ that happened when changes were made to the (discount 
window) set Bank Rate (ibid.). The move to MLR has often been described as the 
first move in the postwar effort to depoliticise monetary policy (Burnham, 2011), and 
certainly in the effort to disarm the effects of ‘announcement’, and the discussion of 
letting ‘markets’ set rates, it is easy to misconstrue the MLR in this way. But for all 
the reasons I argued in the previous chapter, and the fact that the policy was about 
trying to harness state control of liquidity, it is the wrong way to read the shift. 
Instead, MLR is better thought of as a crucial building block in the transformation of 
liquidity governance that was implemented more fully by Thatcher’s government in 
the Monetary Control Act of 1980.  
The Act followed another significant regulatory change, the relaxing of 
controls on the international movement of capital in retail banking that Thatcher 
introduced shortly after taking power in 1979 (Bank of England, 1982). The result of 
which was to allow banks to raise money overseas, and companies and individuals 
to borrow and save overseas without additional government charges. In an instant 
this brought to a close the relevance of the Supplementary Special Deposits 
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scheme (commonly known as ‘the corset’) that had for the previous six years acted 
as a control on bank asset growth (Moran, 1983). Introduced in December 1973 in 
the midst of the CCC fiasco it compelled clearing banks to deposit a proportion of 
their non interest-bearing cash with the Bank of England and in doing so inhibited 
growth of banks’ interest-baring liabilities, in an effort to stem the supply of clearing 
banks’ loanable funds, and tackle the problem of round tripping (HMT, 1980, p. 5). 
The existence of the corset spoke to the problems presented by the credit 
revolution that had undermined the capacity of central bank interest rates to control 
general financial activity. The corset rule, however, by forcing clearers to keep 
some cash at the Bank of England, restricted their ability to bid for funds, limiting 
the growth of their balance sheets, and curtailing lending (Reid, 2003, p. 52). Yet, 
as the monetary authorities were well aware, this only encouraged customers to 
look beyond the clearing banks. As such the corset encouraged disintermediation. 
And once capital controls were lifted, the corset made little sense because 
customers could easily borrow from foreign banks anyway. In that sense, ending 
corset control was as much about reviving the influence of the Bank of England’s as 
it was about freeing financial markets. Yet even if the corset was removed, there 
remained the issue of how to make the Bank Rate effective in a world where 
wholesale finance was more important than public debt for meeting liquidity 
positions.  
The Green Paper on monetary control (HMT, 1980) outlined that interest 
rates would no longer be managed through the discount window, but instead would 
take place through open market operations. Under the new system, which was 
implemented in August 1981, it was said that the monetary authorities would ‘let 
markets dictate interest rates’. A more revealing description would be that the Bank 
would bring money market rates and the Bank Rate into closer proximity. As the 
Bank of England (1980, p. 428) wrote its “operations would be broadly intended to 
offset daily cash flows between the Bank and the money markets”. The new system 
worked like this: At the beginning of the week the clearing banks would submit an 
estimation of their cash needs for the following week. If there was an expected cash 
shortage, the Bank would buy Treasury bills outright, flooding clearers with liquidity. 
If the clearers expect there to be a surplus, however, the Bank would buy bills on 
the expectation of selling them back when the surplus arrives. The Bank did this 
within a general target for very short-term interest rates, refusing to buy bills at 
certain prices, in a similar manner to the MLR policy. But no longer would the Bank 
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try to manufacture a shortage of liquidity by over-issuing Treasury Bills at the 
weekly tender (Wood, 1983, p. 111). 
These interest rate targets weren’t published, heightening the impression 
that they were set more by ‘market interaction’ than discretion by the Bank 
(Burnham, 2011). As part of this shift, and in recognition of the declining relevance 
of central bank liquidity, there was a move away from reserve ratio control towards 
a more general emphasis on capital adequacy (Gardener, 1983). As such under the 
new system the 12.5 per cent reserve asset requirement was dropped, and the rule 
where the clearing banks had to maintain a 1.5 per cent cash balance at the Bank 
was also discarded (Collins, 1988, p. 508). The move away from reserve 
requirements came from a recognition, again, that central bank liquidity mattered 
less in an era of liability management and wholesale finance (Bridgeman, 1980b). 
In part this was a consequence of the interlinking loans the parallel money market 
had developed, which meant developing “prudential tests” that “look at the liquidity 
of the system as a whole, as well as the liquidity of an individual institution which 
might be relying substantially on assets at other banks” (Bridgeman, 1980b, p. 7).  
The only direct requirement established through the Monetary Control Act 
was the necessity of all deposit taking financial houses, including but no longer 
limited to the clearers, to hold a small proportion of cash reserves (0.5 per cent) 
with the Bank of England (which it used for its daily operations). In order to make 
the new system of open market operations function, banks also had submit to the 
Bank of England statistics on retail deposits (M2) (Cuthbertson, 1984, p. 58). The 
hope was that in acquiring this data the Bank would be better placed to make the 
crucial calculation of the broad monetary stock, the total liabilities of the banking 
system (£M3) which was the monetary target around which Thatcher organised the 
MTFS. In that sense though the Thatcher administration was keen to emphasise a 
‘deregulating’ ideal guiding the changes, it is clear that central control was still 
being enhanced. Certainly the Bank was very clear that once the corset had ended, 
interest rates were the only (imperfect) means through which to act out monetary 
policy (Goodhart, 1989).  
The move from the MLR to open market operations was important in two 
ways in particular. Firstly, the unpublicised targets solved, for a while, the problem 
the authorities faced by the ever growing politicisation of interest rates and allowed 
for more frequent short-term changes to be carried out. Second, and maybe even 
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more significantly, it also helped the base rate to move more quickly in line with the 
rates banks accessed wholesale money (Cuthbertson, 1984, p. 59).  
Throughout this period of financial reform, and indeed through the decade 
that had preceded it, monetary policy had been articulated in terms of the need to 
‘keep prices steady’, and bring about a permanent reduction in inflation (Gamble, 
1994). It is for this reason that ‘monetary discipline’ is so often associated with 
Thatcher’s financial reforms. On the basis of a (as it turned out unfounded) 
assumption that inflation came from growth in the monetary stock, targets were 
established for £M3 to which interest rates were supposed to adjust. Notionally the 
idea was that this would help guard against ‘expectations’ of future price rises 
(Keegan, 1984). This, in turn, could provide a link between the target-driven Bank 
Rate and the longer-term rates on the gilt market. One of the major problems, 
identified by the Monetary Control Green Paper (1980), was that the newly 
speculative gilt market had combined with monetary control targets to deepen 
volatility. This is because if £M3 grows faster than the target range, gilt investors 
would expect future interest rates to rise and would, as a result, hold back from 
buying gilts, because they would wait for the better terms they predicted were soon 
to be offered. This would force greater Treasury Bill issues (to finance the national 
debt) and accelerate the growth of the money supply (£M3) and increase liquidity. 
As such, a stop-start irregularity developed in the gilt market.  
Nonetheless, the authorities hoped the new era, where frequent adjustments 
to the Bank Rate through open market operations would rapidly adjust rates across 
the board in line with targets on monetary growth, would “strengthen confidence in 
effective monetary control, and so could encourage greater long-term stability in the 
gilt-edged market” (HMT, 1980, p. 13). Underlying this is the belief that long-term 
interest rates could be brought down - or at least demand for long-term government 
borrowing stabilised - through monetary discipline because investors would no 
longer have to worry about their holdings being ‘inflated’ away. Yet the question 
remained over how short-term rates, which the Bank tried to shape through its 
actions with Treasury Bills, and long-term yields on the gilt market, really related. 
Certainly the aspiration to target £M3 - even if that aspiration was routinely 
unfulfilled - meant trying to move away from funding the debt through the Treasury 
Bills and relying more on the gilt market (Goodhart, 1989). At the same time, this 
new emphasis on constantly varying short-term interest rates made the gilt market 
less stable. There was, as I discussed in the previous chapter, widespread 
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recognition that the operation of the gilt market needed to reform to make the 
market for gilts bigger and more liquid. This was achieved through the second 
regulatory change that this chapter examines, the Big Bang reforms of 1986. 
6.3 The ‘Big Bang’: Remaking the gilt market 
The financial reforms of the 1980s are often discussed in terms of how they helped 
to establish monetary discipline and further the interests of Britain’s financial sector. 
Yet narrowing the view and instead considering how the reforms affected the 
state’s capacity to manage liquidity, shifts our understanding of their impacts and 
their importance. It becomes possible to argue that moving to a system that set the 
Bank Rate through open market operations on the bill market helped the Bank of 
England adjust interest rates more quickly to developments on the wholesale 
money markets. Nonetheless there remained the second problem with the 
operation of public debt management. Namely the incapacity of the gilt market to 
cope in the new era of monetary targeting.  
Gilt troubles 
By 1980 Britain’s outstanding gross debt was £95.3 billion (Nield, 2012). It had 
been four years since the country was forced to seek IMF help and the economy 
was suffering under the strain of Thatcher’s failed attempt to bring money creation 
under control. The operation of the gilt market had been under intense pressure 
since the CCC changes that withdrew Bank of England support for the gilt market 
and made gilt investors especially attuned to the behaviour of government policy 
(Thomas, 1986). At a time when finance had been profoundly changed by the 
presence of American financial conglomerates and their use of liability 
management as part of the credit revolution, the operation of the gilt market 
seemed caught in another age.  
This mattered. As the Wilson committee (1980) reported just after Thatcher 
took power, the traditional gilt market was no longer fit for purpose. Selling gilts was 
a delicate operation which had also been transformed by the changing landscape of 
investors. Since the 1950s, institutional investors had grown in size and with 
traditionally long-term portfolios they were a key participant in the gilt market. By 
1979 pension and life assurance funds held £4.6 billion of long-dated (15-years or 
more) gilts, what amounted to 65 per cent of the entire market (Wilson Committee, 
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1980, p. 181). The volatility in the market that, as I have discussed, emerged with 
the move towards interest-rate based governance of the macroeconomy meant the 
authorities were searching for solutions. Though they had confidence that the 
market structure could ensure new issues would be sold when general conditions 
were favourable, they were far less sanguine about the prospects for gilt sales in 
conditions of uncertainty and at times of inflation. The early 1980s especially, was 
such a time, and, as the Wilson report lays out, the authorities were unsure 
investors would subscribe to new gilt issues and in that sense were fearful of a 
looming crisis in government financing. This was all the more pressing because 
Thatcher had committed to tax cuts for high income earners and was overseeing a 
recession that forced higher social security spending. Described in the Wilson 
report was the view of the monetary authorities that the instability on the gilt market 
could be resolved with a system that was able to undertake large issues (Wilson 
Committee, 1980, p. 182). This, as I discussed in the previous chapter, was 
however limited by the relatively small size and tiny capitalisation of the jobber firms 
that arranged gilt sales on the London Stock Exchange. It is worth remembering 
that this presented a problem for hopes of monetary control because the gilts that 
went unsold were taken onto the Bank’s balance sheet (through the Issue 
Department) in exchange for Treasury Bills. This left the Bank’s overall asset size 
unchanged (Goodhart, 2012, p. 124) but swelled the number of Treasury Bills in the 
financial system, driving credit creation at precisely the time Thatcher’s regime had 
committed to bringing it down. The authorities were, once again, in a bind of trying 
to meet seemingly contradictory objectives. At once they wanted to control the 
money supply, borrow more, and maintain liquidity in the gilt market. This was the 
situation the monetary authorities confronted in 1980s, and the solution that was 
really needed was a fundamental overhaul of the mechanism through which gilts 
were sold. It was thought that moving to a tendering system for gilt sales, could 
resolve some of the tensions. As Tony Coleby, who was head of the gilt-edged 
division at the Bank of England, outlined: 
“The most coherent alternative to our existing way of operating was to 
move to a system based on the auction technique, but that would not have 
provided a quick fix because it needed to be set up as a comprehensive 
programme” (in LSR, 2006, p. 8). 
Under the existing arrangement gilts were issued on both the primary and 
secondary market at prices set by the Bank, with investors dictating yields. Under a 
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possible tender system, the Bank would announce its intention to issue a certain 
volume of securities to be taken up on a particular date (or over a given period), 
and investors would determine both the price and yield at which they were prepared 
to buy them (Wilson Committee, 1980). Indeed, the idea was not new to Britain. 
The Bank had introduced a form of partial tender in 1979 where new gilt issues 
were announced with a minimum tender price that was set in line with market 
yields. One of the boons of the 1979 change was that it secured the monetary 
authorities any gain from a potential improvement in investor sentiment that 
occurred between the announcement of the issue (and its terms) and the date for 
its subscription (ibid.). While useful this was not sufficient (and nor was its intention) 
to smooth the path of sales in the new era of volatility, and whenever investors 
proved unwilling, the Bank would be in the same position of having to absorb the 
unsold issues and open the ‘tap’ of Treasury Bills in the usual way. Put simply, the 
authorities could not at once stipulate a minimum price, while at the same time 
hope to guarantee the sale of a set amount of gilts. There was always the problem 
that, even if they could, investors would only enter a tender at prices so low, and 
yields so high, that the cost of government financing would be too big to bear. As 
such the promise of a reformed system was to guard against this danger by having 
tenders be underwritten at near market prices. This would allow the Bank much 
larger issues, for example six months’ worth of gilts at a time, with clear 
announcements, and would ensure no alarms and no surprises. This would ensure 
smooth sales, in the sense that a price would always be found to sell all the gilts 
(ibid.). This would be better suited to the new post CCC environment where 
investor action in the gilt market was based more closely on an assessment of what 
government policy would imply for future rate changes.  
The monetary authorities clearly favoured change. Alongside Coleby, 
quoted earlier, and the Wilson report mentioned above, chancellor Nigel Lawson 
wrote to Thatcher in October 1980: “We need to discuss not only short-term interest 
rates and the banking system, but also methods of funding and the possibilities of 
smoothing the path of public sector borrowing” (7A-174-6 f.179, Margaret Thatcher 
Foundation Archive).  
While there was, in that sense, consensus about the need to overhaul the 
market and move towards an auction system, there were doubts over the capacity 
of the existing market to handle such a change. To recall, the gilt market was 
dominated by two jobber firms that accounted for nearly 80 per cent of its sales 
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(Kerr, 1986), and neither was well capitalised enough to take on the large issues 
needed to make a tender system work in the way the authorities desired. “My 
judgment,” said Coleby (in LSR, 2006, p. 7), “which was widely shared in the Bank, 
was that we did not have a compatible structure… the [feature being] an absence of 
a body of strong, well-capitalised, market-making intermediaries who were the core 
players in an… auction method.”  
The problem facing the gilt market was two fold. Firstly, the monetary 
authorities could never be sure that gilt tenders would be fully subscribed, which 
meant it continually had to take on issues itself and open the taps for Treasury Bills. 
Second, and related, the solution to the above problem - a tender system - was 
curtailed by the fact that the apparatus through which gilts were sold on the 
Exchange was limited because of the dominance of small, lightly-capitalised British 
financial houses.  
Neither of these issues could be articulated in the brute terms of the 
necessity of monetary discipline or the imperatives of creditors. Both, however, 
threw up a significant issue in the operation of monetary policy. In examining the 
monetary infrastructure through which governance takes place, the Big Bang 
reforms, as I will show, take on a different significance. It was not monetary 
discipline nor the promotion of the financial sector that drove the reforms, but rather 
was the dilemmas of the gilt market. To even try to enact monetary policy in the 
way it wanted, the state needed to open up new avenues of debt management. 
The roots of deregulation 
Bound up with the idea of Thatcher’s imposition of monetary discipline is that it 
promoted creditor interests and those of the financial sector more broadly. This 
colours how financial regulatory reform is understood, in particular with the Big 
Bang which is often depicted as an iconic example of Thatcher’s deregulatory zeal 
(for example Rogers, 2014). Yet the desire to reform the London Stock Exchange - 
on which gilts were sold - actually emerged in the second half of the 1970s, when 
the Labour party was in power (Vogel, 1996). Though the economy at large was 
suffering in the 1970s - and would ultimately lead to the Labour party’s expulsion 
from government - the City itself was booming (Plender, 1986). The fact the City 
could prosper seemingly independently of the rest of the nation was something that 
frustrated Labour MPs and, as such, when the City was beset by a raft of insider 
trading scandals, the Labour government was keen to force through reform (Kerr, 
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1986). This meant that at just the time when the Bank was first trying to find ways to 
better manage the tensions on the gilt market, the Labour government instigated an 
OFT case against the London Stock Exchange (Kandiah, 1999). The body’s officers 
had visited regulators in America and Canada and found they were able to draw on 
an electronic audit trail that could never have happened under the structure of 
London’s Exchange (ibid.).  
When Thatcher defeated Labour in the 1979 election the pressure on her 
newly-formed government to do something about the City was heightened by the 
Wilson report’s call for change to the organisation of the Exchange. Importantly for 
Thatcher, however, the report also insisted that OFT action was not the best 
solution to the City’s problems, and the Conservative government was only too 
happy to oblige and drop the case (Moran, 1990). Instead, Thatcher and her trade 
and industry secretary Cecil Parkinson, bargained for a promise to open up the 
Exchange and this created the space to overhaul the market in the way any move 
to a tender system would require. As such in July 1983 it was announced in the 
House of Commons that the jobber-broker split would not continue, and in April 
1984 the full details of the changes to be made to the Stock Exchange were 
announced in its Discussion Paper (1984).  
“The Stock Exchange has... clear objectives in designing and developing a 
new market structure,” wrote the Discussion Paper (1984, p. 8). “The system of 
dealing must aim for the best possible level of liquidity or depth of market and 
wherever possible to provide continuous two-way trading.” To achieve this there 
were four commitments laid out: first, a deeply capitalised market system to ensure 
liquidity; second, admission of outside houses; third, a system that served large and 
small investors - wholesale and retail; fourth, the gilt market remaining an integral 
part of the Exchange. 
Given the monetary authorities’ frustration with the lack of capitalisation of 
British houses, and the plan to open up the Exchange to foreign firms, it was clear 
to people organising the reforms that there would follow a great period of instability. 
At the time Lawson correctly foresaw that “[t]here would be strong pressures on 
British-owned businesses from American and Japanese competition” (in Pickard 
and Thompson, 2014). Once the Discussion Paper set out the changes and date 
for the Big Bang there was a flurry of merger and acquisition activity as financial 
houses tried to prepare for the inevitable onslaught that Lawson was eluding to. 
Banks that had previously had very little experience of both sides of securities 
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dealing (jobbing and brokering) joined together, with brokers especially gaining 
enormously. In the buyout boom that occurred between the announcement in 1984, 
and the implementation of the changes in 1986, 750 millionaires were created as 
old, partnership firms were paid off in deals where selling prices vastly outstretched 
the real worth of the firms’ equity (Augar, 2000, p. 81). This story of mass buyouts 
and the introduction of American ‘culture’ to the London dealing rooms - alongside 
the new electronic trading screens - dominates memory of the reform. But often 
overlooked is the extent to which the gilt market after the Big Bang barely 
resembled what had gone before. 
By viewing this transformation of the gilt market in terms of the desire to 
resolve the tension between government debt management and its effort at 
monetary control, it is possible to move towards an understanding of the reforms 
that do not resort to standard critical accounts based on the abstract template of 
‘monetary discipline’ or ‘market-rule’ and the promotion of the financial sector. 
After the Big Bang 
The history above should challenge the way in which we understand the 
significance of Thatcher’s ‘monetary discipline’. The very idea that Thatcher 
restored monetary discipline is founded on the principle that excessive public debt 
is unsustainable and that it demands a resolution which inhibits the state’s room for 
manoeuvre and empowers creditors and the financial sector. It is on this basis that 
Thatcher’s legacy as a pro-finance prime minister is founded. Yet when the reforms 
are examined from a perspective that sees public debt securities as crucial to the 
infrastructure of governance, the reforms take on a different light. It becomes clear 
that it is insufficient to assert that the reforms were about the state ‘establishing the 
City as a financial centre’ or ‘forcing capital to be free’ in the pursuit of monetary 
discipline. Rather, the state’s own interest becomes clear. The state, as a debtor, 
needed to find ways to better manage the national debt so as to make possible an 
alternative monetary policy, and the Exchange was a key site where it could 
exercise its agency.  
As I now outline, by remaking the rules of the Exchange, the Big Bang 
substantially changed the gilt market’s operations, widening the market for long-
term British public debt, and deepening its liquidity. In that way the reforms 
empowered the British state. Previously, two jobbers dominated nearly 80 per cent 
of the market. After the reforms there were 27 (Bank of England, 2013). Whereas 
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previously British companies ruled, now American banks joined too. The effect was 
to deepen capitalisation in the market and widen the network of possible buyers of 
gilts (Bank of England, 1984), which together extended their marketability beyond 
recognition.  
One crucial change was replacing the single-capacity system with new 
integrated financial houses. Previously, the brokering role for gilts was separated 
from the jobbing role with different firms managing each. The Big Bang worked to 
unite these two aspects into newly formed Gilt Edged Market Makers (GEMMs). 
These are firms that purchase gilts directly from the Bank and sell them directly 
onto their own clients. In this way the trading and sales of gilts worked in a single 
operation (Bank of England, 1989). For the newly registered GEMMs - which now 
included the likes of Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan and Salomon Brothers - this 
meant the Bank would originate and tender a variety of different gilts and the 
GEMMs would fix their price by buying them at a certain rate of their choosing 
before selling them on (ibid.). The direct access these GEMMs had to the Bank 
meant that after two hundred years there was no longer intermediation provided 
through the Government Broker.  
Moreover, now the whole set of GEMMs were granted the technical and 
fiscal privileges enjoyed only by a very limited number of gilt-edged jobbers 
previously (Thomas, 1986, p. 72). Before the reforms the two big gilt jobbers had 
the unspoken privilege of borrowing from the Bank. In the restructured gilt market 
this lending facility was codified and made available to all 27 GEMMs. These 
GEMMs, as I mentioned, were not narrow banks specialising in gilt trading either. 
They were high street names and international investment houses (Bank of 
England 1989). It meant that a large group of big financial houses had direct 
backing from the Bank. This was money that could be borrowed on a secured 
basis, and was available at the initiative of the GEMMs themselves when their 
routine sources of financing were not available. Though of course they rarely 
needed it, the implicit promise of support meant that the GEMMs were able to raise 
cash from other sources on better terms (Thomas 1986, p. 76). It is precisely why 
when the plans for the reforms were announced and the Bank sent out a call for 
applications to become GEMMs over 50 firms initially expressed an interest. 
Though in the end 27 were taken on, they all agreed that they would be prepared to 
take on larger amounts of gilts than ever before. As the Bank of England (1989, p. 
49) wrote three years later, when evaluating the ‘gilt-edged market since the Big 
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Bang’, “the new structure [was] successful in providing a continual and liquid 
market for investors and official operations.” 
The result was a massive increase in capitalisation in the market. Whereas 
previously the capital of the gilt-edged jobbers was estimated at around £100 
million, the capital of the 27 GEMMs amounted to £595 million, and by 1989 stood 
at £610 million (Bank of England 1989, p. 51). This large capital base is what 
allowed the GEMMs to absorb much larger issues of gilts, and their international 
client base meant finding customers proved not to be a problem. Even on other 
measures of liquidity the new market structure proved more sophisticated. Turnover 
of gilts increased from around £1 billion a day before the Big Bang to around £4 
billion a day by 1989 (ibid.). This was in large part because the bigger pool of 
GEMMs traded with each other but there was also a big increase in customer 
turnover. Investors, of course, gained through the end of fixed commissions, with a 
reduction in wholesale costs of almost 60 per cent (ibid.). These lower costs for 
investors meant they were more willing to take on gilts at lower margins, cutting 
spreads in half, this despite the number of deals increasing (ibid.).  
This may sound like arcane intricacies when set against grand theoretical 
debates about the ‘debt state’ but in such detail theoretical clarity lies. The great 
expansion in liquidity of government securities and the great swell in the size of the 
gilt market meant that the monetary authorities were able to construct policy 
differently. As I outlined in the previous chapter, managing liquidity through 
variations in interest rate was ineffective previously, because debt financing through 
Treasury Bills only served to increase the broad money supply. After the reforms, if 
the Bank wanted to reduce liquidity in the financial system, it was able to sell gilts 
on a much greater scale to non-banks, and in this way “exert some control on broad 
money growth by absorbing from the non-bank private sector liquidity created by 
bank credit” (Allen, 2012a, p. 25). The problem of having to ‘lean into the wind’ and 
manage the pace of gilt sales - which was impossible in the old system where 
brokers and jobbers could not underwrite government auction of gilts - was 
resolved by the new dealing mechanism that Bank of England insiders had longed 
for in the 1970s. 
It is well established that public debt is the life blood of government. Yet too 
often the state’s indebtedness is depicted as its key weakness. This is because by 
occluding the monetary aspects of public debt, and the monetary infrastructure that 
is created through it, means critical literature on debt is often anchored on the idea 
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that the growth of public debt is unsustainable. As such critical accounts unfold 
from the perspective of creditors and their presumed interests to whom the state is 
supposedly dependent. From here it is very difficult to see how the state can use 
the monetary infrastructure to empower itself. This is very clear in the case of the 
1980s financial reforms. These, on the face of it, look a typical neoliberal pro-
market restructuring of the City of London, but they actually had key implications for 
public finance and empowered the state by broadening the market for public debt. 
Conclusion 
The operation of public finance in Britain is deeply intertwined with the governance 
of the broader economy as a whole. For that reason, examination of how the state 
raises debt and manages liquidity provides a crucial vantage point from which to 
reconsider the importance of Thatcherite monetary reform. Doing so allowed me to 
show the precise interest the state had in the reforms, and in that way capture the 
agency of the state that is easily lost in the notion of ‘monetary discipline’ that is 
usually ascribed to Thatcher.  
Through revisiting two key reforms, the Monetary Control Act of 1980 and 
the Financial Services Act of 1986 - the ‘Big Bang’ - I showed how financial reform 
can be better understood in terms of the state’s struggle to build the capacity for 
debt governance. The Monetary Control Act transformed the way the Bank Rate 
was set, allowing rates to adjust more rapidly to developments on wholesale 
markets, while the Big Bang reformed the London Stock Exchange and its biggest 
component, the market for long-term government debt. As such the size and 
liquidity of the gilt market expanded greatly, resolving the problems that had built up 
in the gilt market since the CCC experiment. 
In doing so I outlined how the state, through the postwar years, continued to 
find ways to use public debt securities as a basis for its power. Though public debt 
is nearly always presented as a grave problem and threat to the state and the 
sovereignty of government the chapter and those that preceded it demonstrated 
how the moneyness of debt muddies the creditor imperative and means constantly 
growing debt does not necessarily spell disaster for a government. Instead the 
British monetary authorities have long used monetised public debt for their own 
ends, so deeply institutionalising the process that the threat of unsustainability has 
almost been muted altogether. In that sense by acknowledging its monetary aspect, 
‘the problem of debt’ is transformed. Sophisticated governance of the liquidity of 
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public debt has allowed the British state to amass vast public debts, whose final 
repayment has been delayed indefinitely (Sgambati, 2016). The public debt 
originated when the Bank of England was first formed sat on its balance sheets for 
three hundred years, and the £1 trillion national debt the British state has currently 
amassed is only set to grow (Keep, 2016). This should force us to reconsider how 
we examine debt politics. 
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Conclusion 
The capacity of the state to issue its debt as money in England underpinned its 
great rise as an economic power and established a unique trajectory to its political 
economic development. From this ground - one that recognises the moneyness of 
debt - this thesis has cast the politics of public finance, and the politics of the British 
‘debt state’ in particular, into a new light. This is because the challenge of managing 
public finance is transformed by the monetary aspects of debt. The issue becomes 
less about the steps the state must take to attract investor interest and more about 
governing the monetary infrastructure through which the state relates to the broader 
economy. This insight provided the platform for this thesis to break out of the 
paradigm of creditor dominance and in doing so provided a deeper understanding 
of the emergence of neoliberal financial governance in postwar Britain and the role 
of the state in its construction. 
The central claim of the thesis is that the British state has never been a 
passive recipient of the agenda of creditors when it has raised public debt. 
Precisely because of its monetary dimensions, raising public debt has been very 
productive for the power of the state. It made financing easy to access and more 
importantly established a monetary infrastructure through which the broader 
economy could be manipulated. For this reason, the massive public debt racked up 
by the British state at no point resulted in it becoming a mere instrument of the 
power of creditors. In making that claim I established an alternative understanding 
of the emergence of neoliberal financial governance in Britain. The reforms to the 
financial sector that took place through the 1970s and 1980s are often taken to be 
both a cause and a symptom of the declining power of the state to forge its own 
monetary history. Neoliberalism, in that sense, is often depicted as the 
consequence of the growing ability of creditors acting on financial markets to 
discipline a subordinated debtor state, bending government policies to their will. Yet 
through this thesis I have instead shown how central the British state’s own 
interests were to shaping the way it constructed neoliberal financial reforms. 
In doing so this thesis made a methodological, conceptual and historical 
contribution. Methodologically, I constructed a historical framework of inquiry 
capable of capturing the moneyness of debt. This meant examining how public debt 
acquired the ability to serve as money and how this established an infrastructure 
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through which the state was able to use public debt to govern the economy. It was 
this framework that allowed for the conceptual contribution, establishing an 
alternative reading of the relationship between public debt and neoliberalism. I 
showed how public debt is not necessarily constraining, but instead worked to 
empower the British state. As a result, rather than pin neoliberal financial 
governance to the interests of creditors and the power they wield through financial 
markets, I showed how central the interest and role of the state remains.  
When instead the question of public debt is recast in full recognition of its 
monetary aspect, the political implications are transformed. The state does not 
have to constantly struggle for ways to appear attractive to investors, and as such 
the historical trajectory of the institutions of monetary governance is much more 
contingent. This makes it possible to grasp how the British state has long had the 
capacity to continually amass public debt, well beyond the levels where any 
prospect of repayment is feasible. I showed, in that sense, how the examination of 
public debt cannot depart from the problem of solvency, but instead must explore 
how the state tries to govern the liquidity of its debt.  
To make this argument meant tracing how the difficulty of coming to terms 
with the Financial Revolution, and the way it provided the English state an ability to 
issue its debt as money, led the literature on debt and public finance to occlude the 
monetary dimensions of public debt. As such, accounts about the historical 
development of monetary governance in Britain are often anchored by an 
assumption that growing public debt is unsustainable and presents a problem that 
the state is constantly striving to overcome. The result is that the historical 
development of institutions of public finance are depicted as driven by the need to 
solve the ‘credibility’ problem, an issue that is posed from the perspective of 
creditors, making it very difficult to account for the state’s own interest. 
When instead the question of public debt is recast in full recognition of its 
monetary aspect, the political implications are transformed. The state does not 
have to constantly struggle for ways to appear attractive to investors, and as such 
the historical trajectory of the institutions of monetary governance is more 
contingent.  
From this basis I made a historical contribution through the thesis, 
demonstrating how the British monetary authorities developed the means to grow 
and service public debt and the way in which public debt securities were used to 
govern the economy. In the second chapter, I outlined how the Financial Revolution 
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set British public finance on a unique trajectory. I traced how public debt acquired 
monetary features and showed the way its gradual institutionalisation into the 
political economy over the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries laid the foundations 
for the Keynesian revolution in economic governance after the second world war. I 
demonstrated in the third chapter how Keynesianism marked a shift in the 
understanding of the state’s relationship to debt. Recognition of its moneyness 
allowed the state to treat debt as a tool of economic governance, rather than a 
problem to be avoided. In that sense Keynes can be thought of as helping to found 
a monetary revolution in policymaking, rather than just the fiscal policies with which 
he is often associated. For that reason, I argued that the Keynesian revolution 
marked a major shift in the paradigm of public finance. After the second world war it 
had been accepted that public debt could indeed continue to grow, and pay for 
itself, provided it was used to harness productive investment. The levels of public 
debt grew greatly after the war but coincided with a growing economy. 
This Keynesian regime of governance was, however, undermined by 
innovations in private sector finance. American banks, who first came to operate on 
London’s Euromarkets in the late 1950s, brought with them an emerging practice of 
liability management which, as it developed through the 1960s and early 1970s in 
Britain, helped private banks treat their own debts as money. The result was a 
dramatic expansion in the levels of credit through the early 1970s, something that 
undermined the mechanics of liquidity control that the British monetary authorities 
had established. As a result, the monetary aspects of debt had now become a 
problem for the state. The fiscal boundary was recast as a monetary limit. 
The 1970s shift in the political economy of finance has often been 
expressed in terms of a deregulation of finance, or a move to market-based 
governance. Yet by revisiting the credit revolution in the fourth chapter I provided a 
way of grounding the shift in terms of a particular financial practice, that of liability 
management. The advantage of doing so is that it helps connect the great 
expansion in finance to the monetary infrastructure that was already in place, 
showing how the credit revolution took place by using the institutions of Keynesian 
governance rather than destroying them. Nonetheless, the credit revolution did 
demand a response. To govern successfully the state needed to transform its 
capacity to guide liquidity when much credit was being created outside of its 
operations of public debt. 
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In the final two chapters I looked at the state’s role in the construction of 
neoliberal financial governance. I demonstrated how growing public debt did not 
bring about a depoliticisation of monetary governance and an erosion of the 
discretionary power of the state, but rather a reconciliation with the tensions that 
had built up over the previous decades. The financial reforms of the 1970s and 
1980s worked to greatly expand the size and liquidity of the market for its own debt. 
In that sense, the mode of governance was transformed with the state enhancing 
its capacity to govern the broad economy through indirect management of liquidity. 
None of this was planned before hand and simply put into practice, either by the 
state or by the creditors who financed its growing debts. Rather this was a capacity 
that emerged out of the monetary authorities’ often failed attempts to address 
specific problems they were confronting. 
The capacity the state developed to manage the rhythms of liquidity creation 
only grew after the 1980s. As private credit exploded over the years of the Great 
Moderation and the parallel banking sector - or shadow banking as it was to 
become – grew ever more important to the global political economy, the position of 
public debt securities evolved once again. There is an emerging literature 
examining the way in which public debt has established itself as the final backstop 
of liquidity (for example Gabor and Vestergaard, 2016). This is because in a highly 
leveraged financial system, where sophisticated securitisation on both the asset 
and liability side of bank balance sheets has made risk very difficult to manage, 
public debt securities - particularly US Treasury Bills and UK gilts - are crucial. This 
has allowed both countries to pile on the debt despite running significant budget 
and trade deficits, at the same time as achieving anaemic levels of economic 
growth. This is all the more extraordinary in Britain given the scarce relevance of 
sterling as an international currency for trade. Such is the strength of the investor 
demand for UK public debt that the state has been able to shape the market with 
the QE policy that sees the Bank of England print its own money to buy its own 
debt issues, lowering both the cost of public debt and interest rates more broadly, 
while helping to inflate the assets on which further private borrowing is secured. 
Moreover, the money it has created has allowed the Bank of England’s Asset 
Purchasing Facility to amass a huge volume of assets for itself on which it is now 
making a profit (Bank of England 2016). 
Monetary governance has been the British state’s primary response to 
repeated financial crises and the concurrent stagnation of economic growth over 
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the last two decades. Whatever the attention given to growing public deficits in 
recent years, the level of public debt continues to rise. This irrevocable relationship 
the state has with the market economy is pivotal to the dynamics of contemporary 
neoliberalism. This is apparent in the connection between monetary policy and the 
system of debt-based growth that defines Britain’s political economy. The call by 
some critical voices that a reshaped QE could be mobilised to redistribute wealth 
and promote a more progressive British political economy is a timely recognition of 
both how deeply embedded monetary relations are in the everyday functioning of 
Britain’s economy, and the possible opportunities this provides. To realise these 
opportunities will require broader progressive politics to shift out of its habitual focus 
on fiscal policy. The infrastructure by which debt comes to serve as money and the 
political economic implications this holds for the state in particular must be 
examined more concretely. 
One of the fundamental problems with contemporary analysis of the politics 
of finance is the way creditors are depicted as all-powering masters of the universe. 
This presents a major hurdle to progressive politics. By recasting the neoliberal turn 
in monetary governance in a way that captured how the state has been empowered 
through its use of public debt, this thesis provided a new perspective on the politics 
of public finance. States are not at the mercy of faceless creditors: there is an 
infrastructure in place that can and must be turned to progressive use. 
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